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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate the design of payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
for climate regulation service provided by agriculture. The research provides a 
better understanding of how agroecosystems can contribute towards meeting the 
UK’s targets to reduce GHG emissions. The research comprised of three main 
stages. Stage 1 explicitly models the effect of climate change on land use change 
decisions and its subsequent effect on climate regulatory service provided by 
agriculture, under high and low emission scenarios defined by the UK Climate 
Impacts Programme for the period 2004-2060. This includes a comprehensive study 
of the contribution of the UK farmlands towards GHG emissions, from both changes 
in carbon stocks and changes in annual flows as a result of predicted land use 
change due to climate change. Stage 2 evaluates PES scheme design for farmers’ 
willingness to contribute towards enhancing the climate regulation as an 
environmental service. This stage employed Choice Experiment to elicit farmers’ 
choices for two potential payment scenarios, designed for both arable and livestock 
farmers. It was found, in general, that farmers have a strong aversion to drastic 
changes in land use management; however, flexibility in certain scheme attributes 
and appropriate compensations can help to attract farmers. Stage 3 includes a 
carbon abatement cost analysis for the two potential schemes and provides spatial 
pattern of the carbon costs through PES schemes across UK. Marginal Abatement 
Carbon Costs were estimated by calculating the price of reductions in carbon 
emissions as a result of the adoption of alternative payment schemes. Furthermore, 
spatial analysis was conducted to provide a linkage between the cost of carbon 
mitigation and spatial attributes to identify the most cost-effective areas that can 
be preferentially targeted through the implementation of PES schemes. Overall the 
thesis confirms that although the agriculture sector contributes to the annual 
emissions of the UK, it has the potential to contribute towards the mitigation of 
these emissions as well and highlights the scope of PES schemes for achieving 
emission reductions. Overall, it assesses the effect of scheme design and 
socioeconomic characteristics on the effectiveness of a scheme, in terms of its 
uptake by land managers. It also informs the policy makers about the abatement 
potential and cost-effectiveness of schemes specifically targeting arable and 
livestock farms. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Ecosystem services (ES) are the benefits derived from ecosystems, including 
provisioning, supporting, regulating and cultural services. The quality and quantity 
of these services are affected by the human beings resource use decisions (Jack et 
al., 2008). The ecosystem service framework is widely used for studying the 
interdependence of agroecosystems and environment (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010). Agroecosystems occupy approximately 50% of the earth’s land surface 
(Smith et al., 2007c; Stallman, 2011) and provide a range of services and disservices 
(soil erosion, sedimentation of wetlands, greenhouse gas emissions) (Kragt and 
Roberston, 2012). Conversion of natural land to agricultural systems and the 
associated management activities has impact on the non-provisioning services 
provided by agricultural land. Climate regulation is one such service, which is of 
global importance. Agroecosystems contribute towards climate change, both 
positively through services (carbon sequestration) and negatively through 
disservices (greenhouse gas (GHG) emission). Although agriculture accounts for 10-
14% of total global GHG emissions (Smith et al., 2007c), it also has the potential to 
contribute towards the mitigation of these emissions. International agreements 
have been agreed upon linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developed countries have a commitment as part of 
Kyoto Protocol to reduce their carbon emissions, hence, UK under the Climate 
Change Act 2008, has committed to an 80% reduction in baseline (1990) emissions 
by 2050. Under article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol improved agricultural activities, 
land use change, and forestry that are able to mitigate carbon emissions can be 
included in the emission reductions targets (Smith et al., 2000). These reductions in 
agroecosystems can be achieved through the adoption of several measures 
involving generation and use of renewable energy, enhancing carbon storage in soil 
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and biomass, reducing emissions from land management activities such as reducing 
the use of fertilizers, reducing intensive soil disturbance due to tillage, adopting 
extensive grazing etc. (Smith et al., 2008). 
Policies are increasingly perceived as means for enhancing (reducing) the supply of 
environmental public goods (bads) associated with agricultural activities through 
recognising the value associated with non-marketed ecosystem services (e.g. 
climate regulation) (Sauer and Wossink, 2010). Several policy instruments have 
been deployed to help maintain the balance of ES provided by agroecosystems. 
Farmers usually have no motivation/incentives to produce non-marketed ES; 
therefore, external incentives can play an important role in attracting farmers 
towards the adoption of farm practices for the provision of such ES (Swinton et al., 
2007). Hence, many agricultural policies are focusing on paying farmers for 
conservation and protection. Among these policies, payments for ecosystem 
services (PES) are increasingly promoted as potentially effective tools in 
compensating farmers for the preservation and provision of ecosystems and their 
ES (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008).  
Policies can be made more effective by designing the policies in an efficient way by 
taking preferences of farmers into consideration. Successful implementation of 
these policies can be determined by the rate of participation, characteristics of 
participant farms (Crabtree et al., 1998) in terms of the effect achieved, and spatial 
characteristics (as environmental benefits are affected by location of impact).  
Hence, much of the research evaluating the effectiveness of payment scheme 
policies explored the influence of farm/farmer characteristics, scheme attributes 
(Ayuk, 1997; Brotherton, 1989; Dupraz et al., 2003; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; 
Pagiola et al., 2005; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Thacher et al., 1997), and spatial 
characteristics and variations (Broch et al., 2013; Campbell et al., 2009) on 
participation behaviour. 
The significance of a comprehensive understanding of the contribution of 
agroecosystems towards climate change and its potential to contribute towards 
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climate change mitigation is increasingly recognised for developing effective policies 
in this context (Abson et al., 2013; Balderas Torres et al., 2010; Dawson and Smith, 
2007). Important research advances are required for informing future sustainable 
and effective climate policies that not only address the dynamics of climate change 
with land use changes and management but also explore the farmers’ behaviour for 
their possible contribution in achieving climate mitigation. Although this 
understanding of the underlying preferences of farmers can provide sufficient 
information for policy design, an evaluation of costs associated with the policies can 
help to target the schemes more effectively. As most of the PES schemes are 
required to be implemented in a way that achieves maximum benefit with least cost 
(Chen et al., 2010).  
This PhD thesis evaluates the potential contribution of UK agroecosystems towards 
the UK’s climate change mitigation targets by examining the scope of developing 
payment scheme policies. Overall this research study aims to contribute to the 
understanding of how agroecosystems can contribute towards UK’s climate change 
mitigation targets and how this can be achieved by designing payments for 
ecosystem services schemes. It seeks to examine the changes in climate regulatory 
service provided by farmlands1 and explore the farmers’ preferences for 
participation in potential PES schemes. This thesis attempts to explore the 
heterogeneity in participation behaviour of farmers taking all three factors; 
farm/farmer characteristics, scheme attributes, and spatial variability into 
consideration for two potential payment schemes, respectively for enhancing 
services (carbon sequestration) and reducing disservices (GHG emissions mitigation) 
from farmlands. The analysis entails an assessment of regulatory service provided 
by UK farmlands, and the effect of land use change and farm management activities 
on this service, which was done as part of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment 
(UKNEA) project. The thesis then provides an assessment of the potential 
                                                        
1 The term ‘farmland’ represents a farm as a whole and therefore, is used alternatively for 
‘agroecosystem’ throughout the thesis. 
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participation behaviour of UK farmers in the proposed hypothetical schemes 
focusing on the major land use landscapes of the UK. In particular the thesis tackles 
the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the proposed schemes by providing 
carbon valuation for the emissions abated in accordance with the land use changes 
proposed by each scheme.  
1.2. The Thesis plan 
The remainder of the thesis is set out as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the background literature informing the research study. It 
presents the necessary background of ES and the ES provided by agroecosystem, 
especially focusing on climate regulation service. It then introduces the policy 
instruments employed for conservation of ES and Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes in particular. The chapter ends with presenting the thesis 
motivations and specific research objectives of the study.  
Chapter 3 provides the methodological framework of the research study, which is 
then followed by the description and the theoretical background of the 
methodological approaches employed for achieving the specific objectives of each 
stage of the thesis.  
Chapter 4 presents the quantification of the changes in the climate regulation 
service of UK farmlands. This analysis provides estimations of the contribution of 
farmlands towards GHG emissions, in terms of both the potential carbon stocks and 
the annual GHG flows modelled with land use changes. 
Chapter 5 & 6 These chapters respectively include the Choice Experiment (CE) study 
designed to determine the heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences for participation 
in a GHG mitigation and carbon sequestration payment policy scheme. Each chapter 
includes the description of the design of the policy scheme, its attributes and levels 
(however, the experimental design of the CE and the questionnaire design are 
presented in Appendix A), followed by the estimation results from three logit 
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models (Conditional logit, Random Parameters and Latent class models). The 
chapters explore the main factors affecting the behaviour of the farmers and the 
individual willingness to accept estimates and their distribution across the study 
sample.  
Chapter 7 presents a cost-effectiveness study of both the potential payments 
schemes designed for the CE study. The chapter provides an account of carbon 
abatement costs for land use and management changes proposed by the two 
schemes. This is followed by an investigation of the spatial patterns of the carbon 
values across UK using GIS and regression analysis.  
Chapter 8 synthesises the research study highlighting and discussing the key 
analytical approaches and the research contributions and limitations of the thesis. 
This is followed by a discussion of policy recommendations and directions for future 
research needs in PES scheme designs and climate regulation service.  
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Chapter 2 Research context 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the core literature that has informed the aims 
and motivations of this thesis. The chapter provides a brief overview of ecosystem 
services; specifically it discusses services provided by agricultural ecosystems – with 
an emphasis on climate regulation service. It also introduces payments for 
ecosystem services schemes, their design for agricultural ecosystems, and farmers’ 
participation behaviour in such schemes. In-depth and more specific literature 
pertaining to the context, approaches and findings of each component is included in 
individual chapters of the thesis.   
2.2. Ecosystem services and agriculture 
This section presents an overview and discussion about ecosystem services 
(hereafter ES), especially on how this concept started. It focuses on the ES provided 
by agriculture.  
2.2.1. Ecosystem Services 
Ecosystems are life support systems, which provide renewable resources and 
ecological services (Costanza et al., 1997). The concept of ecosystem was first 
introduced by Marsh in 1864 and was officially used by Tansley (Willis, 1997). This 
term is used to express the interdependence of species on each other and the 
environment (MEA, 2005). According to De Groot et al. (2002) these systems 
provide functions which are beneficial to humans through their structures and 
processes. Westman (1977) termed the social benefits that ecosystems provide us 
as nature’s services which now are popularly termed as ‘ecosystem services’ (Fisher 
et al., 2009). ES have been defined in various ways in the literature; Costanza et al. 
(1997) defined them as the benefits human populations derive, directly or indirectly, 
from the ecosystem functions. These services have also been termed as a function 
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of complex interactions among the species and their abiotic environment (Fisher et 
al., 2009). They maintain biodiversity and the production of ecosystem goods, such 
as timber, biomass fuels, natural fibres, forage, etc. ES are perceived to support and 
protect human well-being and include maintenance of the composition of the 
atmosphere, stability of climate, flood controls, waste assimilation, nutrient 
recycling, soil production, provision of food, pollination of crops, maintenance of 
species, landscapes, recreational sites, aesthetics, and amenity values (Costanza et 
al., 1997).  
ES have been defined by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (hereafter MEA) as; 
“the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems, and they are produced by 
interactions within the ecosystem…” These include provisioning, regulating, and 
cultural services that directly affect people. They also include supporting services 
needed to maintain all other services. This report also classified these services as; 
supporting services (soil formation, nutrient cycling, primary production), 
provisioning services (provision of food, fuel, fibre, fresh water), regulating services 
(purification of air and water, mitigation of floods and droughts, detoxification, 
renewal of soil and soil fertility, control of potential pests, maintenance of 
biodiversity, and climate regulation), and cultural services (aesthetics, recreation, 
ecotourism, spiritual and religious values).  
However, Boyd and Banzhaf (2006) argued that such a broad definition considers 
ecosystem products, functions, and benefits all together and is not very helpful 
from an economic perspective. The authors emphasise that ecosystem services and 
functions are two distinct entities. The functions have been defined as the flows 
that connect the different constituent parts of ecosystems while services are flows 
which have direct and immediate benefits to human i.e. are directly consumed for 
human well-being (Banzahf and Boyd, 2005; Boyd and Banzhaf, 2006). Considering 
these definitions, focusing on end-products only, some services can no longer be 
considered as services, such as climate regulation (carbon sequestration), rather 
they are considered as intermediates in services which are directly used by humans 
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(Kroeger and Casey, 2007). Under the influence of such definitions these services 
are likely to lose their importance. Hence, in agreement with Boyd and Banzhaf, 
Fisher et al. (2009) considered that services and benefits are different, and 
functions and process can be considered as ecosystem services as long as there are 
human beneficiaries. However, they disagree with the consideration of direct end-
points as ES only and argue that as long as these functions and processes affect 
human welfare, they can be considered as ecosystem services. 
This provides a more flexible approach for valuation and other assessment studies 
for ecosystem services by broadening the services to both intermediate 
functions/processes and final products.  
2.2.2. Agriculture and Ecosystem services 
In a simple and traditional, description agricultural land is described as land that is 
utilised for food crop production. In the broad sense, IPCC, (special report on 
LULUCF, 2000) have defined it as ‘land that can provide direct benefits to mankind 
through the production of food, fibre, forage and fodder, biofuel, meat, hides, skins, 
and timber’. Thus, agricultural land includes croplands, managed grasslands, agro-
forestry and bioenergy crops (Smith et al., 2007c).  
Agricultural land constitutes about 40-50% of the Earth’s land surface (Smith et al., 
2007c; Stallman, 2011). Agricultural activities have been carried out for ages and 
have been an important tradition in most parts of the world and therefore, are 
considered as a separate ecosystem (MEA, 2005). Agricultural ecosystems (referred 
to as agroecosystems hereafter) are directly managed by humans. Apart from the 
primary services like the provision of food, fibre, and fuel, agroecosystems also have 
the capacity to provide regulating services such as regulating pollinations, pests, 
levels of soils loss, water supply, carbon storage and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Cultural services provided include the preservation of rural lifestyle, providing open-
space, and rural landscapes for tourists etc. (Swinton et al., 2007).  
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However, agroecosystems also receive ES from other ecosystems. Services such as 
pollination, genetic diversity, soil provision, pest regulation, water provision are 
provided to the agroecosystems by neighbouring ecosystems, while on the other 
hand, agroecosystems also provide both services (e.g. carbon sequestration, soil 
fertility, reducing soil degradation) and disservices (e.g. water pollution, odour, 
greenhouse gas emissions) to the surrounding environment. Dale and Polasky 
(2007) identified the interaction of agriculture with ecosystems in three forms; first, 
agriculture provides ES; second, agroecosystems require ES from surrounding 
ecosystems; and third, agroecosystems affect the quality and quantity of ES 
provided by other ecosystems (both positively and negatively). This linkage 
between the services and disservices from agriculture has been nicely illustrated 
diagrammatically (Figure 2.1) by (Swinton et al., 2007).  
 
Figure ‎2.1 Illustration of services and disservices to and from agriculture (adapted 
from Swinton et al., 2007) 
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Traditionally, most of the focus has been on enhancing production from 
agroecosystems and land managers have mostly concentrated on the provision of 
food and fibre. This has been mostly at the expense of other ES. However, there is a 
potential for enhancing the impact of agroecosystems on ES provision by focusing 
on sustainable use of agricultural land. The ES generated by agriculture are 
beneficial not only locally but globally and climate regulation is one of these 
important global services.   
2.3. Climate regulation and agriculture 
Agriculture influences the global climate through the storage of carbon and also 
through the release of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
and nitrous oxide (N2O). Carbon is stored in vegetation, in soil, in decomposing 
organic matter, and is exchanged into the atmosphere through respiration and 
photosynthesis (Erb, 2004). Nonetheless, stored carbon is not retained in these 
systems forever as human and natural activities cause it to be released back into 
the atmosphere. The carbon emissions from agricultural ecosystems occur in 
several ways including the use of fossil fuels in farm machinery, use of fertilizers 
(indirectly as energy is used in their production), cultivation or tillage of soils (Pretty 
and Ball, 2001a), which results in the removal of the topsoil and breakup of 
aggregates which tend to capture carbon in the soil. Carbon sequestration can be 
attributed to the increased soil organic matter decomposition rates due to 
cultivation and the loss of topsoil layer due to erosion. Developments in farm 
mechanisation have increased the rapid loss of the soil carbon stocks. Carbon losses 
from grasslands can be attributed to the intensity of grazing by livestock. This 
carbon is lost into the atmosphere as a vegetative loss as well as methane emissions 
from the livestock, both from manure and enteric fermentation (Dawson and Smith, 
2007).  
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Global efforts have been made to combat climate change in the form of 
international frameworks and agreements (e.g. UNFCCC2, Kyoto Protocol). These 
international agreements provide environmental benefits by making the signatory 
countries responsible for their actions (Dumanski, 2004). Agreements like the Kyoto 
Protocol bind the countries to meet their emission reduction targets by 20123. 
These reductions can be achieved by focusing on the sources, sinks of the 
greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol recognises the need to address the industrial 
and the transport sector and the land-use sector (which includes forestry and 
agriculture) under articles 3.4. 
Land use change has been highlighted as a key human-induced effect on 
ecosystems (Turner et al., 2003). Land use changes can cause disturbances in the 
ecosystems and thus affect the carbon stocks and fluxes: e.g. conversion of forest to 
agricultural ecosystems also affects soil organic carbon concentrations apart from 
the carbon lost from the trees cut down during this change. Changes in land cover 
and land use result in the removal or emission of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere and altering the earth’s surface albedo which affects the Earth’s 
radiation balance. They also modify the balance in the distribution of energy by 
disturbing the balance between the latent and sensible heat flux and thus, we can 
say that these land use and land cover changes alter the climate at local, regional, 
and even global level (Marland et al., 2003). The most important land-use changes 
that affect the carbon sequestration property are the changes in the forest woody 
biomass through cutting down the trees for commercial or fuel wood purposes, 
production or use of woody commodities or by planting trees in different non-
forested areas, conversion of forests and grasslands for agriculture or grazing 
                                                        
2 UNFCCC stands for United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change  
3 Annex I (developed) countries according to the Kyoto Protocol are required to report the extent to 
which they have met their emission reduction targets for the first commitment period 2008-
2012. It will then continue for the following commitment time periods. 
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purposes, changes in the soil of an area by carrying out ploughing and other tillage 
activities. 
Agricultural systems contribute to carbon emissions through several mechanisms, 
such as: clearing of forests to create new croplands, direct use of fossil fuels for 
operating farm machinery; cultivation of soils resulting in the loss of soil organic 
matter (SOM); and indirect use of energy for the manufacture of different products 
(e.g. fertilizers) used in agriculture (Niles et al., 2002; Pretty et al., 2002).  
These greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture represent approximately 10-14% 
of global and 8% of the UK emissions (Smith et al., 2007c). These emissions include 
three main gases methane, nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide. Under the Climate 
Change Act, 2008, the UK government is committed to reduce national emissions by 
80% of 1990 levels by 2050 (Moran et al., 2010), with all significant sources coming 
under scrutiny.  The need to achieve reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in an 
economically efficient way is recognized by the Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC). Mitigation from agricultural activities also needs to be addressed in the same 
way by recognizing and implementing the mitigation measures which can be 
enacted at a lower (Moran et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2000) or least cost. Some of the 
abatement options can not only result in lower emissions but can also deliver 
improved profitability and thus might be adopted without any specific intervention. 
The measures can be categorized as: Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (CO2, 
N2O and CH4), which are released to the atmosphere in large amounts, by managing 
the flows of carbon and nitrogen more efficiently; enhancing removals by increasing 
the storage of carbon (carbon sequestration) in both soil and vegetation through 
improvements in management practices, which helps in withdrawing CO2 from the 
atmosphere and in some instances CH4 can be removed from the atmosphere as 
well; avoiding emissions by using bio-fuels from crops or agricultural residues. A 
vast literature is available discussing and presenting the mitigation measures that 
can be carried out in order to reduce the emissions or manage or improve the sinks 
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from agricultural ecosystems (Lal, 2008; Moran et al., 2010; Paustian et al., 1997; 
Smith et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2000).  
2.4. Policy instruments for conservation of ecosystem services 
Humans, directly or indirectly, depend on the products and services provided by 
ecosystems. Ecosystems are being increasingly degraded throughout the world. This 
degradation is resulting in the loss of or reduction in the provision of valuable 
ecosystem services. One of the key factors of natural ecosystem degradation and 
ecosystem service loss is lack of appropriate valuation or policy design for these 
ecosystems and their services (Defra, 2010). This lead to an increase, towards a 
more appropriate representation of ecosystems in policy designs.  
Certain land use activities can lead to external effects and these in economics are 
termed as ‘externalities’. An externality can be described as a positive or negative 
effect of an economic activity on others (Lipper et al., 2009), and is not taken into 
account in an unregulated market. In order to overcome this economists have 
proposed to use taxes for negative externalities and subsidies for positive 
externalities (Jack et al., 2008; Panayotou, 1994). Additionally, environmental policy 
instruments have been developed to deal with such externalities. Some examples of 
such policies include: command and control (direct regulation); market-based 
compulsory instruments (taxes, charges, and tradable permits); and market-based 
voluntary instruments (subsidies) (Panayotou, 1994; Zandersen et al., 2009). 
According to Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010), ES started to be included into policy 
structures by the early 2000s through the “Ecosystem Approach” adopted by UNEP-
CBD in 2000. Later with the MEA, the ES concepts and policies around that 
approach have multiplied (Fisher et al., 2009). With the increasing interest towards 
ES research, work towards the development of incentives for conservation of these 
services was also augmented. Economic and market based instruments were 
developed for pollution mitigation and conservation (Maynard and Paquin, 2004). 
Two main instruments in this context have been Markets for Ecosystem Services 
(Bayon, 2004) and Payments for Ecosystem Services (Wunder, 2005). Markets for ES 
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include energy taxes, wetland mitigation banking in the US (Robertson, 2004), 
carbon markets-emissions trading of greenhouse gases in the UK (Bayon, 2004), 
Chicago Climate Exchange, a private trading system to buy carbon credits, and the 
EU emission trading system for greenhouse gas emissions (European Climate 
Exchange, 2008 as cited in Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). While Payments for ES 
(hereafter PES) is a mechanism of providing incentives to the providers of the ES.  
PES have been utilised to increase the flow of resources from an ecosystem but also 
for improving a depleted ecosystem (Rosa et al., 2002).  
Mitigation can be an important part of the policies designed for meeting climate 
change reduction targets, since agricultural land makes up a large part of the total 
land use, and has had major contributions towards greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change. The ES provided by agriculture produce both market and non-
market benefits; however, landowners usually have little or no appropriate 
incentive to provide the social non-market benefits, and thus they prefer to opt for 
market products like food and fibre.  
2.5. Payments for Ecosystem services 
PES is an incentive based approach for the conservation and management of 
ecosystems which has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. It is a fairly novel 
way of managing natural resources and is quite similar to targeted subsidies (Engel 
et al., 2008; Zandersen et al., 2009). It offers new ways of addressing market 
failures and provides a different way of solving the under-provision of a demanded 
ecosystem service. The PES approach is based on the Coase theorem which states 
“that the problem of externalities can be overcome through private negotiations 
between the affected parties4” (Zandersen et al., 2009 pg.32-33). 
PES schemes are a series of mechanisms that are based on the idea that resource 
managers who are providers of an ecosystem service should be provided with 
                                                        
4 Affected parties can be the governmental organizations (government-financed schemes) or the 
service provider and the beneficiaries of service (user-financed schemes).  
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compensation by the beneficiaries of the services (Engel et al., 2008). PES was 
defined by Wunder (2005): 
a) Voluntary transaction where 
b) A well-defined environmental service (or land use likely to secure that 
service) 
c) Is being bought by a service buyer 
d) From a service provider 
e) If and only if the service provider secures service provision. 
PES schemes have been implemented at a wide variety of scales in both developed 
and developing countries. PES schemes can either be based on the willingness to 
pay (WTP) of the beneficiaries of the ecosystem service or the willingness to accept 
(WTA) payments of the service provider (the ecosystem manager). In private 
markets both of these are joined together to determine an equilibrium price 
(Zandersen et al., 2009). 
According to Rosa et al., (2002) PES schemes have certain common characteristics, 
they: 
a) use economic instruments with lowest possible costs for achieving 
environmental targets; 
b) single out environment service; 
c)  prefer large scale ecosystems preferably owned by few people to reduce 
transaction and monitoring costs; and 
d) Seek to secure private property rights and to reward landowners.  
However, when designing PES schemes it is important to understand the land use 
and the ES provided by it and their values. This requires the recognition of the 
goods and services as assets that  can then be traded at an agreed price (Smith et 
al., 2006). It is also important to identify the beneficiaries and the providers, which 
can either be the actual users of the ES, or others such as government agencies, 
conservation institutions, or international funding institutions (Engel et al., 2008). 
Wunder et al. (2008) also identified some issues that need to be considered while 
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designing PES schemes: compliance, required to ensure that the PES recipients 
comply with their contracts; additionality, which arises if the change in ecosystem 
service could have been achieved without any payment programme; permanence, 
which determines whether the ES provided are long term or not; and leakage, 
which considers whether the environmentally-damaging land uses that the PES 
programme are replacing are being displaced elsewhere (more relevant for global 
scale services).  
Payment programmes have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to 
translate non-market values into real financial incentives to the local land managers 
for managing and providing the service (Engel et al., 2008). These schemes have 
been popular for public services because they have been designed strategically for 
long term protection and conservation of ecosystems, natural resources and ES 
(Corbera et al., 2009). The schemes usually provide payments to ecosystem 
managers to adopt changes in the way they use the ecosystem to generate positive 
externalities or reduce (mitigate) negative externalities from that ecosystem (Lipper 
et al., 2009).   
A wide variety of payment programmes have been implemented to provide 
ecosystem services across the globe, for example national scale programmes in 
Costa Rica and Mexico, agro-environmental programmes in the US and Europe 
(Engel et al., 2008). In Ecuador a watershed conservation programme provides clean 
drinking water and a Forests Absorbing Carbon dioxide Emissions Forestation 
Programme has established carbon dioxide fixing plantations in the highland area 
(Kemkes et al., 2010).  
This thesis addresses the design of schemes in relation to mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emissions (negative externality) and enhancing carbon storage (ecosystem 
service/positive externality) through modifications in land use management in UK 
agriculture. 
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2.6. Payments for Ecosystem services in an agricultural context 
Payments for ecosystem services have been promoted across the developing world 
to support environmental stewardship in agricultural and forest based landscapes 
and have been implemented through local scale projects involving private investors, 
NGOs, government, and resource managers (Kosoy et al., 2008). They are 
increasingly applied across the developed world as well. There are more than 300 
PES programmes implemented worldwide (Maynard and Paquin, 2004). Most of 
these have been set up to promote biodiversity, watershed services, carbon storage 
and landscape beauty (Wunder, 2005) e.g. The programme to conserve watershed 
forests for the Catskills and Delaware catchments in the US, Vittel and Perrier’s PES 
for water quality improvements to reduce nitrate contamination due to agricultural 
intensification and for retaining forests to guarantee clean and reliable water 
source, the Environmental Stewardship programme in the UK for wide range of 
environmental outcomes, and the Conservation Reserve Programme in the US for 
landowners to deliver environmental benefits.  
Land managers receive benefits from farmland. Intensive farming can provide them 
with higher agricultural productivity and increased income. However, this can lead 
to costs to society, as they receive the benefits from food production, but face the 
long term effects of soil erosion, and increased carbon and greenhouse gas 
emissions (these prove to be global costs). Therefore, payments by the service users 
can help make conservation a more attractive option for land managers as service 
providers. Figure 2.2 illustrates that the minimum payment to the service provider 
has to be equal to the benefits given up, when converting to the more socially 
beneficial land use practices. The maximum payment would equal the costs 
incurred by the public because of increased soil erosion, and carbon and 
greenhouse gas emissions (climate change).  
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Figure ‎2.2 The logic of a PES scheme for agroecosystems (Adapted from Engel et al., 
2008) 
In the developing world context the payment schemes also have an added 
advantage of providing funds to the poor land owners (Rosa et al., 2002 pg 11) who 
are providing the service by managing the ecosystems. This has resulted in more 
sustainable livelihoods through the provision of cash or other incentives (Pagiola et 
al., 2005).  
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input farming systems. Most of these schemes have been voluntary and, therefore, 
depend on farmers’ willingness to participate in the schemes. The development of 
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Environmentally Sensitive Areas, the Countryside Stewardship scheme in England, 
Tir Gofal in Wales, the Countryside Premium Scheme followed by the Rural 
Stewardship scheme in Scotland, and the Countryside Management scheme in 
Northern Ireland (Defra, 2010). Agri-environmental schemes have been a popular 
means to enhance the supply of public ES associated with agricultural activities. 
These schemes have encouraged land managers to adopt agricultural activities that 
can enhance the supply of ES or mitigate the negative effects, by offering 
compensation payments (green payments). These schemes have been considered 
to be a combination of incentive based policies and command and control (Sauer 
and Wossink, 2010). 
2.7. Overview of design and participation in PES schemes 
In this context, farmers are the largest group of resource managers. They depend 
on and provide a wide variety of ecosystem services through their land use 
activities. The farmers’ role can have both positive and negative effect on 
ecosystems and ecosystem services. Understanding their behaviour and attitude 
and the factors driving their decisions can be useful in designing new strategies that 
can enhance ES. This presupposes that the participants would at least not be worse 
off than without the PES programme, otherwise they would not be willing to 
participate (Pagiola et al., 2005). 
Participation in PES programmes has been voluntary and has been termed as an 
‘indicator’ of scheme effectiveness (Wilson and Hart, 2000). Considerable research 
has been conducted towards the motivations behind farmers’ participation looking 
into their preferences towards the design and scope of PES schemes.  
Dupraz et al. (2003) found that the scheme participation will be more likely for 
farmers who understand the utility of the measure, either because of their 
education levels or positive attitude towards environment. Wunder et al. (2008) 
emphasized that farmers’ participation in payment schemes is influenced not only 
by its contribution towards household income and land opportunity cost but also on 
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non-monetary incentives like increase in land tenure security, improvement in 
internal organization, increased visibility of community for donors and 
organisations. Potter and Gasson (1988) conducted a study in England and Wales to 
estimate the extent to which agricultural land managers are likely to participate in 
payment schemes.  
Pagiola et al. (2005) summarized the factors that affect the land manager’s decision 
to participate into three groups:  
a) Factors that affect the eligibility of the participant; this includes whether the 
land comes into the target area or not, whether the land follows the 
required management practices and whether the land is productive enough;  
b) Factors that affect the desire to participate; the land manager or owner 
need to think if participating in the scheme will be profitable enough and if 
the current farming practices fit in the scheme or not; and 
c) Factors that affect the ability to participate; these include security of land 
tenures, ability to meet the investments needed and the ability to required 
the needed technical assistance. 
Studies, for example the ones by Ayuk (1997), Caveness and Kurtz (1993), Thacher 
et al. (1997), have indicated that farm size is positively related to the farmers’ 
willingness to participate in payment schemes. It has also been suggested that 
larger land holdings, production capacity and incomes, lead to greater flexibility 
towards the land manager’s decision to participate (Nowak, 1987). Godoy (1992) 
highlighted the importance of land tenures especially for long term payment 
schemes. Apart from these external factors a few studies (Brotherton, 1989; Potter 
and Gasson, 1988; Wilson, 1996) postulated that some internal factors, such as the 
attitude of the land owners towards the payment schemes or environmental 
friendly schemes, affect their participation in such schemes. Ayuk (1997) and Wilson 
(1996) have suggested that internal factors like land manager’s age and education 
also influence his decision towards participation (Zbinden and Lee, 2005). These 
studies have also indicated that in order to ensure maximum number of eligible 
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participants in payment schemes, policy makers should target conservation-
oriented land owners.  
The farmers’ decision to participate in payment schemes by selecting policy 
alternatives other than the status quo can be formulated as dependent upon the 
maximization of its utility, subject to resource constraints. Farmers’ livelihood 
depends upon their agricultural produce, and usually for them budget constraints 
include the off-farm incomes and restricted profit generated by on-farm activities 
(Dupraz et al., 2003). This has been usually addressed by providing sufficient 
payments or introducing practices that are economically profitable. Generally it is 
assumed that farmers’ decisions are based on utility maximization rather than 
profit. Therefore, willingness to accept (WTA) estimated can provide an insight into 
the profit foregone, which the land manager is willing to trade-off. 
Moreover, it has also identified that spatial factors can also affect the farmers’ 
willingness to accept. According to Campbell et al. (2009) the spatial distribution of 
the WTA estimates can help to identify the effective areas for targeting the policies. 
According to Bateman et al. (1999), rural landscapes are usually spatially spread 
across, therefore, the WTA estimates can vary according to the pre-dominant 
agricultural land use and the landscape attributes. Hence, incorporating spatial 
information can be useful in the design and effective implementation of ES 
conservation policies.  
Understanding the potential participation in the payment programmes can be 
important to inform the policy makers for future policy decisions related to the 
development of payment schemes. 
2.8. Thesis motivation and research objectives 
Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions are important issues for 
agroecosystems because of their potential impacts on agricultural production and 
agriculture being a major contributor to the build-up of greenhouse gases into the 
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atmosphere. Agroecosystems also have the potential to reduce these emissions and 
enhance the provision of climate regulation services.  
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes have become increasingly popular 
policy instruments for conservation and protection of ES in the agricultural sector. 
As explored in the review of the literature above, a number of studies have 
assessed the potential participation of land owners’ in PES schemes by determining 
the factors affecting their behaviour, addressing improvements in PES scheme 
designs by concentrating on farmers preferences for different scheme attributes.  
However, some research gaps in ecosystem service management: include 
appropriate estimations and of the potential to enhance the provision of ES; 
effective design of incentives for ES provision; and improvement of such incentives 
in terms of their cost-effectiveness. Another issue that has not been sufficiently 
addressed has been the extent to which specific geographic areas should be 
targeted for policy development. Detailed spatial distribution of required incentive 
compensation can help identify the areas of value that can be targeted more 
effectively. The literature review revealed that none of the currently published 
studies have addressed farmers’ WTA requirements for climate regulation service.  
Therefore, research towards effective design of PES in the agricultural sector needs 
to address the different dimensions of the ES provided by agroecosystems and to 
gain insight into the behaviour of the land managers towards the provision of those 
ES. This underpins the key motivation of this research study. Therefore, the current 
study builds on the definitions (discussed in section 2.2) of Daily (1997), MEA 
(2005), and Fisher and Turner (2008), which provide a more precise justification of 
using climate regulation service provided by agroecosystems as an ecosystem 
service and assessing the potential use of payments as an economic instrument to 
help enhance this service. The derivation of the payment estimates is important 
since they can help provide information to policy makers to design and implement 
more effective policies.  
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This thesis also contributed to the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UKNEA) 
report. It estimated changes in the climate regulatory service provided by UK 
enclosed farmlands in terms of carbon and greenhouse gas stocks and flows. The 
thesis assesses the scope of provision of climate regulation service by farmlands in 
the UK through the design of policy incentives.  
Three main research objectives are defined for this thesis to achieve the overall aim 
of investigating the design of PES for climate regulation service provided by 
agriculture. This provides a better understanding of how the agricultural sector can 
contribute towards meeting the UKs’ GHG emission reduction targets.  
Objective 1: To explicitly model and predict changes in regulatory service provided 
by farmlands due to changes in land use induced by climate change.  
Further sub-objectives to achieve the main objectives were: 
a. To collate and review previous literature and outline an overview of the 
carbon stocks, both soil carbon (SOC) and vegetative carbon (biomass) 
stocks (BIOC), for different land uses. 
b. To develop flow estimates of GHG emissions for each land use. 
c. To evaluate the change in regulatory service by enclosed farmlands by 
estimating the potential changes in carbon stocks and GHG flows for two 
climate change scenarios for the year 2020, 2040, 2060.  
Objective 2: To investigate land owners’ payment scheme preferences for 
enhancing climate regulation (through emissions mitigation and carbon 
sequestration) and to suggest scheme design for developing effective policies for 
attracting farmers to contribute towards the UK’s carbon abatement targets.  
This was achieved by exploring the following sub-objectives: 
a.  Estimating farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) requirements for adoption of 
GHG mitigation and policies for potential reduction in GHG emissions from 
UK farmlands. 
- 24 - 
b. Estimating farmers’ WTA requirements for adoption of changes in land use 
practices through the uptake of carbon sequestration policy. 
c.  Exploring the extent of heterogeneity for two potential payment policies and 
investigating whether this heterogeneity is associated with particular farm 
or farmer characteristics.  
Objective 3: To calculate carbon abatement costs for potential payments schemes 
and provide an analysis of the spatial pattern of the carbon abatement costs 
through PES schemes across the UK. 
The sub- objectives in this context included: 
a. To estimate the carbon abatement costs for the two potential policy schemes 
explored under objective 2, and compare the cost-effectiveness of the 
schemes.  
b. To provide an analysis of the spatial pattern of the carbon costs through PES 
schemes across the UK to identify the areas of highest potential for effective 
implementation of policies.  
This thesis uses multiple methodological approaches to address the objectives and 
sub-objectives. The next chapter provides a detail description of the methodological 
framework and approaches employed to achieve the specific research objectives of 
the study. 
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Chapter 3 The Research framework and Methods  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the approaches employed for the different 
analytical components of the thesis. The chapter describes the overall research 
framework in terms of stages and the steps taken to achieve the specified 
objectives of the research. It also provides an elaborate description of each method 
employed for each stage of the analysis, while the data and individual steps of the 
analysis are provided in the respective results chapters.   
3.2. Research framework  
Land use management activities impact the climate regulation service provided by 
agroecosystems by moderating global GHG emissions. On the other hand 
agricultural land use is also affected by the changing climate. Understanding the 
current balance of carbon inputs and greenhouse gas emissions due to land use 
change and land management activities, and the impact of these emissions on 
agriculture itself, is crucial in predicting the impacts of future land use change on 
the climate regulation service provided by farmlands. This is also important for the 
design and effective implementation of efficient policies to enhance the climate 
regulation service provided by agriculture.  
This thesis aims to investigate the design of PES for climate regulation services 
provided by agriculture in order to provide a better understanding of how the UK 
farmlands can contribute towards the UK’s emissions reduction targets. The 
research was split into three main analytical components to achieve the three main 
research objectives. The first part aims to quantify the climate regulatory service 
provided by UK farmlands. This helps to identify the changes in the climate 
regulatory service provided by farmlands in terms of GHG emissions and carbon 
sequestration due to changes in land use and management activities. This informs 
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the analysis of how to design policies to mitigate climate change. The second part 
aims to evaluate potential PES scheme designs for enhancing the climate regulation 
service provided by farmlands. The third part uses parts one and two to develop a 
carbon abatement cost analysis for potential PES schemes and identify the spatial 
distribution of the costs of mitigating carbon emissions and enhancing 
sequestration, and link the costs to the landscape and socioeconomic attributes of 
the farms and farmers. This spatial analysis will identify the areas of lower carbon 
value in terms of achieving climate change mitigation cost effectively in PES 
schemes.  
The three stages follow a logical interlinked pathway to examine the effective use of 
land use management for enhancing climate regulation incorporating farmers’ 
decision making. Figure 3.1 provides the integration between the different stages of 
the analytical framework. The three stages are discussed in detail in the subsections 
to follow. 
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Figure ‎3.1 Methodological framework of the research study 
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3.3. Research stages and Methods 
This section provides details of each empirical stage of the thesis and the methods 
employed to conduct the analysis of each stage.  
3.3.1. Stage 1: Estimations of changes in regulatory services 
The first stage of the research framework corresponds to the first objective of the 
thesis – to explicitly model land use related agricultural GHG emissions under high 
and low UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) emissions scenarios for the 
period 2004-2060. As mentioned earlier this stage proposes to provide a 
quantification of changes in regulatory service provided by farmlands due to 
changes in land use and farm management activities. This included a 
comprehensive study of the contribution of farmlands towards GHG emissions, 
from both the potential carbon stocks and annual flows, modelled with the land use 
changes by using outputs from a land use model and thus, exploring the changes in 
the GHG emissions at a national extent in the UK. This stage was conducted as part 
of the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UKNEA) in collaboration with the 
economics team for climate regulation service assessment in ‘enclosed farmland5’ 
(for details please refer to http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org). 
The first step towards this analysis was to define the boundaries in terms of land 
use and livestock types. Seven land use types were considered according to the 
major landscapes in the UK. The land use categories included were cereals, oilseed 
rape, root crops, temporary grassland, permanent grassland, rough grazing, and 
other land-uses (such as horticulture, on-farm woodland, and bare/fallow land). The 
livestock types included were sheep, cattle (beef), and dairy cows. The analysis was 
carried out for three GHGs carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide 
(N2O). The second step was to carry out a comprehensive review of the literature to 
                                                        
5 Enclosed farmlands includes cropped and grasslands along with hedges, ditches and, small farm 
woodlands. Enclosed farmland is mainly managed for food production; however, they also 
provide landscape characters, habitats for wildlife, and recreational opportunities.  
- 29 - 
collate the data for the carbon stocks in agricultural soils and vegetation (Bateman 
and Lovett, 2000; Bradley et al., 2005; Cruickshank et al., 1998; Dale, 1997; Dawson 
and Smith, 2007; Milne et al., 2007); carbon flows from soils and emissions from 
farming activities (Falloon et al., 2004; Foley et al., 2005; Lal, 2004; UKAgriculture, 
2013; Worrall et al., 2009); and GHG emissions from land uses and livestock 
(Beaton, 2006; Lal, 2004; Roulet et al., 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; UKCIP, 2009). 
This data was used to calculate the soil and vegetative carbon stocks, GHG 
emissions from land use management activities, and changes in land uses and 
livestock for the baseline year (2004). The third step was to predict land use change 
across the UK, considering selected UKCIP climate change scenarios (2020, 2040, 
and 2060). A structural land use model (LUM-FB) developed by Fezzi and Bateman 
(2011) was used to evaluate the changes in the carbon storage capacity and 
changes in GHG flux derived from land use management change. GIS was employed 
to develop maps for changes in the land use, carbon stocks and GHG emissions, as 
this allows linking land use changes to climate scenarios.  
To estimate the changes in regulatory service based on land use changes a fine 
grain spatially explicit model developed by Fezzi and Bateman (2011) was employed 
(for details of the significance and theoretical and econometric derivation of the 
model please refer to Fezzi and Bateman, 2011). This model is highly spatially 
explicit, being implemented on a large data panel of 2km2 grid. The model includes 
data covering the whole of the UK, including the share of each land use and 
livestock numbers, environmental and climatic characteristics, and policy and other 
drives, for the past 40 years.  
The LUM-FB model (details in UKNEA, 2011; Abson et al., 2013) outputs included 
the predicted agricultural land use shares for each land use type and predicted 
livestock numbers for each 2km2 grid for the baseline (2004) and each analysis year 
(2020, 2040, and 2060) under UKCIP low and high GHG emissions scenarios. The UK 
climate data used in the models was taken from the spatially explicit (25km 
resolution) UKCIP09 climate predictions. The outputs from the application of the 
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UKCIP scenarios to the LUM-FB model were employed for the first phase of this 
thesis. 
The resulting climate change induced land use changes were used to calculate the 
annual changes in regulatory service provided by the farmlands. This was achieved 
by estimating the changes in potential equilibrium carbon stocks in both the above 
and below ground biomass across the UK, and the changes in annual emissions 
(flows) of GHGs which derive from changing the agricultural management or 
activities resulting from those land use changes. More elaborated descriptions of 
the framework, data and procedures undertaken for this analytical stage are 
provided in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2. Stage 2: Investigating farmers’ preferences for PES schemes 
This stage deals with the second main objective of the thesis – to investigate land 
owners’ payment scheme preferences for enhancing climate regulation (through 
emissions mitigation and carbon sequestration) and to suggest scheme design for 
developing effective policies for attracting farmers to contribute towards the UK’s 
carbon abatement targets. This stage explores if payment schemes would help in 
contributing towards reductions (increases) in emissions (carbon sequestration), 
and if they would be adopted by the farming community in the UK. This involved 
the use of a quantitative approach to elicit farmers’ choices for two potential 
payment scenarios, designed for both arable and livestock farmers, by employing 
Choice Experiments (CE). The first step in this analytical stage was to identify the 
capacity of agricultural land, in terms of feasible measures for GHG mitigation and 
carbon storage, from a review of existing literature. Taking these measures into 
consideration, two suitable policy schemes were defined; one for the mitigation of 
GHGs from livestock manure (mitigation policy scheme), and the other for 
enhancing carbon storage in agricultural land (sequestration policy scheme). 
Defining attributes and levels are the first step for a CE study design. The attributes 
and levels for the above mentioned schemes were chosen according to their ability 
to best define each scheme (a detail of the attributes and levels of each scheme is 
- 31 - 
presented in Chapters 5 & 6, while the design of CE is presented in Appendix A). 
After the design of the policy schemes, a survey approach was employed to gather 
data on farmer/ farm characteristics, and land use management activities along 
with the farmers’ choices between proposed policy schemes. The hypothetical 
options were presented as two possible payment schemes. Since, the survey was 
designed to target both arable and livestock farms, it was required that both the 
schemes be presented in the same questionnaire, providing the farmers with an 
opportunity to choose the scheme more relevant to their farm’s capacity. Logit 
model estimations enabled an investigation of the heterogeneity in farmers’ 
behaviour, and allowed an analysis of the how socioeconomic factors might 
influence farm management decisions. The CE estimations also provided the data 
for estimations of the compensation requirements for participation in the scheme. 
This was used to calculate the carbon abatement costs for the final stage of the 
analysis of this thesis.  
A detailed overview of the methodologies that could potentially be used for such 
investigations and why CE was the preferred approach and its theoretical 
framework is presented below: 
ES valuation:  
The supply of ecosystem services by farm households is associated with their 
willingness to accept any profit loss, which is due to the reduction in the 
productivity and costs associated with changes in their agricultural activities. This 
provides an estimate of the lowest level of compensation land owners expect from 
implementing management changes according to payment scheme designs. WTA 
estimates give information on how farmers trade off different levels of attributes 
against per hectare payments (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009) and can help to inform 
the design of payment schemes (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Hence, many of the recent 
studies looking into the participation of farmers in PES schemes have used the 
minimum WTA approach (e.g. Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009; 
Kaczan et al., 2011).  
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Various methods have been employed to investigate the farmers’ preferences 
towards scheme attributes. The two major approaches generally used include 
Stated Preference (SP) and Revealed Preference (RP) methods. RP methods are 
based on choices made in real markets, while SP methods involve hypothetical 
situations. The RP methods involve the valuation of a non-market good by studying 
actual behavior in a closely-related market. The two most commonly used RP 
methods are the ‘travel cost method’ and ‘the hedonic pricing method’ (Pearce, 
2002). Auctions have also been employed as a method for collecting data in real 
markets for some studies; as they involve real transactions, they are considered to 
be closer to true willingness to pay or accept (Broch and Vedel, 2012). However, 
auctions are more difficult to organise as they are more time consuming and 
expensive as real payments need to be made (Kimenju et al., 2005). Even though RP 
methods have the advantage of being based on actual choices made by individuals, 
their notable disadvantages are that the valuation is based on current or previous 
levels of the non-market and that the non-use values are not measured (Alpizar et 
al., 2001). On the other hand, SP methods are less expensive and easier to conduct 
and, using a multi-attribute SP approach, can help to estimate attribute values that 
provide more detailed information regarding the trade-offs and values associated 
with different policy designs (Campbell et al., 2009). SP methods include 
approaches like Contingent Valuation Methods (CVM) and Choice Experiments (CE). 
CVM has increased acceptance as a versatile and powerful methodology for the 
valuation of environmental changes and services. CVM is a direct survey approach 
for estimating consumer preferences for hypothetical market scenarios. Initially 
open-ended elicitation formats (CVM) were used (Hanley et al., 2001) but later on 
there has been a shift towards dichotomous choice elicitations. CE, being a multi-
attribute approach, presents respondents with various alternative descriptions of 
the goods, differentiated by their attributes and levels, and asks them to choose the 
most preferred. The willingness to pay or accept is then directly revealed by their 
choices.  
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CE was the preferred approach for this study because of its ability to estimate 
multiple changes for specific attributes of a policy scheme design, which can further 
provide detailed information of an individual’s willingness to accept for each 
attribute.  
CE was originally developed for application in marketing and transport studies 
(Louviere and Hensher, 1982) but gradually it became increasingly accepted in 
environmental valuation studies. Various studies have used it for estimation of the 
benefits of recreation (Adamowicz et al., 1994; Bateman, 1996; Scarpa and Thiene, 
2005), evaluation of water management (Birol and Cox, 2007; Birol et al., 2006), and 
land management (Colombo et al., 2005; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009).  
Various studies have also used this method specifically in agroecosystems 
management and provision of ecosystem services (such as Beharry-Borg et al., 
2012; Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 
Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012). CE is used to elicit respondents’ preferences for 
specific attributes. The respondents have to choose one out of a given number of 
alternatives, and the inclusion of a cost attribute makes it possible to obtain, 
indirectly, respondents willingness to pay or accept estimates for the environmental 
good. 
Three logit models are used to analyse the preferences and attitudes of the farmers. 
The conditional logit model (CLM) framework imposes homogenous preferences 
across respondents, which is considered to be a limitation as the preferences can be 
heterogeneous (Birol et al., 2006). For identifying the preference heterogeneity the 
random parameters model (RPL) and Latent Class model (LCM) are used. The RPL 
allows the utility parameter to vary continuously over the complete population, 
whereas the LCM captures the heterogeneity across the population by classifying 
the population into classes. RPL allows explicitly for a range of attitudes within the 
population, identifies which attributes have significant levels of heterogeneity in 
preferences, and quantifies the degree of the spread of values around the mean 
while LCM provides further insight into the data by endogenously identifying groups 
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of respondents who have similar preferences for particular attributes (Hynes and 
Hanley, 2005). Since accounting for this heterogeneity is important in a policy 
context (Garrod et al., 2012) as the target group for a particular policy initiative may 
have very different socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes, implying 
differences in individual decision making. Hence, for the current research all three 
models will be estimated to provide an in-depth understanding of the heterogeneity 
of preferences and attitudes.  
CE theoretical framework: 
CE is based on Lancastrian Economic Theory of Value and Random Utility Theory. A 
CE model can be derived following McFadden (1974) and Train (2003).  
Payment schemes are assumed to not only induce utility losses to farmers due to 
restricting farm management activities, but also to provide them with a monetary 
benefit for abiding by the scheme conditions. It can be posited that a farmer ‘n’ will 
chose to participate in a scheme alternative ‘i’ among j alternatives, if the net utility 
‘Uni’ from doing so, is greater than the status quo or other alternatives. The overall 
utility from a contract can be expressed as;  
                                                                              (1) 
Where Uni is the utility derived from scenario i, Xi is a vector of the attributes that 
makes up the PES programme and Zn is a vector of farmer n characteristics.  
The utility that an individual derives from an alternative is considered to be 
associated with its attributes. So the utility function has a corresponding indirect 
utility function, Vni, which has a deterministic component vni and an unobservable 
component, εni, and is presented as: 
          ε                                                             (2) 
In logit models it is assumed that εni is independently and identically distributed 
extreme value (Train, 2003), and does not depend on underlying parameters or 
data. 
- 35 - 
The probability Pni that farmer n chooses alternative i over alternative j, can be 
expressed as the probability that the utility associated with alternative i is greater 
than that associated with all the other alternatives, j: 
                                         ε           (3) 
Conditional logit model (CLM) 
First a conditional logit model (CLM) was used to estimate the influence of scheme 
characteristics on the likelihood of participation. A CLM is the most commonly used 
and simplest of all the choice models. The utility for CLM, including a constant term 
to capture the effect of unobserved influences exert over the selection of the 
‘business as usual’ or ‘do not want to participate’ option becomes: 
                                            (4) 
The BAU is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if one of the hypothetical 
payment programmes is selected by a respondent on a particular choice card or 1 if 
the ‘do not want to participate’ option is selected. 
It assumes that unobservable components are identically, independently distributed 
and follow a Gumbel distribution (Hensher et al., 2005; Train, 2003). Therefore, the 
probability of selecting the alternative will be: 
      
                              
                                
 
   
                                     (5) 
Where, βk is the utility coefficient and Xkni is the level of attribute k for alternative i 
for a farmer n.  
Random Parameters Model (RPL) 
In RPL models the error term for individual n and alternative j,     is assumed to be 
composed of two additive elements so that the utility function for j as perceived by 
farmer n is described as: 
        
       
                                                       (6) 
- 36 - 
Here β´ is the taste parameter and η´ is a vector of random normal terms whose 
distribution over individuals and alternatives depends on the underlying parameters 
and observed data relating to the individual n and alternative i.  
The RPL model addresses the three limitations of standard logit models by allowing 
for random taste, i.e. ‘variation, unrestricted substitution pattern, and correlation in 
unobserved factors’ (Train, 2003 pg. 15) and explains taste variation by using 
explanatory variables and mixing distributions (Train, 2003).  
Stated more explicitly, a RPL model is any model whose choice probabilities can be 
expressed in the form 
                                                                       (7) 
Where        is the logit probability evaluated at parameters β. 
          
       
        
 
   
                                                       (8) 
Where      is the density function,        is the observed portion of the utility, 
which depends on the parameters β. If the utility is linear in β, then             . 
In this case, the mixed logit probability takes its usual form: 
         
      
        
                                                     (9) 
The mixed logit probability is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated at 
different values of β, with the weights given by the density function    .  
The standard deviations of the β represent the individual’s tastes and thus 
accommodates for the unobserved heterogeneity in the sample (Hensher and 
Greene, 2003).  
The three issues that need consideration for RPL model estimations are; the 
selection of random parameters, distribution of the random parameters, and the 
number of points for simulation. For the RPL analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 the 
random parameters were selected by first assuming that all parameters are random 
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and then examining their standard deviations to establish the overall contribution 
of the additional specification of the random parameters (Hensher et al., 2005).  
The influence of the distributional assumptions of random parameters are 
determined by defining the selected random parameters as functional forms such 
as normal, triangular, uniform, and lognormal (Hensher and Greene, 2003). Most 
commonly the normal distribution is used while the lognormal distribution is used 
for coefficients with an explicit sign assumption such as compensation (Train, 2003). 
Hence, all the attributes described in Chapters 5 and 6 were specified as normal 
except the compensation payments.  
The selection of a number of points for simulation can be conducted by methods 
such as Monte Carlo simulation methods, Halton method, etc. The Halton method is 
considered to have the ability to achieve more precise results with fewer draws 
(Train, 1999) and was used to determine the model stability and precision of 
estimates (Hensher, 2005). For the models estimated in Chapters 5 and 6, 1000 
Halton draws provided stable models.  
Latent Class model (LCM) 
The Latent class model (LCM) captures taste heterogeneity between different 
classes, each latent class being unique and thus accounting for taste variation across 
the population. The LCM classifies the respondents into segments and predicts their 
choice behaviour according to the segment they belong to. The number of 
segments is determined endogenously by the data (Birol et al., 2006).  Selecting the 
number of classes in the model should be based on the ability to provide 
interpretative simplicity; statistical criteria for model fit along with analyst’s 
judgement, are to be considered (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Scarpa and Thiene, 
2005; Swait, 1994). 
The LCM is specified as a random utility model where farmer n belongs to latent 
class s= (1, 2,…, S). The utility function can now be expressed as: 
                                                                          (10) 
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Where,     comprises of the attributes that appear in the utility functions and β’s is 
a segment specific parameter vector while       represents the random variation for 
the farmer n. The probability that the farmer n belonging to segment s will choose 
alternative i is given by: 
         
       
         
                                                            (11) 
In order to predict an individual’s membership in a segment, an unobservable latent 
segment membership likelihood function is used: 
     
     
                                                         (12) 
Where, Zn denotes a vector of individual and   
  is a segment specific parameter 
vector; and     is a stochastic error term. The error terms are assumed to be 
distributed independently across segments and individuals (Swait, 1994). The LCM 
then estimates joint probability to account for both choice and segment 
membership, Pnis =       . Wns. Therefore, the marginal probability of observing 
farmer n in segment s choosing alternative i is given by: 
          
      
        
  
   
   
    
    
                                          (13) 
Where the probability of selecting alternative i is equal to the sum over all latent 
classes s of the class-specific membership model conditional on the product of class 
Pni|s, and  the probability of belonging to that class Wns  (Swait, 1994). 
Marginal Willingness to Accept (WTA) estimations 
The supply of ecosystem services by farm households is associated with the 
willingness to accept a profit loss, which is due to the reduction in productivity and 
cost associated with changes in agricultural activities. This provides an estimate of 
the lowest levels of compensation land owners expect by taking up the changes 
required by payment schemes. Therefore, WTA estimations enable an analysis of 
how farmers trade off different levels of attributes against per hectare payments. 
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Eliciting WTA responses helps to inform effective policies (Espinosa-Goded et al., 
2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
WTA can be estimated by taking the ratio of an attribute’s parameter coefficients to 
the marginal utility of the payment attribute. This provides the marginal rate of 
substitution between the attribute and money (Hanemann, 1994).  
Individual specific conditional estimates of minimum WTA for a specific change in 
the particular land management attribute can be estimated using: 
                
 
    
       
        
                                       (14) 
Where,      is the estimated matrix of individual specific a posteriori probabilities 
of segment membership, and the ratio  
        
        
  is the implicit price for the 
attribute change, being valued, using the parameter coefficients from the relevant 
latent class segment. 
Welfare estimates (compensating variation) 
Compensating variation (CV) is defined as the amount of money taken from income 
that will equate to the utility of the preferred choice after the change in quality with 
the utility of the preferred choice before the change (Bockstael and McConnell, 
2007). The situations before and after the change needs to be compared in order to 
examine the monetary impact of a change. The status quo (ASC) coefficients show 
the marginal utility of non-participation. Subtracting the marginal utilities of all the 
programme attributes from the marginal utility of the status quo (ASC) can provide 
the overall WTA for the programme (Train, 2003). Therefore, the welfare estimates 
for a policy would be represented as: 
      
               
      
                                         (15) 
Where ∑βatt, is the sum of the coefficients of all the policy attributes and βascBAU is 
the coefficient retention of with the status quo.  
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ASC, the alternative specific constant, is usually incorporated into econometric 
analysis to capture unobservable influences beyond attributes present in the choice 
sets and a significant ASC indicates the presence of a status quo effect (Adamowicz 
et al., 1998; Scarpa et al., 2005). Generally in most CE studies ASC has proved to be 
highly significant and influences the model fit. Usually omitting the current situation 
would result in decreasing utility (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2009).  
The effects of the ASC on preferences and its exclusion from welfare estimations 
have been discussed by various studies in the literature. Reasons behind preference 
for the status quo include regret avoidance; maintaining consistency; misperceived 
costs (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988); loss aversion (Kahneman et al., 1991); 
mistrust (Adamowicz et al., 1998); complexity of choices (Moon, 2004 cited in 
Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2009); and perceived task complexity (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 
2009). However, aversion to choosing the status quo occurs if the status quo is 
defined in a less favourable way (Soini and Horne, 2005) through yea-saying bias to 
please the interviewer. Since calculating welfare measures is important for 
evaluation of PES schemes, the ASC is of critical importance. Alternative 
interpretations of ASCs are further discussed in the CE results chapters (Chapter 5 & 
6) and the compensating variation estimations are described and discussed in 
Chapter 7.   
The complete CE study design is explained in Appendix A while the framework for 
the analysis is presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  
3.3.3. Stage 3: Carbon valuation and spatial linkage 
The final stage of the research deals with the third objective of the thesis – to 
calculate carbon abatement costs for potential payment schemes and provide an 
analysis of the spatial pattern of the carbon abatement costs through PES 
schemes across the UK. This stage involves; a) calculation of carbon abatement 
costs by combining the individual welfare estimates from the CE study with the 
carbon abatement potentials, calculated from the estimated emissions/carbon 
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storage, and b) exploring the interdependence between carbon abatement costs 
and the landscape and individual farms characteristics.  
This stage of analysis involved estimations based on results and outputs from the 
first two stages of the thesis.  
The carbon valuation analysis involved the estimations of emissions for each policy 
scheme. A Marginal Abatement Carbon Cost (MACC) was estimated by calculating 
the price of reductions in carbon emissions as a result of the adoption of alternative 
policy scenarios. This was done by defining two policy levels for each policy scheme. 
This helped to investigate the relationship between policy design, scheme 
participation and therefore the carbon reductions, and required compensation 
payment. The carbon abatement estimations were combined with the individual 
WTA estimations from stage 2 to calculate the costs per tonne of carbon.  
This cost analysis was followed by a spatial analysis to provide a linkage between 
the carbon costs and spatial attributes. The land use maps generated in stage 1 
were employed for this analysis. These spatial distributions identified the areas of 
lower carbon costs for climate change mitigation that can be targeted effectively by 
implementing PES schemes.  
The spatial analysis was carried out by mapping the resulting data using GIS. The 
carbon values were joined with the outputs of the Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario 
(2004) of land use models (stage 1). Carbon abatement calculations were carried 
out for the BAU land use scenario according to the policy changes recommended by 
both mitigation and sequestration policy scheme. This helped to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of policy implementation in each grid (represented by the 
individual respondent). This provided linkage of the spatial attributes of landscape 
with the socioeconomic and carbon mitigation for each respondent, enabling 
identification of the areas with highest mitigation potential and lowest 
compensation costs. Regression analysis was employed to explore sources of 
variations in the carbon valuation. A complete description of the data manipulation, 
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processing, and the steps of this analysis is provided in the data and methods 
section of Chapter 7. 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter provided the overall research framework of the thesis. It provided an 
overview of the three stages of the PhD research and how they complement each 
other to achieve the main aim of the study. Each analytical component was 
discussed in detail explaining the methods applied. The following chapters will 
provide, and discuss, the results of each stage individually.   
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Chapter 4 Estimating changes in climate regulatory service due to 
changes in farmland management 
 
Abstract 
Land use change is induced by various drivers such as socio-economic, 
technological, governance, and climate change. Agricultural systems are not only 
impacted by climate change but they also contribute to GHG emissions. This 
chapter provides estimates of changes in the GHG emissions and carbon storage in 
the UK farmland as a result of climate change induced land use changes. The 
analysis was done in two phases; first, the greenhouse gas emissions and carbon 
storage (for both soil and biomass carbon) stocks were calculated for different land 
use and soil types across the UK by reviewing existing data. Then a high resolution 
land use model, at the scale of the UK, was used to explicitly model land use related 
agricultural GHG emissions under high and low emission scenarios as defined by the 
UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP), for the period from 2004-2060. The 
analysis showed that there are large variations in land use change across the UK 
with respect to climate change scenarios. The estimates predicted significant 
regional differences, revealing an increase in GHG emissions in the northern and 
western parts of the UK and a decrease in lowland south and east of the country. 
The results also predicted an 11% increase in emissions over the next couple of 
decades considering climate change induced land use change. The analysis suggests 
that climate change will reduce the capacity of ecosystems to regulate the increases 
in carbon emissions. However, some adjustments to land use will help to reduce 
emissions for some regions.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Climate change is an important issue in agriculture because it not only affects 
agricultural production, but also because agriculture is a major contributor towards 
the emission of GHGs (Paustian et al., 1997). Agriculture accounts for 10-14% of 
global (Smith et al., 2007c) and approximately 9% of the UK (Stallman, 2011) 
emissions of GHGs. About 70% of UK land is under agricultural production (Banzahf 
and Boyd, 2005). On the other hand, a climate regulation service is provided by 
agroecosystems in terms of accumulation of atmospheric CO2 as carbon in soil and 
biomass.  
Agriculture contributes to GHG emissions through the use of fossil fuels; emissions 
from production, transport and application of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides; from 
livestock through direct release or from vegetation and soil due to grazing; and 
tillage of soils, which breaks up aggregates to release carbon stored in soil (Lal, 
2004; Pretty and Ball, 2001a; Smith et al., 2008). The major GHGs emitted include 
CO2, CH4, and N2O. About one third of global CO2 emissions are caused by changes 
in land use like forest clearing, cultivation shifting, intensive cultivation, etc. and 
approximately two-thirds of the global CH4 and most of the N2O also are released by 
agriculture (Kotschi and Muller-Samann, 2004). 
 However, agriculture simultaneously offers a potential to reduce GHG emissions 
significantly. Land use and management activities are an important part of climate 
regulation assessments (Rounsevell and Reay, 2009). Different land use activities 
have different capacities for storing or emitting GHGs, depending upon the 
intensities of changes. Agricultural land use activities are associated with energy 
consumption and GHG emissions, and these land uses can have a profound impact 
on the greenhouse gas flux. Land use changes affect the level and value of climate 
regulation service. It can alter the carbon stocks both below and above ground for a 
given land use (Erb, 2004). The impacts of land use change on agriculture, have 
received considerable attention (Hediger, 2006; Moran et al., 2010; West and 
Marland, 2003). Since GHG emissions vary according to land use type (Lal, 2004), 
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changes in land use will affect these emissions (Smith, 2004). Given that both 
predicted climate change patterns and the productivity of agricultural land varies 
across regions, changes in agricultural land uses will alter productivity, and are 
expected to affect the GHG emissions across space even at relatively fine spatial 
scales. Consequently, models for GHG estimations should ideally be spatially explicit 
to account for fine resolution adjustment to climate change through changes in land 
use and consider the impact of these land use changes on GHG emissions.  
Thus, this chapter builds on the literature of estimations of GHG emissions to 
predict the effect of climate change on land use change decisions and its 
subsequent effect on the climate regulatory service provided by agriculture. The 
analysis uses the structural econometric model (as described in Chapter 3) to 
explicitly model land use related agricultural GHG emissions under high and low 
emission scenarios as defined by the UKCIP for the period from 2004-2060. Hence, 
the specific objectives of the study are: 
 To collate and review previous literature and give an overview of the carbon 
stocks, both soil carbon (SOC) and biomass (vegetative) carbon (BIOC) 
stocks, for different land uses. 
 To develop flow estimates of GHG emissions for each land use category. 
 To evaluate the change in regulatory service by enclosed farmlands by 
estimating the potential changes in the carbon stocks and GHG flows for two 
climate change scenarios for each of the years 2020, 2040 and 2060.  
The chapter starts with an overview of the analytical framework (Section 4.2). 
Section 4.3 provides a detailed description of the data collated for the estimations 
of carbon and GHG (CO2, N2O, and CH4) fluxes from UK farmlands, followed by data 
for GHG flux estimations from agricultural land use change (Section 4.4). The results 
and discussions of the estimations are provided in section 4.5, while the chapter 
concludes at section 4.6.  
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4.2. Analytical framework 
This analysis includes the evaluation of the change in the regulatory service of UK 
enclosed farmlands (defined in Chapter 3). The analysis includes carbon stock and 
GHG flux estimations from land use changes. The carbon stock estimates are based 
on predicted changes in both the SOC and BIOC under the land use patterns. The 
GHG flux estimates include both the GHG emissions resulting from land use change 
and changes in management activities (including energy usage, emissions from 
fertilizers and livestock, etc.) and the annual SOC emissions or storage resulting 
from changes in land use. All the GHG fluxes and carbon stocks are converted to 
CO2 equivalents (CO2e). 
The changes in land uses are drawn from the output of the CSERGE agricultural land 
use model (LUM-FB) (see detailed description in Chapter 3) based on the predicted 
climate changes associated with the UKCIP low and high GHG emission scenarios 
(Baggott et al., 2007) for the years 2004, 2020, 2040 and 2060 (detail below). The 
analysis also includes estimates of both the changes in potential equilibrium carbon 
stocks and the changes in annual flux of GHGs associated with the shifts in the 
modelled agricultural land use.  
The GHGs included in the analysis are CO2, CH4, and N2O. CH4 is produced by decay 
of organic matter under anaerobic conditions. The enteric fermentation in ruminant 
livestock, stored manures and biomass burning are some of the practices which 
result in the production of methane (Mosier et al., 1998). N2O is released by 
microbial action on nitrogen in the soils and the application of organic (manure) and 
artificial fertilizers (Smith et al., 2007b) while CO2 is released from the soil due to 
soil decomposition and from land use and management activities (Lal, 2004).  
The analysis included eight land use types; cereal cropping, oilseed rape, root crops 
(sugar beet and potatoes), temporary grassland, permanent grassland, rough 
grazing, and other agricultural land-use (including woodland, horticulture, and 
bare/fallow land). It also included three livestock types; sheep, dairy and beef.  The 
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livestock numbers and land use shares are derived from the LUMFB model.  The 
framework of this study is presented in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For this analysis (Figure 4.1) it is assumed that the SOC stocks depend not only on 
the land use but also the soil type (either organic or non-organic), while BIOC is 
assumed to be dependent on land use only. As mentioned above, each land use is 
associated with certain farm management activities such as tillage, fertilizer 
spreading, pesticide spraying etc. Carbon emissions include direct emissions from 
soils and emissions from changes in farm management activities due to land use 
changes are captured. Livestock contributes to the GHG emissions through manure 
and enteric fermentation which release N2O (due to excretion of nitrogen) and CH4 
respectively. The analysis does not include introduction of new crops and 
technological innovation in carbon efficiency.  
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Enteric 
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Figure ‎4.1 Changes in land use and associated GHG emissions and carbon stocks 
included in the analysis 
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UKCIP Scenarios 
The UKCIP, in conjunction with the Met Office, has created projections for a variety 
of climatic variables under certain global scenarios6 detailed by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The projections correspond to 
three future emissions scenarios – Low, Medium, and High. However, for the 
current study only the Low and High emissions scenarios were employed to 
examine the potential changes in the carbon stocks and GHG flux from UK 
farmlands. The year 2004 was taken as the baseline year and the projections were 
estimated for the years 2020, 2040 up to 2060.   
4.3. Data and Estimations of carbon stocks and GHG flux from UK 
enclosed farmlands 
Carbon stored in live biomass and the soils of agricultural systems cannot be 
retained permanently, as different human and natural activities cause it to be 
released back into the atmosphere. According to Dawson and Smith (2007) carbon 
emissions in farmlands occur in the form of:   
i. Increased soil organic matter decomposition rates due to 
intensification of cultivation. 
ii. Soil degradation due to erosion.  
The emissions of GHGs from enclosed farmlands occur because of farming activities 
and livestock. The major sources of GHG were considered in the annual GHG 
emission flux and these include: 
iii. The indirect CO2 emissions due to energy use from agricultural 
activities such as tillage, sowing, spraying, harvesting, and the 
production, storage and transport of fertilizers and pesticides. The 
GHG estimates were calculated for typical farming practices for each 
                                                        
6 This data is freely available from the UKCIP website (http://ukclimateprojections.defra.gov.uk)  
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hectare, and were applied to each land use type in order to map 
these emissions across the UK. 
iv. Emissions of N2O and CH4 from livestock, including beef cattle, dairy 
cows and sheep through the production of manure and enteric 
fermentation. 
v. Direct emissions of N2O from artificial fertilizers. 
In order to estimate GHG emissions for the UK it was assumed that agricultural 
activities can be adequately described from the typical farming practices for each 
crop type.  
A detailed account of carbon storage and GHG fluxes from the enclosed farmlands is 
presented in the following sub sections: 
4.3.1. Soil carbon stocks 
Data:  
Various studies have estimated carbon stocks across the UK under different land 
uses (see Bradley et al., 2005; Dawson and Smith, 2007; Milne and Brown, 1997).  
Soil organic carbon represents the UK’s largest carbon stocks (Bradley et al., 2005; 
Milne et al., 2007). Soil types were defined as either organic (peat) soil or non-
organic (non-peat) soils. Areas of peat soils were identified from the European Soil 
Database (Watkiss and others, 2005).  
For organic soils it is assumed that undisturbed soils (rough grazing) had an average 
soil carbon content of 1200 tC/ha, (Bateman and Lovett, 2000). Dawson and Smith 
(2007) estimated the total soil carbon in GB to be 9.8±2.4 billion tonnes of which, 
5.1 billion tonnes is stored in the peat lands. The values for non-organic soils were 
derived from Bradley et al. (2005) estimates which are: 132.6 tC/ha for England, 
187.4 tC/ha for Scotland, 142.3 tC/ha for Wales and 212.2 tC/ha for Northern 
Ireland. 
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Estimations: 
The ability of soil to store carbon depends on the type of soil and the land use 
applied to those soils along with the related climate, hydrology, and topography of 
the area (Abson et al., 2010). For this analysis the two factors, i.e. soil type and land 
use, were modelled.  
The influence of land use on the two soil types was accounted for by applying land 
use factors to the national SOC estimates. Taking data from Cruickshank et al. 
(1998) it was assumed that non-organic soils under arable land uses have 84% of 
the SOC of the same soils under improved grassland, while soils under woodland 
and rough grazing have 33% more than improved grasslands.  
Peat soils under arable land uses were assumed to have long term equilibrium SOC 
equal to the average non organic soil SOC of the region within which the soils are 
located. For peat soils under temporary grasslands, permanent grasslands and 
woodlands; SOC was assumed to be 580 tC/ha (Cruickshank et al., 1998).  
The validity of the model assumptions for the estimates of potential equilibrium 
SOC for the UK for the baseline year (2004) was checked by comparison with the 
most comprehensive estimate of UK SOC provided by Bradley et al. (2005). They 
estimated the UK SOC stock as 4,563 million tC, the estimates for the baseline year 
scenario (2004) for the current study were 4,616 million tC, showing a discrepancy 
of 1.3%. The largest discrepancy was 5.8% for Scotland, which is potentially due to 
the extensive peat soils found in Scotland and the difficulty in accurately estimating 
SOC in peat soils due to issues like surrounding soil depths along with associated 
technical factors (Pretty and Ball, 2001b). The estimates of average equilibrium SOC 
for each land use are presented in Table 4.1. 
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 Table ‎4.1  Average SOC estimations for different land uses and soil types in the UK 
Land uses England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland 
Non 
peat 
(tC/ha) 
Peat 
(tC/ha) 
Non 
peat 
(tC/ha) 
Peat 
(tC/ha) 
Non 
peat 
(tC/ha) 
Peat 
(tC/ha) 
Non 
peat 
(tC/ha) 
Peat 
(tC/ha) 
Oilseed 
rape 
111 133 157 187 120 142 178 212 
Cereals 111 133 157 187 120 142 178 212 
Root crops 111 133 157 187 120 142 178 212 
EFH_other 111 133 157 187 120 142 178 212 
Temporary 
grassland 
133 580 187 580 142 212 212 580 
Permanent 
grassland 
133 580 187 580 142 212 212 580 
Rough 
grazing 
176 1200 249 1200 189 282 282 1200 
Woodland 176 580 249 580 189 282 282 580 
 
 
4.3.2. Estimations of biomass carbon stocks 
Data: 
The data for estimates of the biomass carbon stocks for different agricultural land 
uses were taken from Cruickshank et al. (1998); Milne et al. (2001); Bradley et al. 
(2005); and Ostle et al. (2009). It was assumed that annual vegetative carbon stock 
represents a permanent stock while a particular agricultural land use continues. The 
biomass lost through harvest in one year is assumed to be replaced by new biomass 
growth in the next year. 
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Estimates:   
The vegetative carbon stocks were based on both above and below ground 
biomass. For the baseline year it was estimated that the total UK BIOC stocks were 
28.82 million tC. This is in broad agreement with the findings of Milne et al. (2001) 
who estimated vegetative carbon stocks of 22.8±5.1 million TC for Great Britain 
(England, Wales, and Scotland only). Table 4.2 indicates the per hectare estimates 
of BIOC for various land uses considered in this analysis.  
 
Table ‎4.2 Average vegetative stocks for different land uses 
Land use BIOC (tC/ha) 
Oil seed rape 1.8 
Cereals 2.4 
Root crops 2.5 
Temporary grasslands* 0.9 
Permanent grasslands* 0.9 
Rough grazing (non-organic soils)** 1.66 
Rough grazing (organic soils)** 2.0 
Other 1.4 
Woodland 36.8 
*Based on improved grassland category ** Based on semi-natural grassland category 
(Sources: Cruickshank et al., 1998; Milne et al., 2001; Ostle et al., 2009; Bradley et al., 2005) 
 
4.3.3. Estimations of direct CO2 emissions from soils 
The emissions from soils (Table 4.3) include emissions from peat soils which release 
CO2 under aerobic conditions. For all other kinds of soils (mineral soils) the soil 
carbon flux is assumed to be zero at equilibrium (Falloon et al., 2004). 
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Table ‎4.3 Direct carbon emissions from soils 
Land uses Soil emissions (tCO2eq/ha/yr) 
Cereals 15 
Oilseed rape 15 
Root crops 15 
Temporary grassland* 7.30 
Permanent grassland* 7.30 
Rough grazing (non-oragnic soils)** 0 
Rough grazing (organic soils)** 0 
Other  11.15 
*Based on improved grassland category ** Based on semi-natural grassland category 
(Sources: Baggot et al., 2007; IPCC, 2006) 
 
4.3.4. Estimations of indirect CO2 emissions 
The carbon flows are an integral part of the carbon consequences in the enclosed 
farmlands sector, and these emissions are attributed to the different management 
practices associated with different land uses.  
Data: 
The carbon emissions (Table 4.4) for this analysis were calculated for agricultural 
activities such as tillage, sowing, fertilizers and pesticides (herbicides, fungicides, 
insecticides) applications, harvesting and bailing by combining the estimates from 
Lal (2004), which is based on a review of existing studies converted into tCO2e/ha.  
Estimations:  
The analysis was carried out for the eight land use types mentioned in the 
framework section. The emissions were based on typical farming practices, which 
have been taken from the UK agriculture website (Chen et al., 2010). The farming 
practices for each land use type are as follows: 
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Cereals: A typical production cycle for cereals includes onetime conventional tillage 
(including mouldboard ploughing, two discings, field cultivation and rotary hoeing) 
emitting 0.13tCO2e/ha/yr, one time sowing emitting 0.01tCO2e/ha/yr, 2 fertilizer 
sprays emitting 0.24tCO2e/ha/yr, 2 pesticides (herbicides and insecticides) 
applications emitting 0.01tCO2e/ha/yr, one time combine harvesting emitting 
0.0366tCO2e/ha/yr, and one bailing emitting 0.12tCO2e/ha/yr. 
Oilseed rape: A typical production cycle for oilseed rape includes a conventional 
tillage emitting 0.13tCO2e/ha/yr, sowing emitting 0.01tCO2e/ha/yr, 3 fertilizer 
sprays emitting 0.27tCO2e/ha/yr (fulfilling N requirement is 210 Kg N/ha), 5 
applications of pesticides (2 herbicides, 2 insecticides, and 1 fungicide) emitting 
0.03tCO2e/ha/yr, and combine harvesting emitting 0.0366tCO2e/ha/yr. 
Root crops: root crops also involve conventional tillage emitting 0.13tCO2e/ha/yr, 
sowing emitting 0.01tCO2e/ha/yr, fertilizer spraying emitting 0.26tCO2e/ha/yr (N 
requirement 200Kg N/ha), 4 pesticide applications (including 3 insecticide spraying 
and 1 herbicide) emitting 0.02tCO2e/ha/yr, and harvesting emitting 
0.0366tCO2e/ha/yr. 
Temporary grasslands: includes conventional tillage, which is assumed to occur 
only once in every four years, emitting 0.03tCO2e/ha/yr, sowing also is assumed to 
be once in four years therefore emitting 0.003tCO2e/ha/yr, fertilizer application 
emitting 0.33tCO2e/ha/yr, forage harvesting emitting 0.0011tCO2e/ha/yr, and 
bailing emitting 0.121tCO2e/ha/yr. Here, the distinction between dairy and beef 
grasslands has been based on the nitrogen (fertilizer) requirement for each use of 
the grasslands which, for temporary grasslands with beef cattle, is 175 KgN/ha, and 
for dairy cows it is 250 KgN/ha. 
Permanent grasslands: include only 1 fertilizer application emitting 
0.23tCO2e/ha/yr (N requirement is 175 KgN/ha/yr), and bailing emitting 
0.121tCO2e/ha/yr. 
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Combining the number of applications and the emissions from each farming activity 
provides us with total indirect emissions for each land use, which are summarised in 
Table 4.4. 
Table ‎4.4: Indirect carbon emissions for each land use specifically for each agricultural 
activity.  
Land use Emissions from each farm activity (tCO2e/ha/yr) Total indirect 
emissions 
(tCO2e/ha/yr) 
Tillage  Sowing  Fertilizer 
spraying  
Pesticide 
spraying  
Combined 
harvesting  
Forage 
harvesting  
Bailing  
Cereals 0.13 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.55 
Oilseed 
rape 
0.13 0.01 0.27 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.48 
Root crops 0.13 0.01 0.26 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.46 
Temporary 
grassland  
0.03 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.48 
Permanent 
grassland  
0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.35 
Rough 
grazing  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 0.10 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.40 
(Sources: Lal, 2004) 
4.3.5. Estimations of N2O emissions from different land uses 
Data: 
N2O emissions contributed by the use of fertilizers and by the manure of livestock, 
either spread as slurry or as direct input from the grazing livestock, were considered 
for this analysis. In order to avoid double counting of emissions from artificial 
fertilizers and organic fertilizers (manure), the information regarding the N 
requirements for each land use type and N inputs by both artificial fertilizer and 
organic manure was used.  
The N2O emissions estimates for fertilizers were calculated by using the N 
requirement for each land use category, which are; Cereals (187 Kg N/ha/yr); 
Oilseed rape (210 Kg N/ha/yr); Root crops (200 Kg N/ha/yr); Temporary Grassland 
(250 KgN/ha/yr); Permanent Grassland (175 KgN/ha/yr); Rough Grazing (0 Kg 
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N/ha/yr) (Beaton, 2006; Kroeze, 1994). Emissions from each kg of fertilizer (Table 
4.5) were taken from Lal (2004).  
The estimations for N2O emissions from farmyard manure included the N 
requirements and manure excretion for livestock. The manure excretion data was 
taken from (UKCIP, 2009) and was extended for the livestock numbers and land use 
distribution for each 2km2 across the UK.  
Estimations:  
The estimates from inorganic fertilizers were calculated by combining the N 
requirements for each land use category with the emissions from each kg of 
inorganic fertilizer. The values were converted to carbon equivalents (CO2e) (Table 
4.5). 
Table ‎4.5: N2O emissions from different land uses according to the Nitrogen requirements 
from inorganic fertilizers 
Farm Activity N 
Requirement 
(KgN/ha/yr) 
Emissions 
(KgN2O/Kg 
fertilizer) 
Conversion 
Factor 
(KgN2O-
tCO2e) 
Total emissions 
(tCO2e/KgN/yr) 
Cereals 187 0.0171 0.296 0.95 
Oilseed rape 210 0.0171 0.296 1.06 
Root crops 200 0.0171 0.296 1.01 
Temporary grassland  
250 0.0171 0.296 1.27 
Permanent grassland  175 0.0171 0.296 0.89 
Rough grazing (non-
peat) 
0.00 0.0171 0.296 0.00 
Rough grazing (peat) 0.00 0.0171 0.296 0.00 
Other 204 0.0171 0.296 1.03 
(Sources: Beaton, 2006; Kroeze, 1994; Lal, 2004) 
In order to calculate the distribution of N2O emissions from farmyard manure across 
the land it was necessary to consider the grazing and housing time periods for 
livestock. According to Smith et al. (2007a) average dairy cattle are housed for 190 
days and grazed for 175 days, beef cattle are housed for 151 days and grazed for 
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214 days, while sheep spend 335 days grazing while they are housed for 30 days 
only during the year. It was assumed that the emissions are 100% from farmyard 
manure during housing and 100% from deposition on grasslands during grazing 
periods. The data used to calculate distribution of manure is presented in Table 4.6.  
Table ‎4.6: N2O emissions from manure supplied by livestock 
Livestock Excretion 
(Kg 
N/head/yr) 
Direct application to grasslands 
Slurry/Farm applications for 
other land uses 
Direct 
application  
to 
grasslands 
(Kg 
N/head/yr) 
Direct grassland 
application 
emissions 
(tCO2e/head/yr) 
 
Slurry/Farm 
applications 
for other 
land uses 
(Kg 
N/head/yr) 
Slurry Application 
emissions 
(tCO2e/head/yr) 
Dairy 
51.00 24.45 0.1448 26.55 0.0157 
Beef 24.80 14.54 0.0861 10.26 0.0061 
Sheep 
10.00 9.18 0.0543 0.82 0.0005 
(Sources: Beaton, 2006; Freibauer, 2003) 
4.3.6. Estimations of CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation 
The CH4 emissions from livestock are mainly from enteric fermentation. These 
emissions were calculated by using the data from Roulet et al. (2007) and are 
presented in Table 4.7. 
Table ‎4.7: Methane emissions from enteric fermentation 
Livestock  Emissions from enteric 
fermentation 
(tCH4/head/yr) 
Total emissions 
(tCO2e/head/yr) 
Dairy 0.1035 0.0023805 
Beef 0.048 0.001104 
Sheep 0.008 0.000184 
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4.4. Estimations for GHG flux from agricultural land use change 
This section relates to the annual flow of emissions of GHG from land use change. It 
is comprised of two components: i) Annual SOC fluxes due to land use change. For 
example, permanent grassland converted from arable farming will be accumulating 
SOC, while permanent grassland on land that was previously under rough grazing 
will be losing SOC; and ii) Annual carbon fluxes from changes in vegetative biomass 
associated with land use changes. 
For the Baseline year (2004) annual flows of SOC were only estimated for organic 
(peat) soils as there is insufficient data on land use change prior to the baseline to 
accurately model changes in SOC in non-organic soils. In the analysis of the 
subsequent years, SOC flows from both organic and nonorganic soils due to land 
use change were included. Annual SOC fluxes were based on the assumption that 
organic soils sequester carbon under rough grazing. Estimates for SOC sequestration 
rates in organic soils vary from 0.18tC/ha/yr (Turunen et al., 2002) to 0.36-
0.73tC/ha/yr (Worrall et al., 2009). For this analysis an average of six estimates 
found in the literature was taken as 0.3tC/ha/yr, and was assumed as the SOC 
accumulated in peat under rough grazing. Under arable/horticultural land uses it 
was assumed that 1.22tC/ha/yr of SOC would be released from peat soils, and 
0.61tC/ha/yr would be released from peat soils under improved grassland (Foley et 
al., 2005). For nonorganic soils it was assumed that mean equilibrium SOC levels 
would change from those associated with the previous land uses to the SOC levels 
associated with the new land uses (see Table 4.1). SOC storage and SOC emissions 
were assumed to occur evenly over a 100 year and 50 year period respectively 
(Thomson et al., 2007). For example, a hectare of nonorganic soil in England 
converted from cereals to permanent grassland was assumed to accumulate 22 
tonnes of SOC before it reached a new equilibrium.  
Emissions and accumulations of carbon in terrestrial vegetative biomass were based 
on the change in vegetative biomass in the move from one land use to another. The 
change in equilibrium vegetative carbon stock estimates for each      2 km2 grid (see 
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Table 4.2) was divided by the time period over which the change occurred to 
provide an estimate of the annual vegetative GHG fluxes from EFH. Where the 
modelled annual accumulation of carbon in terrestrial vegetative biomass was 
lower than the baseline year, then a net emission of GHG was considered. It was 
assumed that the accumulation and emissions of GHGs associated with unchanged 
land uses were zero, with annual emissions balancing annual sequestration. Total 
GHG fluxes from agriculture are simply the sum of SOC fluxes, vegetative biomass 
carbon fluxes and fluxes from agricultural activities within each 2 km2 grid. 
4.5. Results and discussions 
The results are illustrated by mapping the baseline year (2004) against scenarios for 
high and low emissions for the years 2020, 2040, and 2060. The analysis of the 
changes in annual greenhouse gas emissions from changes in land use management 
is also presented and illustrated by mapping the Business as Usual scenario (BAU) 
against the outputs from the scenario analysis. 
4.5.1. Evaluation of the changes in carbon storage capacity 
a.  Carbon stocks for baseline year 
This analysis provides a total UK estimate of vegetative carbon stocks for the 
baseline year (2004) of 134MtC, of which 77% is stored in woodlands. This 
compares with Milne and Brown’s (1997) estimate of 113.8±25 MtC for GB with 
80% stored in the woodland (Dale, 1997). Figure 4.2 shows the potential equilibrium 
vegetative carbon stock (a), SOC stock (b), and combined vegetative and SOC stocks 
(c), for the baseline year 2004. From Figure 4.2 it is clear that the vegetative stocks 
are quite evenly spread across the UK, with the highest stocks in the forested areas, 
while SOC is highest in the upland peat. 50% of the carbon stocks are found in 
Scotland (2365 MtC), with a further 37% (1755 MtC) in England, 7% (338 MtC) in 
Wales, and 6% (292 MtC) in Northern Ireland. 
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Figure ‎4.2 Baseline potential equilibrium carbon stocks for the UK 
 
b.  Changes in carbon stocks under UKCIP scenarios 
With the exception of projected moderate increases in carbon stocks in 2040 for 
Northern Ireland (due to increased rough grazing), only some parts of east England 
and parts of the north east Scottish Highlands show a consistent increase in carbon 
stocks, again due to a reversion of land use from arable farming to rough 
grazing/semi natural grasslands. The largest reductions in carbon stocks occur in 
peat land and uplands in the UK. There is a significant reduction in potential 
equilibrium carbon stocks in the lowland agricultural regions of southern England, in 
both low and high emissions scenarios, but the losses are more prominent in the 
high emissions scenario for the year 2060.  
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the regional changes in carbon stocks for two climate 
scenarios. The patterns are quite similar across both, although changes in the 
southern regions increase more rapidly in the high emissions scenario. The total 
reduction in potential UK equilibrium carbon storage from the baseline year to 2060 
is 1,381 MtC for the low emissions scenario and 1,560 MtC for the high emissions 
scenario, this would equate to total CO2 emissions of approximately 5,064 MtCO2e 
and 5,719 MtCO2e respectively. The total UK emissions of GHGs in 2008 have been 
estimated as 6,285 MtCO2e (Yearley, 2009).  
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Figure ‎4.3: Changes in potential equilibrium carbon stocks for the UK due to land use 
changes under two UKCIP emissions scenarios
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Figure ‎4.4 Regional changes in potential UK equilibrium carbon stocks due to land use change under two climate changes scenario
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4.5.2. Evaluation of the changes in GHG flux 
The GHG flux in UK enclosed farmlands are due to the indirect emissions from 
farming activities (including emissions due to manufacture and application of 
external inputs, direct emissions from both artificial fertilizers and farmyard manure 
from livestock, and direct emissions from enteric fermentation in livestock (dairy, 
beef and sheep) (Figure 4.5).  
The annual GHG fluxes for baseline years are estimated to be 35 MtCO2e. Official 
estimates for the GHG emissions from agriculture for 2004 range from 44.53MtCO2e 
(Thomson et al., 2007) to 51.7 MtCO2e (Yearley, 2009). It was expected that the 
analysis presented here would have estimates below the official figures because the 
emissions for pig and poultry farming, or carbon emissions from soils (due to lack of 
spatially explicit data on land use change prior to 2004), are not included. In 2004 
emissions from enteric fermentation and direct release of N2O from the application 
of both artificial fertilizers and farmyard manure represent the highest source of 
GHG emissions. Emissions were highest in the south of England, and lowest in the 
extensively farmed upland areas in the UK.  
The changes in annual GHG fluxes from agricultural activities and agricultural land 
use change under the two UKCIP climate changes scenarios are illustrated in Figure 
4.6. The negative values represent net reductions in annual emissions, while 
positive values represent net increase in GHG emissions from agriculture. Both 
scenarios show considerable changes in annual emissions, with lowland areas of 
England showing a decrease in emissions, and the largest reductions in the South 
West of England. Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland and northern upland areas of 
England are all predicted to show an aggregate increase in carbon emissions due to 
increased livestock numbers and a greater presence of arable and horticultural 
production, leading to increased emissions of N2O and methane. The conversion of 
peat land from rough grazing/semi-natural grassland to improved grassland is also a 
potentially large source of increased GHG emissions. While the emissions per 
hectare are more pronounced in the high emissions climate scenario, the overall 
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predicted emissions from agriculture are similar for both scenarios, with UK GHG 
emissions for EFH estimated as moving from 1.54 tCO2e/ha/yr to 1.69 tCO2e/ha/yr 
in 2060 (low emissions scenario), and 1.65 tCO2e/ha/yr in 2060 (high emissions 
scenario). This equates to an aggregate increase in UK GHG emission for agriculture 
of approximately 11% between 2004 and 2020, under both emissions scenarios. 
Table 4.8 provides a detailed analysis of the percentage of change in the UK annual 
GHG emissions from enclosed farmlands.  
- 66 - 
 
Figure ‎4.5: Estimated CO2 flux from the UK farmlands for the year 2004 
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Figure ‎4.6: Estimated Changes in GHG emissions from enclosed farmlands 
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Table ‎4.8: Changes in regional carbon fluxes from the baseline year from enclosed 
farmlands 
Regions UKCIP low emissions Scenario UKCIP high emissions scenario 
Change in 
carbon 
fluxes     
2004 -
2020  
Change in 
carbon 
fluxes     
2004 -
2040  
Change in 
carbon 
fluxes  
2004 -
2060  
 Change in 
carbon 
fluxes  
2004 -
2020  
Change 
in 
carbon 
fluxes   
2004 -
2040  
Change in 
carbon 
fluxes  
2004 -
2060 
Scotland 42.4% 56.9% 66.1% 39.8% 60.4% 82.1% 
Wales 19.9% 23.0% 22.2% 19.1% 23.4% 18.3% 
Northern 
Ireland 
18.7% 21.6% 22.2% 17.8% 23.0% 22.1% 
North East 18.7% 20.2% 19.1% 18.0% 21.0% 15.8% 
North West 18.1% 21.2% 21.3% 17.3% 21.9% 20.3% 
Yorkshire 
Humber 
8.2% 6.0% 2.2% 8.4% 4.8% -3.8% 
East Midlands -5.2% -12.8% -20.3% -3.6% -15.7% -30.1% 
West 
Midlands 
-3.6% -11.7% -20.4% -2.3% -14.6% -32.4% 
East of 
England 
-14.1% -21.0% -27.6% -11.3% -23.4% -37.1% 
South East -14.3% -23.8% -33.0% -10.4% -27.6% -45.4% 
South West -1.8% -8.0% -16.6% -0.3% -11.3% -30.7% 
London -17.4% -26.7% -35.5% -13.2% -29.6% -46.4% 
UK average 11.5% 11.8% 9.7% 11.7% 11.3% 
 
6.7% 
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The regional analysis of changes in annual carbon emissions from agriculture (Figure 
4.8) shows an overall increase in emissions, most of which comes from Scotland, the 
North of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Scotland is predicted to move from 
being the lowest emitter of agriculture related GHGs to one of the highest, while 
Northern Ireland GHG emissions from agriculture are predicted to exceed 
3tCO2e/ha/yr under both emissions scenarios by 2020. These estimates do not 
include annual fluxes of SOC in peat soils as they are included in the stock analysis. 
In the baseline year net carbon emissions from UK peat soils is estimated at 
3.76MtCO2e/yr increasing to 7.67 MtCO2e/yr by 2060 (high emissions scenario), 
with Scotland accounting for almost half of these emissions (1.56 and 
4.19MtCO2e/yr in 2004 and 2060 respectively). These emissions are due to land use 
change, mainly from rough grazing to more intensive agricultural land uses such as 
permanent grasslands. 
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Figure ‎4.7: Estimated changes in GHG emissions from UK agriculture from 2004-2060 under two climate scenarios 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the changes in regulatory service provided by UK 
farmlands. It employs outputs from a structural land use model to assess the 
changes in the regulating service over time (2004-2060), based on UKCIP scenarios. 
The study shows that climate change has a major impact on UK agriculture. The 
analysis presented in this chapter shows that there are large variations within the 
enclosed farmland habitats across the UK with respect to the climate change 
scenarios. The estimations suggest that agricultural responses to climate change 
over the next 50 years may lead to significant changes in UK land use and a regional 
disparity in resultant changes to GHG emissions.  
The spatial analysis indicates that northern parts of the UK are expected to see a 
decrease in potential carbon stocks and rising GHG emissions due to increased 
agricultural intensification as the climate warms. On the other hand, the southern 
parts of the UK are predicted to see small increases in carbon stocks and associated 
falls in annual agricultural emissions because of a shift from cereal cropping 
towards grasslands due to a projected drier hotter climate in the future. Overall, 
these changes may have significant impacts on UK attempts to decrease GHG 
emissions, as agricultural emissions are estimated to increase by around 11% over 
the next two decades considering the climate induced agricultural land use change. 
The study reveals that adjustments in land use induced by climate change will help 
to mitigate agricultural GHG emissions in some regions, while in others it will have 
the opposite effect.  The cost of provision of carbon from the providers (farmers) 
perspective can prove to be more useful for directing future policies. Such a carbon 
cost analysis both from the literature and from real data, collected from farmers for 
this thesis, will be attempted in Chapter 7. 
The study concludes that climate change is likely to cause changes, directly and 
indirectly, in carbon stocks through land use change. The heterogeneity in land use 
and changes in emissions in response to climate change lead to the need for 
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designing policies for land managers to adopt changes in land use management. 
Effective policy instruments may have to combine incentives, restrictive regulations 
and interventions to encourage the land use managers to adopt land use changes to 
contribute towards reducing (enhancing) emissions (carbon sequestration) on their 
farms. An assessment of potential designs for such policies is presented in Chapters 
5 and 6, for the major farm types (arable and livestock) in the UK.  
The estimates calculated for this study were very much in accordance with the most 
comprehensive UK SOC estimations provided by Bradley et al., 2005 (with only a 
1.3% discrepancy). Significant regional changes were predicted, revealing an 
increase in GHG emissions in the north and western parts of the UK and a decrease 
in the lowland south and east of the country. This is attributed to the changes in 
land use management partly induced by climate change. This provides the basis for 
addressing the mitigation of climate change, through changes in agricultural 
activities. Combining the estimations from this study with carbon values can help to 
identify the potential cost of potential GHG mitigation in this sector. Furthermore, 
identifying potential cost effective policy schemes for enhancing the regulatory 
service can also provide a step forward for UK farmlands to contribute towards the 
national GHG mitigation targets. This will be attempted in the following three 
chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter 5 Investigating farmers preferences for payment 
schemes to promote climate change mitigation  
Abstract 
This chapter reports the results of a CE study to determine the willingness to 
participate in a policy scheme designed to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from livestock farms. As described in the survey design (see Appendix A), the CE 
questionnaire was administered to 380 farmers. The respondents were presented 
with two potential payment schemes, one for mitigation of GHGs from livestock 
farms and the other for carbon sequestration in arable farmlands. The respondents 
opted to participate in the payment schemes according to their farm types, 
therefore, some of the farmers with mixed-farms, responded to both (mitigation 
and sequestration) payment scheme questionnaires. This resulted in 329 responses 
for the mitigation payment scheme while 115 responses were obtained for the 
sequestration payment scheme. The responses were analysed using three discrete 
choice models and the results for the mitigation payment scheme are reported in 
this chapter (for the sequestration payment scheme, refer to Chapter 6). Random 
parameter Logit and Latent Class models were used to analyse the farmers’ 
responses to investigate their preferences, heterogeneity in their preferences and 
the willingness to accept values estimates. It was found, in general, that farmers 
show strong aversion to drastic changes in land use management; however, 
flexibility in certain scheme attributes can help to attract farmers. Socioeconomic 
characteristics like livestock units, farm income, age, and farm size proved to have 
significant effect on the behaviour of the farmers. These results can aid in designing 
policy schemes for climate regulation in the UK, with possible implications for the 
delivery of other ecosystem services from farmland.  
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5.1. Introduction 
Agro-ecosystems are widely recognised to provide many services that contribute to 
the well-being and economic prosperity of human kind, from provisioning services, 
regulatory services to recreational opportunities. This type of ecosystem is the one 
that is most directly managed by humans and occupies approximately 40-50% of 
the earth’s surface (Smith et al., 2007b; Swinton et al., 2007). Agricultural lands 
have always been given importance for their provisioning services (food, fuel, fibre, 
etc). Along with this they also have the capacity to provide regulatory services like 
regulating levels of water supply, carbon storage, and greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, agricultural land also accounts for 10-14% of global (Smith et al., 2007c) 
and 7% for the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions (NFU, 2005) and under the Climate 
Change Act, 2008, the UK government is committed to reduce national emissions by 
80% of 1990 levels by 2050 (Moran et al., 2010).  
The valuation of environmental goods and services provided by agroecosystems can 
be helpful to address the degradation being caused to these ecosystems and their 
services. For agri-environmental policy assessments, monetary estimates are the 
basis for economic evaluations (Huber et al., 2011). PES schemes are an important 
policy instrument for improvement in ecosystem services. These schemes can help 
to establish both improvements in the environment and in welfare gains of 
ecosystem managers by linking the beneficiaries of the services to those who 
deliver them (Defra, 2010). Various payment schemes have been used in 
agricultural ecosystems for the provision of different ecosystem services (such as 
biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, carbon sequestration, and 
landscape improvements). Instruments such as agri-environment schemes are being 
used to enhance the efficiency of supply of the ecosystem services associated with 
agriculture (Sauer and Wossink, 2010) and are an important component of the EU 
agricultural policies in the UK. These agreements have attracted increasing global 
attention as they have changed ecosystem services into financial incentives for local 
land managers (Engel et al., 2008) by compensating them for any income loss or 
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increase in costs incurred by the part they play in providing the environmental 
goods.  
The voluntary nature of PES schemes means that the farmers’ decision to 
participate is of utmost importance to achieve the policy objectives of the schemes 
(Wilson, 1996). According to Wilson and Hart (2000) it is important to understand 
the motivations of farmers to participate in payment schemes, as participation is an 
‘indicator’ of scheme effectiveness. There has been considerable research interest 
in the design and scope of PES schemes. It is imperative that PES schemes must be 
properly designed and implemented to achieve the aim of the scheme effectively 
(Layton and Siikamäki, 2009). Several studies have assessed the potential 
participation of land owners’ in PES schemes by determining the factors affecting 
their behaviour (Paulrud and Laitila, 2010; Thacher et al., 1997; Vanslembrouck et 
al., 2002; Vignola et al., 2010). Others have addressed improvements in PES scheme 
designs by concentrating on farmers preferences for different scheme attributes 
(Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 
Tesfaye and Brouwer, 2012) utilising CE techniques because of the non-availability 
of real data. A few of these have focused on European case studies (Beharry-Borg et 
al., 2012; Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009). 
It is important to account for any heterogeneity in land managers’ behaviour in 
order to make a better-informed case for improving climate regulation policies for 
agricultural sector. This chapter and the one following (Chapter 6), present a study 
in the UK to assess the design of two potential payment schemes specifically 
addressing climate regulation by looking into the participation behaviour of the UK 
farm owners. Various studies (such as IGER, 2001; Moran et al., 2008; Smith et al., 
2008) have identified feasible and cost-effective measures to enhance mitigation of 
emissions and carbon sequestration. These two chapters explore whether payment 
schemes would generate reductions (increases) in emissions (carbon sequestration) 
and if they would be adopted by the farming community in the UK. This is carried 
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out by investigating the participation (non-participation) of farmers in potential PES 
schemes, by considering the role of scheme design and farmers (farm) socio-
economic characteristics. The potential use of payments provided to farmers as 
incentives to adjust their agricultural land management practices to contribute 
towards this ecosystem service is examined. The study focuses on two potential 
payment schemes simultaneously for both arable and livestock farmers and reports 
on farmers’ preferences for key attributes of the payment schemes.  
This chapter will present a description and design of the mitigation payment policy 
scheme and the model estimations for this policy only. The sequestration policy 
scheme is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The chapter begins (Section 5.1) by 
introducing farmers preference heterogeneity and the importance of investigating 
this heterogeneity for UK farmlands in the climate change context and in view of 
the specific research question addressed. Section 5.2 provides a review of the 
related literature explaining the development of the mitigation policy scheme and 
the study framework adopted for this analysis. This is followed by an account of the 
attributes and levels defining the mitigation policy scheme in Section 5.3. Section 
5.4 presents a short description of the experimental design. Section 5.5 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the survey and the parameter estimations of the discrete 
choice models, which include the conditional logit model (CLM), random parameter 
logit model (RPL) and Latent Class model (LCM). The latter two models are used to 
investigate the presence of taste heterogeneity of the respondents’ preferences. 
The parameter estimates from the model specifications are then used to calculate 
the WTA estimates (Section 5.6) and also the results of individual-specific WTA 
values are calculated and presented using kernel density graphs for each attribute. 
A discussion of the estimation results is presented in Section 5.7. Finally the chapter 
ends with the conclusions of the study (section 5.8).  
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5.2. Theory and Methods 
5.2.1. Related literature 
Understanding the participation in payment programmes is of vital importance and 
can inform policy makers for future policy decisions related to the development of 
payment schemes. Farmers’ participation in payment schemes and the factors 
affecting their participation decisions have been under discussion for quite some 
time. Brotherton (1989) suggested that both farmers’ attitudes and scheme 
attributes affect the participation decision. Wilson (1997) also studied the factors 
influencing participation of farmers in the Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) 
scheme, using Brotherton’s classification. Later Falconer (2000) carried out a similar 
investigation into farmers’ behaviour towards Agri-environmental Measures (AEMs) 
for eleven regions across Europe. From a further review of studies (for example, see 
Brotherton, 1991; Potter and Gasson, 1988; Thacher et al., 1997; Wilson and Hart, 
2000; Wilson and Hart, 2001) it was possible to categorise the factors as: i) socio-
demographic elements; ii) household characteristics; iii) farm business 
characteristics; and iv) farm characteristics.  
More recently, studies have investigated the preferences of farmers for different 
scheme attributes. Identifying the factors affecting the farmers’ participation 
decision can help to both improve existing payment scheme designs or to develop 
new schemes overcoming barriers for farmer participation (e.g. Broch and Vedel, 
2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Wilson, 1997). Several 
studies have addressed the heterogeneity in farmers participation behaviour (see 
Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Wilson 
and Hart, 2000). This heterogeneity has also been linked to variables including  
farm/farmer characteristics such as household income, land use opportunity cost 
(Wunder et al., 2008); farm size (Ayuk, 1997; Caveness and Kurtz, 1993; Thacher et 
al., 1996); farm production capacity, farmers age (Potter and Lobley, 1992; Wynn et 
al., 2001), and farm income (Nowak, 1997). Maynard and Paquin (2004) have 
suggested that participation is dependent upon the payment scheme developers’ 
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ability to include strategies to gain the confidence of the farmers to take up the 
schemes. According to Dupraz et al. (2003), a better understanding of the utility of 
the measure can make a participation decision more likely. Hudson and Lusk (2004) 
investigated six attributes of possible importance and found a preference for 
increasing income, minimising risk, keeping autonomy and shorter contracts. Horne 
(2006) explored forest owners’ acceptance of incentive based policy instruments for 
biodiversity conservation. She finds that forest owners preferred restrictions on 
small areas, short contracts and to be able to cancel the contract. Beharry-Borg et 
al. (2012) studied the potential drivers of participation in a payment programme for 
water quality protection. The study revealed that considerable heterogeneity of 
preferences appeared to exist between farms/farmers: a small proportion of 
farmers appeared very reluctant to commit to change their management practices 
while a considerable number of farmers were willing to modify their land 
management practices if high enough compensation was available. 
Findings of several studies also suggest that farmers can be extremely resistant to 
participation (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009), however, 
farmers do appear to trade-off compensation payments with flexibility in land use 
management restrictions, length of agreement and amount of paperwork involved 
(Christensen et al., 2011; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
However, none of the recently published studies have specifically addressed 
farmers’ WTA requirements for climate change mitigation in the agri-environment 
sector. This study specifically looks at the potential of developing anaerobic 
digestion (AD) for reducing methane emissions from UK farmlands (especially 
livestock and mixed farms). Therefore, this study involves ex-ante evaluation of 
farmer uptake of attributes of a mitigation payment scheme, to analyse the impact 
of different attributes and attribute levels on their participation behaviour.  
 For this thesis, the SP method was considered appropriate because this study is 
based on hypothetical payment schemes and no revealed data are available (see 
detail of the methodology in Chapter 3). This approach also made it possible to 
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combine both qualitative (technical assistance, plant ownership) and quantitative 
(compensation levels, length of agreements, generator capacity and distance) 
attributes in one design. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate landowners’ payment scheme preferences 
for mitigating GHG emissions from UK farmlands and to suggest scheme design for 
developing effective policies for attracting farmers to contribute towards the UK’s 
emission reduction targets. To achieve this aim, the following objectives were 
identified: 
 Estimating farmers WTA requirements for adoption of GHG mitigation 
policy for potential reduction in GHG emissions from livestock farms. 
 Exploring the extent of heterogeneity for a potential mitigation policy 
and investigating whether this heterogeneity is associated with 
particular farm or farmer characteristics. 
5.2.2. GHG mitigation through Livestock farms 
The potential mitigation payment scheme was described for GHG mitigation 
specifically from livestock. The major GHG emissions from livestock farms are 
methane and nitrous oxide. Methane is produced by enteric fermentation from 
ruminant animals and from slurry storage. Nitrous oxide emissions are mainly from 
the manure produced by livestock due to excretion of nitrogen. The selected 
mitigation policy scheme involved setting up Anaerobic Digestion (AD) plants on the 
farms for the capture of CH4 (with a global warming potential1 of 21 times higher 
than CO2). It is also considered to be a cost-effective method of reducing emissions 
(methane) from manure (Bywater, 2011), to some extent from fossil fuels (carbon 
dioxide) due to bio-fuel production and from the use of artificial fertilizers as the 
digestate from the plant is a used as organic fertilizer and reduces the requirements 
for artificial fertilizers. The biogas produced after the anaerobic digestion in the 
                                                        
1 Global warming potential (GWP) is a measure of the total energy that a gas absorbs over a 
particular period of years compared to CO2. CO2 has a GWP of 1 which serves as a baseline for 
other GWP values.  
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plants consists mainly of methane (55-75%) and carbon dioxide, with small volumes 
of nitrogen, hydrogen, hydrogen sulphide and oxygen (Bywater, 2011).  
AD plants potentially have the ability of improved slurry handling (proper storage, 
handling and spreading), and to meet a farm’s energy and fertiliser requirements; 
which makes them a very useful tool. After the treatment process the digestate 
from the AD plant has no strong odour, is easily spreadable, and improves nutrient 
recycling and uptake (Tranter et al., 2011). The underlying idea for AD plants is that 
the slurry is scraped daily to capture the GHG emissions (especially CH4) and the 
plants then generate renewable energy by using the biogas directly in a boiler for 
heating purposes and renewable electricity which can be fed into the national grid.  
This provides an opportunity for the farmers to not only reduce their energy bills 
and farm GHG emissions but can also provide economic benefits by selling the 
surplus energy and digestate (Defra, 2009). Biogas production from AD plants can 
prove to be advantageous for both livestock and arable farmers. It provides an 
opportunity for the livestock farmers to generate income from the manure of the 
livestock and improve the quality of fertilisers and at the same time it can provide a 
profitable alternative of a ‘break crop’2 to the arable farmers.  
AD plants can be either on-farm AD (OFAD) units for a single farm or larger 
centralised AD (CAD) units to deal with waste products from a number of farms. AD 
plants are quite popular in mainland Europe and are mostly found in Germany, 
Denmark, Austria and Sweden. Around 4000 OFAD units are in operation in 
Germany while larger CAD units have been set up mostly in Denmark and are 
integrated into the renewal energy production system (Wilkinson, 2011). The main 
success of these plants can be attributed to the design simplicity of the plants along 
with conducive governmental regulations and policies which makes it feasible for 
farmers to set up these plants (Lusk, 1998). 
                                                        
2 A break crop is any crop sown as a crop rotation to provide diversity to help reduce disease, weed 
and pest levels Kirkegaard, J., O. Christen, J. Krupinsky & D. Layzell. 2008. Break crop benefits in 
temperate wheat production. Field Crops Research, 107 (3), pp.185-195.. 
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There is a significant potential for AD plants to contribute to UK climate change 
objectives, as about 100 million tonnes of slurry are produced on UK farms (Defra, 
2010). This causes GHG emissions, odour and potential run-off to water resources 
causing pollution and eutrophication. The uptake of AD plants in the UK has been 
very small; still according to DEFRA (2012) 78 AD plants are currently under 
operation in the UK of which 48 plants treat waste feedstock while only 29 treat 
farm feedstock with one CAD in Devon (Bywater, 2011). The failure of UK farmers 
adopting AD plant technology has been associated with a lack of economic returns, 
insufficient financial incentives through agri-environmental schemes or payment 
schemes, lack of recognisable level of additional income for the farmers, non-
availability of soft loans, absence of technical assistance, and lack of operational 
knowledge (Mistry and Misselbrook, 2005).  
The UK government has also recognised AD plants potential towards mitigating 
climate change and other environmental problems and is focusing on encouraging 
farmers and farming organisations towards the development and use of this 
technology. The need for developing a more effective system and drivers to attract 
the farmers in UK towards adoption of AD plants has been identified by Bywater 
(2011). Defra established an action group which has devised an action plan in order 
to address the challenges the AD sector faces in the UK. According to Defra (2009) 
National Farmer Union (NFU) expects 1000 OFADs on UK farms by 2020. Incentives 
provided by the government which are developed for renewable energy 
technologies and are also applied to AD plants, include Renewable Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs), renewable energy Feed-In Tariffs (FITs) and Renewable Heat 
Incentives (RHI). Financing has always been a major barrier to the development of 
the development of small scale OFADs. However, the UK government and other 
organisations are taking positive steps to overcome this. In 2011, the government 
announced that it will promote community-scale renewable energy projects 
through a Rural Community Renewable Energy Fund (DEFRA, 2012). Similarly, both 
retail and corporate banks are also coming forward to fund AD projects. It has been 
suggested that the retail sector could provide funds as loans as part of 
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environmental and corporate social responsibility obligations (ibid). Nevertheless, 
banks seem to be reluctant and still not ready to lend money to implement an 
unfamiliar technology (Bywater, 2011).From the literature available the costs 
associated  with establishment of AD plants vary from £150,000 to £1 million, 
depending on the size and generating capacity of the plants (Farming Furtures., 
2013). On the other hand it is also worth mentioning that most of the existing case 
studies have shown that revenue generation is quite high in terms of energy 
savings, profits from export of energy, and gate fees3 especially for centralised units 
etc. The projected pay-back time for most of the UK case studies (Bywater, 2011; 
Farming Furtures., 2013) is considered to be between 5 and10 years. 
 A review of the case studies suggests that most of the farmers who have set up 
OFAD plants have been satisfied with the revenue returns from their respective 
plants. Although Feed-in tariffs have proved to be helpful, it is still not enough to 
encourage more farmers to invest in ADs.  
Therefore, the aim in this chapter is to explore whether payment schemes could be 
designed to attract the UK farming community to adopt AD plant options to 
contribute towards reduction in UK GHG emissions.  The attempt of this study to 
investigate participation behaviour can help to inform future policy design by 
incorporating the identified preferences of farmers.   
5.2.3. Study framework 
This chapter utilises a CE approach to evaluate a PES scheme design for farmers’ 
willingness to contribute to GHG mitigation (from livestock manure) as an 
environmental service specifically in UK livestock farms. The first step towards 
conducting a CE study is to define the policy scheme by suitable attributes and 
attribute levels appropriate for potential scheme design (for details please refer to a 
detailed CE design included as Appendix A).   
                                                        
3 Gate fee, is the fee charged by an AD plant owner, for disposal of organic waste by various 
companies into the AD plant.   
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The CE survey was designed to cover main farm types and to have a sample 
representative covering the national extent of the UK. To achieve this, various 
farmers markets, livestock auction markets, annual farming expos and annual dairy 
and livestock events were selected to conduct the survey. In total, 329 face-to-face 
questionnaires were conducted.  
The choice data and the socio-economic data collected from the surveys was then 
used to evaluate farmer up-take of potential payment scheme design features to 
analyse the impact of different attributes and attribute levels. Simple logit models 
along with the RPL and LCM were utilised simultaneously. First CLM was employed 
to account for different socio-demographic characteristics of the farmers. Then, RPL 
was used to identify the existence of preference heterogeneity followed by LCM 
estimates with finite classes for individual segment-specific utility parameters. This 
helps to provide a better understanding of the underlying preferences (Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009) and heterogeneity in farmers’ behaviour. The willingness to accept 
requirements were then calculated and the effects of farm/ farmer characteristics 
on these requirements were also analysed. This was done by using individual 
segment specific WTA estimations.  
5.3. Attributes for mitigation policy scheme 
The first step for CE design is to define the policy scheme in terms of its attributes 
and potential levels. Identification and correct specification of relevant attributes 
and levels describing the hypothetical scenario is important so that they can be 
relevant for both land managers and policy makers. Significant attributes were 
identified and their levels were chosen to be realistic and represent possible future 
values if policy measures were to be implemented (Bennett and Blamey, 2001). The 
range of levels was selected to represent each attribute according to the size and 
scale of the improvement the farmers are willing to carry out. The choice and 
selection of the attributes and levels was based on a combination of evidence from 
the findings in the existing literature of agri-environment schemes across Europe 
and information from the pilot study of this research.  
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The mitigation policy scheme, as already described in section 5.2.2., was developed 
predominantly for livestock farms and required the farmers to provide all the 
manure produced from the housed livestock to an anaerobic digestion plant and in 
return generate energy which can be used not only for farm energy requirements 
but the surplus can also be exported to the national grid providing farmers with 
additional monetary benefits. This policy required the farmers to set up AD plants 
for heat and electricity generation according to the size of their farms and the 
number of livestock units they managed. Issues and problems faced by the existing 
plants were also considered and were addressed in the design of the policy. The 
potential payment scheme was described in terms of 6 attributes, four of which 
were described in quantitative terms while the other two were qualitative. The 
respondents were informed that if they are provided with an opportunity to setup 
an anaerobic digestion plant would they prefer to participate in a payment scheme 
which would help to mitigate the manure emissions from the livestock on their 
farm. For this purpose the respondents were briefed about the funding 
opportunities available for setting up such plants (such as government funding or 
non-governmental or private grants) and the revenue they might be able to 
generate from various sizes of AD plants (which can help them easily repay the 
loans, grants they have acquired) apart from the compensation payments the 
scheme offers.  
 It is known that economic interests and incentives are not the only factors that 
farmers consider when deciding whether or not to participate (Siebert et al., 2006). 
It has been found that securing farmers’ independence is essential for reaching high 
participation rates (Schenk et al., 2007). Therefore, the scheme presented to the 
farmers included the option of retaining the ownership of the plant or to have it 
managed by a power supply company to avoid the hassle and complexity of 
management and operation of the plant. The payment attribute was included to 
determine the WTA of the farmers to participate in potential schemes. This 
provides an insight into how farmers trade-off the changes in land management 
activities required by the schemes for the provision of climate regulation services. 
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A detailed description of the attributes and levels is presented as follows: 
a. Plant generating capacity 
This attribute was described as the power generating capacity of the AD plant. The 
generator capacity determines the energy generated by the plants to meet the farm 
energy needs and the cost of investment. It also represents the monetary benefits 
the farm will have because of the income saved by using energy generated and 
income made by exporting the energy to the national grid. The generation capacity 
scales can range between a few kWs to several MWs depending upon the amount 
of feedstock (animal slurries and other organic feedstock) available (Tranter et al., 
2011). From the review of literature and existing case studies it was identified that 
before installation of an AD plant it is important to establish the expected capacity 
of the plant. The capacity of the plant is determined by the size and livestock 
number on the farm. It was assumed that the farmers will consider the capacity of 
their farm to provide enough manure and feedstock before choosing the levels of 
this attribute. A wide range of generator capacities were used and defined into four 
levels; the first two levels were for farmers who might prefer lower generator 
capacities for on-farm ADs. These farmers were assumed to manage/own small 
scale farms with fewer livestock units and farmers who would prefer to have OFAD 
rather than CAD. The other two levels were for higher generator capacity plants and 
were targeted towards farmers with larger farms and higher livestock units. This 
range of generating capacities could also be translated into on-farm AD (OFAD) 
plants or centralised AD (CAD) plants, depending on the size of the farms managed 
by the farmers and the potential revenue generated by the plant. It was also 
expected that even small scale farmers might opt for higher generator capacity 
plants if they are willing to share CAD with the neighbouring farms.  
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b. Distance 
This attribute represented the distance of the AD plant from the participating farm. 
The levels of this attribute were chosen to present the respondents with options of 
having an OFAD or a shared CAD plant. The smaller farm holders can opt for sharing 
the energy generation and the benefits with the neighbouring farms. CADs have 
proved quite successful in Denmark (Wilkinson, 2011) especially with financial 
incentives provided by the government. However, the farmers were also informed 
that increased distance of the AD plant from the farm also incurs additional 
transportation costs in order to transport the manure and feedstock to the plant. 
The expectation here is that the farmers would respond to this attribute according 
to the farm size and livestock unit numbers they manage. They would also consider 
the costs and benefits associated with having an OFAD or CAD. This attribute will 
help to identify the preferences of farmers for OFADs or CADs. The estimations of 
this attribute will reveal if policy schemes should be designed for OFADs or CADs 
and the scale of the farmers these schemes should be targeted to.  
c. Technical Assistance/Training 
Available studies on existing AD plants suggest that farmers have in the past faced 
technical problems during the operation and management of the plant. Due to lack 
of technical assistance and knowledge, it becomes difficult for farmers to solve any 
mechanical issues that can be easily handled otherwise. Some AD owners have 
mentioned that it takes time to get trained and used to of all the mechanical and 
technological components of these plants. Therefore it is assumed that including 
technical assistance/training will help to overcome these barriers. This attribute was 
one of the two qualitative attributes with two levels. The levels were labelled as 
‘Yes’ for the option of provision of technical assistance/training and ‘No’, if the 
farmers did not think of it to be important.  
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d. Plant ownership 
Plant ownership involved options for the farmers regarding their farm operation 
and management. This attribute allowed the farmers to choose between managing 
the AD plant or to hand it over to a power supply company for its operation and 
management. Therefore, this attribute was defined with two levels, ‘prefer 
ownership of the plant’ or ‘prefer to have it managed by a power supply company’. 
The first level provided the farmers with the opportunity to keep all the benefits 
from the plant to themselves, and required them to be responsible for the full 
management and operation of the plant themselves. However, the second level 
provided the farmers with an opportunity to participate in the scheme; without 
being involved in the complexity of the management and operation of the plant by 
handing over the plant to a power supply company. 
e. Length of Agreement 
Length of contract, binding the participants for a certain period of time, can have a 
significant role in the decision making process. The respondents for this study were 
provided with a wide range of levels for this attribute; 2, 5, 10, 20 years and the aim 
was to investigate its impact on the respondent’s decision to participate.  
f. Compensation payments 
In order to estimate the WTA payments of the various attributes of the payment 
scheme, a monetary attribute related to the payment level was included. Designing 
a cost-effective payment scheme requires information on the minimum WTA 
farmers would require for carrying out the suggested changes. For policy makers, 
compensation is an incentive to encourage farmers to participate, and they attempt 
to pay appropriately to ensure their participation in the payment schemes. 
 This attribute will help this study to evaluate preferences of the respondents and 
how much it influences their participation decision. The compensation amounts 
were offered as ‘per hectare’ payments which is how farmers normally receive 
payments for PES schemes by government or other organisations.  
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Table ‎5.1:  Description of attributes and levels for the mitigation payment scheme 
Attributes Description Variables Levels Coding 
Generator  
Capacity 
The capacity of the 
plant to generate 
electricity 
(kW/MW) 
GCAP 20kW 50kW 1MW 2MW Linear 
specification 
Distance The distance of the 
plant from the 
farm (km) 
DIST < 1 ~ 5 10 15 Linear 
specification 
Technical 
Assistance 
whether they 
would like 
technical 
assistance/training 
provided with the 
programme 
TECH No Yes Dummy 
coded 
No = 0, 
Yes=1 
Length of 
agreement 
The minimum 
contract length 
they prefer (Years) 
LOA 2 5 10 20 Linear 
specification 
Plant 
ownership 
Suitable option of 
receiving the 
benefits and 
ownership of the 
plant 
OWN Prefer to own 
the plant 
Prefer the 
plant to be 
managed by a 
power 
company 
Dummy 
coded 
Own =0, 
power 
company =1 
Compensation 
(£/ha) 
Compensation 
payments for the 
total farm size 
(£/ha) 
COMP 10 25 50 75 Linear 
specification 
 
5.4. Experimental Design 
After identifying the attributes and levels of policy scheme, an experimental design 
was constructed in order to generate the choice cards with different combinations 
of choice attributes and levels.  
For this study, in order to generate the choice cards with different combinations of 
choice attributes and levels, a full factorial design was produced first. The total 
number of choice sets resulting from this was 44 + 22 = 260. This large number of 
combinations, was considered not feasible to be used, therefore, an orthogonal 
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fractional factorial design was generated using Ngene 1.0.2., which resulted in 36 
choice sets. Since this is quite a large amount of information to be presented to one 
respondent, a blocking strategy was employed to reduce the number of choice sets 
given to each respondent. The 36 choice sets were then blocked into 6 blocks of 6 
choice sets. Using this strategy, each respondent was presented with 6 choice cards.  
Each choice card offered two policy options described with varying levels of 
attributes along with a ‘do not want to participate’ alternative. Before asking the 
respondents to complete the choice cards, they were familiarised with all the 
attributes (presented above) and were made aware that achieving GHG mitigation 
through this scheme has associated costs. They were also informed that most of this 
cost can be earned back by the revenue generated through the energy production 
and the savings on the energy bills for both the farm and the house.  
A detailed description of the questionnaire and survey design is presented in 
Appendix A and the choice cards are presented in Appendix C of the thesis.  
5.5. Results 
Mitigation payment scheme estimations involved 1974 choices elicited from 329 
respondents and the estimations were carried out using Limdep 9.0 Nlogit 4.0. 
5.5.1. Data organisation 
The data was organised according to the levels of the attributes used in the choice 
experiment. The two attributes with two levels were ‘dummy’ coded. Therefore, 
training assistance/training was coded as 0 for without training and 1 with training 
included in the scheme. Similarly, plant ownership was coded as 0 for opting to 
manage the plant themselves and 1 for handing it over to a power supply company. 
The rest of the four attributes with four levels were specified using ‘linear’ coding, 
using the same values as presented in the CE attribute design (see Table 5.1) which 
were presented to the respondents. 
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5.5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides a summary of the socioeconomic characteristics and some of 
the land management activities carried out at the farms. Completed questionnaires 
from 329 farmers were used for this analysis. 
The survey sample displayed considerable heterogeneity in farm characteristics and 
the descriptive results are presented below: 
a. Distribution of respondents: 
The CE survey was conducted with an intention to include a range of farming 
landscapes in the UK. This scheme as described above focused on mitigation of 
emissions from livestock manure, therefore, it was targeted towards livestock farms 
pre-dominantly, however, farmers with mixed farms also showed preferences for 
participation if they had enough livestock manure production at the farm. Figure 5.1 
shows the distribution of farmers across the various regions of the UK, most of the 
sample constituted of farms belonging to the North of England and Midlands.  
 
Figure ‎5.1 Regional distribution of the sample population 
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b. Age, gender, and household size: 
The descriptive results revealed that the majority of respondents were middle aged 
to sixty years, with most of them (53%) between the ages of 41-60 years, followed 
closely by the respondents of the age group 17-40 years (36%). Only 11% of the 
respondents belonged to the older age group of 61-80 years. The male and female 
distribution of the respondents was 80% males to 20% females.  
About 38% of the respondents had a household size of two persons, while 34% had 
three and 19% were with a household size of four persons. Only 7 % respondents 
had household sizes larger than four persons.  
Table ‎5.2:  Age, gender and household size of the respondents 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Age (years)    
17-30 9.42 31 
31-40 26.44 87 
41-50 31.31 103 
51-60 22.19 73 
61-70 9.12 30 
71-80 1.51 5 
Total 100 329 
Gender   
Male 80.55 265 
Female 19.45 64 
Total 100 329 
House hold size   
1 3.04 10 
2 38.30 126 
3 34.04 112 
4 18.54 61 
5 3.65 12 
6 1.82 6 
>6 0.61 2 
Total 100 329 
 
c. Level of Education: 
12% of the sample did not respond to this question and were considered as missing 
values. The survey sample showed that about 38% of the respondents hold a 
college degree, while 30% have been to secondary school and 18% have been to 
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university for undergraduate and/or postgraduate degrees and only 2% had only 
primary education. 
Table ‎5.3: Education level of the respondents 
Level of Education Percentage (%) Frequency 
 
Missing 
 
11.55 
 
38 
Primary school 01.82 6 
Secondary school 30.70 101 
College 37.69 124 
Undergraduate 15.20 50 
Postgraduate 03.04 10 
Total 100 329 
d. Ownership of the land, farm size and farm income: 
The survey sample shows that about 80% of the farmers owned the farmland. The 
farm sizes were noticed to be quite varied, the mean (139 ha) biased heavily 
upwards (120 ha median) with most of the farmers (77%) being in the range of 10-
200ha. Most of the farmers (30%) had farm income in the range of £31,000-£60,000 
and above £90,000 (29%).  
e. Land use and livestock types: 
Land use was typically heterogeneous within the farms with 54% of the farms being 
mixed farms (containing both arable and grasslands), while 41% farms were pre-
dominantly grasslands. Only a small percentage of the sample (5%) managed only 
arable farms. The arable farms varied into root crops, cereals, oilseed rape and 
other vegetable farms. Mixed animal farming was very common: 64% of the farms 
had sheep along with dairy cows and cattle while 34% had only dairy cows and 
cattle. Since, this scheme was targeted to livestock farmers; most of the farmers 
who opted to participate in the CE for this scheme had pre-dominantly dairy and 
cattle farms. 
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Table ‎5.4: Farm ownership, farm size and income from the farm 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Farm ownership   
 Tenant 19.45 64 
Own 80.55 265 
Total 100 329 
Farm size (ha)   
10-100 35.87 118 
101-200 41.34 136 
201-300 20.67 68 
301-700 1.82 6 
701-809 0.30 1 
Total 100 329 
farm income (£/annum)   
£6,000-£30,000 14.89 49 
£31,000-£60,000 30.09 99 
£61,000-£90,000 25.84 85 
>£91000 29.18 96 
 Total 100 329 
Table ‎5.5 Land use and livestock types of the farms 
Livestock types and land use 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Livestock type 
Sheep with dairy and 
cattle 
63.53 209 
Dairy and Cattle only 36.47 120 
Total 100.00 329 
Land use type    
Arable 4.56 15 
Grassland 41.03 135 
Both 54.41 179 
Total 100 329 
 
5.5.3. Parameter Estimates of choice models 
The parameter estimations for this study were done using Conditional Logit, 
Random Parameters Logit and Latent Class models. A detailed account of the 
characteristics of and differences between the various logit models is presented in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis.   
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a. Estimates of CLM 
The basic Conditional Logit model (CLM) was specified so that the probability of 
selecting a particular alternative was a function of attributes and the alternative 
specific constant (ASC), which had a value of 1 if the ‘do not want to participate’ 
option was chosen and 0 if either of the other alternatives was chosen. The 
estimates show (Table5.6) that all attributes except the plant generator capacity 
(GCAP) have significant utility coefficients and the signs of the coefficients are as 
expected. The results show that respondents prefer to have on-farm anaerobic 
digestion plants with availability of technical assistance/training, with short term 
contracts, and avoiding interference of any power company for the plant 
management. The negative coefficient values for all attributes imply an aversion to 
undertake the mitigation options specified; however, the positive and significant 
compensation attribute shows that farmers are more likely to participate when a 
scheme offers higher compensation other things being equal. Interaction terms 
were also introduced between mean estimates of the utility parameters and 
farm/farmer characteristics with the choice data in the CLM. The assumption was 
that this will help to explain the effect of socioeconomic characteristics on 
preferences. The conditional logit interaction (CL-int) model was estimated for all 
the characteristics from the survey data. After extensive testing of various 
interactions with all the farm/farmer characteristics, the variables with significant 
coefficients were farmer’s age (AGE), farm income (FINC), farm size (FSIZE) and 
number of livestock units (LSU). The interactions show that farms with lower farm 
income have a stronger preference for having the AD plant close to the farm than 
other farmers. It also revealed that younger farmers and farms with larger farm size 
require lower payments per hectare and farms with larger number of livestock units 
are less averse to long contracts.   
Overall the results imply that farmers are willing to trade off for changes to 
management and compensation amounts. 
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Table ‎5.6 Parameter estimates from CL and CL-int models 
Model CLM CLM-int 
Loglikelihood -1615.02 -1598.83 
Pseudo-R2 0.17 0.18 
AIC4 1.64 1.63 
BIC5 1.66 1.66 
Attributes Coefficients (SE) Coefficients (SE) 
GCAP -0.0000 (-0.0000) -0.0000 (-0.0000) 
DIST -0.0705*** (0.0074) -0.0614*** (0.0091) 
TECH 0.1287* (0.0752) 0.1255* (0.0756) 
OWN -0.9058*** (0.0815) -0.4936** (0.1604) 
LOA -0.0322*** (0.0056) -0.0568*** (0.0103) 
COMP 0.0295*** (0.0015) 0.0382*** (0.0056) 
ASC -1.2016***  (0.1365)  
AGE*COMP  -0.0003** (0.0001) 
FINC*DIST  -0.0001* (0.0005) 
FSIZE*COMP  0.0042** (0.0001) 
FSIZE*OWN  -0.0031** (0.0010) 
LSU*LOA  0.0001** (0.0000) 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively 
b. Estimates for RPL 
Since CLM assumes homogeneous preferences across the respondents, Random 
Parameter Logit (RPL) models were specified to account for the taste heterogeneity 
of individual preferences and enhance the accuracy and reliability of the estimates. 
The utility parameters for all the attributes were specified as random using normal 
distribution except for compensation which was specified with log normal 
distribution. This sensitivity analysis revealed that all attributes except 
                                                        
4 AIC stands for Akaike information criteria 
5 BIC stands for Bayesian information criteria 
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compensation (COMP) had significant standard deviations. In the final estimations 
all the random attributes were specified using a normal distribution. The results 
(Table 5.7) show that RPL model was statistically significant with R2 value of 0.26 
and reveals unobserved heterogeneity for the 5 random attributes with significant 
standard deviations.  
The RPL results reveal all attributes were highly significant with highly significant 
standard deviations indicating that these are indeed heterogeneous in the 
population. On average the results suggest that farmers display an aversion to 
higher levels of the attributes and the RPL model shows a similar trend as the CLM. 
The results also reveal that farmers would require higher levels of compensations 
for participation in scheme which requires the adoption of intensive measures.  
The RPL provided a good overview of the mean effects over the population, but it is 
difficult to use it for analysing the patterns in the preferences (Broch and Vedel, 
2012). Thus, to further account for this heterogeneity in preferences and to divide 
the respondents into groups with similar preferences, the Latent Class (LC) model 
was estimated.  
c. Estimates for LCM 
LC model also captures taste heterogeneity from different classes, each class being 
unique and thus accounting for heterogeneity (see details in Chapter 3). The 
selection of the model with appropriate number of classes which best describes the 
data was based on its ability to provide interpretative simplicity, statistical criteria 
for model fit along with analyst’s judgement (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Scarpa 
and Thiene, 2005; Swait, 1994). The model for this scenario was estimated over 2, 3 
and 4 classes; however, the 4 class model did not converge. The log likelihood and 
R2 values increased while AIC and BIC decreased from the 2-class to the 3-class 
model, thus implying that the 3-class provided a better fit. The results as presented 
in Table 5.7 reveals that segment-3 was associated with 43% of the sample 
population while segment-1 and segment-2 were associated with 34% and 23% 
respectively. The trend as shown in the CLM can still be seen in the LCM, however, 
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LCM provided sufficient improvement relative to the basic CL, CL-int and RPL 
models in predictive capability (R2) to justify this increased complexity. There is a 
general aversion for most of the scheme attributes except the availability of 
technical training/assistance and compensation amounts. Segment 1 shows the 
strongest aversion towards all the attributes out of the three segments. Though the 
results from all the model estimations do show that provision of technical 
assistance has been preferred by most of the sample population, however, the LCM 
revealed that segment 1 includes the population group who show an aversion to 
this attribute. Segment 2 shows a similar trend as the CL and RPL models, i.e. 
showing an aversion to most of the attributes but preferring the provision of 
technical assistance. However, segment 3 consists of the farmers who display a 
positive response towards most of the attributes. Hence, they prefer to have longer 
contract terms for on-farm AD plants with the provision of technical assistance.  
d. ASC (status quo) consideration 
For the current study the CE was designed such that respondents had the option of 
not selecting either of the two policy alternatives presented to them i.e. do not 
want to participate and had no associated compensation. Therefore, a status quo 
constant was added in the model estimations. This constant is generally added to 
represent the non-attribute reasons for selecting an attribute.  
It was observed in the model estimations that the ASC has quite high negative 
values, which reveals that there is very strong aversion to status quo or a strong 
preference to move away from status quo. However, most of the coefficients of the 
attributes also show reluctance to levels of changes in their current way of 
agricultural management.  
Therefore, to further explore this effect for this research, a model without ASC was 
also estimated. The welfare calculations revealed highly negative compensation 
estimates suggesting that farmers are willing to pay to participate, which seemed 
quite unrealistic. There has been a great deal of debate and arguments about 
whether to use ASC constants in valuation estimates, with some studies deciding 
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not to use it in WTA estimations because of potential bias due to yea-saying 
concerns (Adamowicz et al., 1998; MacDonald et al., 2011). Therefore, it was 
decided to exclude ASC estimates from the welfare calculations carried out in 
Chapter 7. The ‘no constant’ model estimations results are presented in Appendix B 
for reference.  
 Table ‎5.7 Parameter estimates from RPL and LCM models 
Model RPL (5 random attributes LCM (3 CLASS)  
Loglikelihood -1601.98 -1486.24  
Pseudo-R
2
 0.26 0.31  
AIC 1.63 1.52  
BIC 1.66 1.66  
Chi squared 1133.3 1364  
Degrees of 
Freedom 11 23 
 
 Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment3 
Attributes 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
GCAP 
-0.0000 
(-0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0001) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.00005 
(-0.00005) 
DIST -0.0408*** 
(0.0108) 
0.1242*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.1300*** 
(0.0274) 
-0.2097*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.0106 
(-0.0079) 
TECH 0.3599*** 
(0.0909) 
0.5967** 
(0.1964) 
-0.4455* 
(0.2311) 
1.0529 *** 
(0.1563) 
0.2246** 
(0.00845) 
OWN -0.803*** 
(0.09896) 
0.5659** 
(0.2039) 
-5.9656*** 
(0.9441) 
-1.2982*** 
(0.1433) 
-0.6068*** 
(0.0825) 
LOA -0.0185** 
(0.0071) 
0.0637*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.4399*** 
(0.0649) 
-0.0292** 
(0.0105) 
0.0301*** 
(0.0067) 
COMP 0.0477*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0700*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0271*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0267*** 
(0.0020) 
ASC   -8.1142*** 
(1.2213) 
-0.8734*** 
(0.2340) 
-1.2368*** 
(0.1939) 
Percentage   34% 23% 42% 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively
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Post-hoc analysis of individual-specific segment membership probabilities in the 
LCM using farm/farmer characteristics as individual-specific variables was used to 
investigate the suggested segment association of each individual (Wedel and 
Kamakura, 2000). The majority of the heterogeneity was not observable. However, 
the estimations (Table 5.8) revealed that farm income, age, and livestock units are 
the most important determinants of segmentation in the sample. There is a higher 
probability of belonging to segment-1 if farmers have a low number of livestock 
units while segment-2 farmers are mostly in the older age group and with low farm 
incomes.  
Table ‎5.8 Explanation of the Individual Segment specific probabilities with socio economic 
characteristics 
 Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
CONSTANT 0.4581 (0.9586) -2.1775* (1.0871) Fixed 
Gender -0.0582 (0.3240) -0.0783 (0.3793) Fixed 
Ownership 0.1274(0.3422) 0.1117 (0.4077) Fixed 
Farm income 0.0000034 (0.0000) 0.000024* (0.0000) Fixed 
Farm size 0.00158 (0.00178) -0.0011 (0.0020) Fixed 
Education 0.0976 (0.1140) 0.0425 (0.1245) Fixed 
Age 0.0054 (0.0129) 0.0326** (0.0145) Fixed 
Household size -0.1263 (0.1347) 0.1603 (0.1447) Fixed 
Livestock units -0.0037** (0.0013) -0.0020 (0.0013) Fixed 
Percentage 34% 23% 42% 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively 
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5.6. Minimum marginal WTA estimates  
The results of the model estimations suggest that there is considerable taste 
heterogeneity within the farmers. The results of the LCM suggest that the sample 
significantly comprised of three classes. An examination of the log-likelihood values 
indicate that LCM model provided an improvement in the fit over the CL and RPL 
models. It is also clear from the results that 42% of the sample population belong to 
the third segment while the rest are divided between the first and second segment.  
The results of the overall marginal WTA estimates for each of the model (Table 5.9) 
show that the highest WTA estimates of £85.15 are revealed for the members of 
segment-1 of the LCM for retaining the ownership of the digestion plant 
themselves. It was also observed that within each model and each segment the 
highest WTA estimates are for the ‘plant ownership’ attribute. As discussed in the 
results section the model estimations revealed that farmers preferred to keep the 
ownership of the plant to themselves. Higher WTA estimates for this attribute, 
shows that they prefer retaining the monetary benefits (both in terms of 
compensations and revenue).  
Since, LCM proved to fit the data better the parameter estimates from the LCM 
model were used to calculate individual-specific estimates (Train, 2003). These 
estimates can then be used to calculate individual-specific WTA values which give a 
distribution of WTA values for each attribute. Segment-specific estimates of 
minimum WTA values for particular attribute were calculated to produce estimates 
of respondents-specific minimum WTA values.  
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Table ‎5.9 WTA estimations from the choice models for the mitigation payment scheme (in 
GBP/year) 
Attributes CL CL-int RPL LCM 3 segment  
    Segment-
1 
Segment-
2 
Segment-
3 
Mitigation scenario 
Generator 
capacity 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002 0.02*** -0.002 
Distance 2.39 1.61 0.86 1.86*** 7.73*** 0.40 
Technical 
Assistance 
-4.36 -3.28 -7.54 6.36* -38.81*** -8.38** 
Plant ownership 30.67 12.91 16.83 85.15*** 47.85** 22.65*** 
Length of 
Agreement 
1.09 1.49 0.39 6.28*** 1.08** -1.12 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively 
Negative (-) minimum WTA values mean that the respondents do not require any compensation for 
adopting the suggested changes. 
 
Kernel density plots provide a useful illustration of heterogeneity within the WTA 
results. These graphs can be helpful in presenting comparisons of segment 
memberships. A description of the density estimates for the WTA estimations for 
each attribute follows:  
Generator Capacity: 
Figure 5.1 shows that all three segments have very low WTA values for this attribute 
and only segment-2 farmers show some significance consideration to it. Segment-3 
farmers do not require any compensation for this attribute. Despite this attribute 
actually representing the size and the revenue generated by the plant, still it 
appears the farmers did not pay much attention to this attribute and the results 
show that this attribute does not have a significant effect on the participation 
behaviour of more than 50% of the sample population. 
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Distance: 
All three segments have positive compensation values for this attribute, however, 
only the first two segments show positive WTA values, implying that they require 
compensation values for this attribute to be included in the scheme, while segment 
3 farmers are shown to be not affected by this attribute. It is also clear from the 
estimations that overall the sample prefers to have AD plants closer to their farms. 
This can be due to the cost of transportation of manure associated with the 
increase in distance between the plant and the farm.  
 
Figure ‎5.2 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for generator capacity of AD 
plant 
 
Figure ‎5.3 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for Distance of AD plant from 
the farm 
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Technical assistance/ training 
All the segments show significant values towards this attribute, showing that they 
prefer to have this attribute included in the scheme (Figure 5.4). The first peak in 
the graph represents segment-2 and shows the strongest preference for this 
attribute. The literature (as discussed in section 5.3) identified lack of technical 
assistance/training as one of the major reasons for the closure of past AD plants in 
the UK, as the farmers did not have enough technical skills to properly manage and 
operate the plants themselves.  
Plant ownership 
All segments show very strong significance for this attribute and all of them require 
the highest compensation values for this attribute. This displays that farmers prefer 
to avoid the hassle of dealing with external companies and prefer to retain the 
revenue net-benefits to themselves. The second peak in Figure 5.5 represents 
segment 1 which have the highest compensation for this attribute.  
Length of agreement 
Figure 5.6 illustrates that farmers of segment 1 and 2 have compensation amounts 
in the positive range of the graph. The highest peak is for segment-1, requiring the 
highest compensation amounts increasing the length of agreements. Segment-3 
farmers however, do not require compensations for this attribute. It is clear from 
the estimations that most of the sample population prefer short term contracts for 
this policy scheme. 
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Figure ‎5.4 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA technical assistance/training 
 
Figure ‎5.5 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA Plant ownership for AD plant 
management 
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Figure ‎5.6 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA length of agreement of the scheme 
 
5.7. Discussion  
Although agroecosystems are major contributors to the UK’s national annual 
emissions of GHGs, it is also clear that this ecosystem can also help to mitigate 
these emissions. In this regard a technology based policy scheme was designed to 
reduce the methane emissions from livestock. This policy was specifically designed 
to identify the target groups in the pre-dominantly livestock farming sector. This 
study contributes to the literature on estimation of economic costs to the 
government of emission reductions from UK livestock farms by looking into the 
scope of mitigating methane emissions by designing a potential payment scheme. 
The hypothetical payment scheme was developed with scheme attributes 
suggesting different levels of changes in the management activities. In 
compensation for undertaking these changes the farmers were offered various 
levels of annual payments.  
A CLM, RPL, and LCM were used to analyse the data. In common with previous 
studies (For example, Beharry-Borg et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2011; Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009) the farmers were found to show heterogeneous preferences for 
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different land use management activities. The results suggested that farmers 
generally show aversion to drastic changes in their land use management activities 
but they can be encouraged to adopt some activities by providing the appropriate 
level of changes and compensation incentives. Results generally imply that most 
farmers would prefer to participate in schemes with flexible and less restrictive 
measures. The importance of scheme flexibility has also been suggested by Ruto 
and Garrod (2009) and Wynn et al. (2001). Ruto and Garrod indicated that generally 
farmers participating in AES across Europe are willing to trade-off 6-10% of their 
current payments for flexibility over measures or land attributes and demand higher 
payments for attributes like increased paper work and increased contract duration. 
The basic CL model revealed that all the attributes except the anaerobic plant 
generator capacity significantly influences farmers decision to voluntarily 
participate in the payment scheme. The results implied that on-farm anaerobic 
digestion plants are likely to be attractive for larger scale farms with higher number 
of livestock units conditional upon the combinations of distance of the plant, 
availability of technical assistance, length of agreement, plant ownership, and 
payments per hectare. Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred three segments 
Latent Class model indicated a general aversion to most of the attributes except the 
provision of technical assistance/training. The segment membership revealed that 
segment-1 farmers are the most averse while segment-3 farmers are more willing 
to participate and prefer OFADs with longer contracts.  
Including the socio-economic interactions in the CL model provided information 
about the behaviour of the farmers. This model indicated that farmers with higher 
farm income prefer to have the AD plants very close to the farm, which can be due 
to avoid the hassle and costs associated with transport of manure to the plants.  
The analysis also revealed that lower compensations are required by younger 
farmers and larger farms while farmers with larger farm sizes have higher 
preference for retaining the ownership of the plant. Another determinant was the 
number of livestock units, which has a positive influence over the farmers 
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preference towards length of agreement i.e. farms with higher number of livestock 
units are less averse to longer contracts.  
Overall the results show a preference for short term contracts, which is in 
accordance with Ruto and Garrod (2009). However, considering the associated 
investment costs and the requirement of longer time period to achieve the required 
GHG reduction, it seems more appropriate to have long-term schemes. Further 
investigations using the Latent class model revealed that one segment of farmers 
were less averse to long term contracts which were identified to be farms with 
higher number of livestock units. Hence, this helped to identify the target group to 
achieve the required long-term commitments. 
Estimations of the relationship between individual specific segment membership 
and socio-economic variables provided further understanding of the segmentation 
of the sample. It indicated that farm income, age, and livestock units were the main 
determinants of farmers’ segmentation. Segment-1 farmers having smaller number 
of livestock units while segment-2 comprised of older farmers and farms with 
higher farm incomes. 
The descriptive statistics presented in the subsection 5.5.2 show that the sample 
consists mostly of remote farms belonging to the North of England and Midlands. 
Average age of UK farmers is 59 years (DEFRA, 2012) while the sample showed an 
average of 45 years. The statistics also revealed that 80% of the farmers owned 
their farms (while in the UK agriculture sector 63% are owners of the farms). It was 
also shown that the average farm size for the sample (140ha) was higher than the 
UK average of 77ha (DEFRA, 2012), revealing that most of the farms included in the 
sample are large farms.  
The CE results reveal that there is a higher possibility of participation in payment 
schemes by younger farmers, large farms with high farm incomes, and large number 
of livestock. The sample profile also shows similar characteristics, making the 
assessment of implementation of payment schemes more favourable. Furthermore, 
since the sample collected represents mostly remote farms from the northern parts 
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of England and Midlands, these results cannot be effectively generalized to the UK. 
This suggests that it is important for policy makers to take complete profile of the 
target groups into account for designing effective policies. 
The WTA estimates revealed that the ownership of the anaerobic plant has been 
given significant consideration by the farmers and they prefer to keep the 
ownership of the plant to themselves, avoid hassle of dealing with others, and avoid 
sharing the income. Further analysis of individual specific WTA estimations show 
that segment-1 farmers consists of the farmers which show the strongest aversion 
and require higher minimum compensations for participating in such schemes while 
the segment-3 consists of farmers which are more flexible and require lower 
compensation values for most of the scheme attributes.  
Methodologically this study shows that CL-int and RPL models can provide useful 
information on main drivers of heterogeneity but LCM was required to show a more 
distinct distribution of that heterogeneity. As in this study the sample was 
categorised into three segments, each showing a distinctive behaviour towards the 
scheme design.  
Understanding how preferences of farmers vary across the population, policy 
makers can be in a better position to design such schemes. Linking the 
recommended management activities to the WTA compensation values, can help to 
understand how the target farmer population will behave towards different levels 
of required changes. By considering the heterogeneity of farmers, it has been 
shown that there is a potential of attracting farmers at the lower WTA spectrum by 
keeping some flexibility in the scheme designs. The findings reveal that livestock 
farmers can be attracted towards centralised AD plants easily as they consider it to 
be a less expensive option with less initial capital costs and inputs.  
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5.8. Conclusion 
This chapter reported results of a CE study to investigate how farmers’ trade-off the 
changes in land management practices required for the provision of GHG 
mitigation. 
An in-depth understanding of the farmers’ behaviour and preferences can provide 
useful information towards developing and designing new agri-environment 
schemes which ensure sufficient participation by the farmers. The results of the 
estimations suggest that the possibility of attracting farmers to mitigate GHG 
emissions exists but requires higher compensation payments. AD plants have not 
been very popular in the UK as compared to some of the mainland European 
countries. This study, looking at the feasibility of a scheme which requires the 
adoption of AD plants, provides an insight into the behaviour of farmers towards 
various scales and types of AD plants. This can help policy makers to design policies 
and AD plants according to the preferences of farmers.  
The results reveal that small scale farmers show very strong aversion to AD plants. 
This is potentially attributed to the fact that AD plants have very high associated 
capital costs. This can help to address the issue of AD plant closure in the UK by 
helping farmers to better understand how to set up plants which are better suited 
to their farms and are more sustainable over longer time periods. The study 
identified that younger farmers, larger farms, and farms with more livestock units 
can be potential target groups for effective implementation and targeting of 
mitigation schemes.  
This study contributes to the literature on climate change mitigation for agricultural 
ecosystems. The survey reveals that farmers, though willing to participate in either 
small scale OFADs or CADs, do not have the required capital investments. This study 
shows in addition to favourable governmental regulations (in terms of loans, 
subsidies, funding grants etc.) simplistic plant designs and monetary incentives can 
help to attract farmers towards setting up plants for generation of renewable 
energy.  
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In summary, this chapter provides useful information to address the climate change 
mitigation provided by UK livestock farms by designing cost effective schemes for 
farmers. This can encourage farmers to make desirable changes in their land use 
activities. The study identified target groups by providing segmentation of survey 
respondents according to their characteristics and associating it with their 
willingness to accept values. Further work linking the spatial attributes and 
distribution to this segmentation can help to identify the target areas for effective 
implementation of the policies. 
The key findings of the study provide a basic insight into the preferences of farmers 
and provide a further possibility of carrying out a cost-effectiveness analysis in 
terms of carbon abatement costs for each farm. This will help to provide 
information regarding the potential costs of achieving GHG mitigation. The cost-
effectiveness analysis along with the spatial distribution of costs will be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 Investigating farmers’ preferences for payment 
schemes to promote carbon sequestration 
Abstract 
This chapter provides details of a CE study to investigate arable farmers’ willingness 
to participate in a policy scheme designed to enhance carbon sequestration service 
provided by the UK farmlands. This study was done in conjunction with the study 
presented in the preceding chapter of this thesis. It provides an extension of the CE 
work done for the mitigation policy scheme (Chapter 5). As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, the respondents opted for the preferred payment scheme 
according to their farm types and a total of 115 responses were collected for this 
policy scheme. Most of the respondents, who opted to participate in this scheme, 
have either pre-dominantly arable farms or mixed farms, with large area of arable 
land. The responses for this scheme were also analysed using three discrete choice 
models. The estimations presented an overall aversion to drastic changes in land 
management activities. Unobserved heterogeneity was identified across the study 
sample however, even latent class model was not able provide a very distinct 
categorisation of the sample. In line with the results of the mitigation payment 
policy, the estimations for this model also revealed that farmers prefer lower level 
of changes in the land management activities. The marginal willingness to accept 
estimations illustrate that they are willing to adopt changes like conversion of 
arable land to grassland and afforestation. However, higher compensations will be 
required for the adoption of conservation ploughing and extensive grazing. 
 
 
 
 
-112- 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the second payment scheme of the CE study of this thesis. It 
provides the details from the investigation of arable farmers’ participation 
behaviour in a carbon sequestration payment scheme. This study includes the 
investigation of preference heterogeneity of farmers for scheme attributes and 
factors affecting their land use and participation decisions. An account of payment 
schemes and participation in payment schemes in general has been presented in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.1., followed by some evidence from literature about factors 
affecting the preferences of farmers in Section 5.2. Therefore, this chapter only 
focuses on the specific existing knowledge of the participation behaviour related to 
arable farmers.  
Agricultural land is a very actively managed ecosystem which provides food, fuel 
and fibre for human use along with various other use and non-use services. It plays 
a substantial role in maintaining global climate regulation especially the carbon 
cycle. Agricultural land is considered to contain about 12% of global terrestrial 
carbon (Dixon et al., 1993). Above ground vegetation including forests act as carbon 
sinks; however, soil can store much more carbon than the vegetation depending on 
the land use (Milne and Brown, 1997). The storage of carbon in the soil is a global 
issue and it requires appropriate policies to address it in a sustainable way. Many 
agricultural practices can contribute towards enhancing carbon sequestration in 
agricultural land such as reduced tillage, crop residue incorporation, using cover 
crops, appropriate application of manure, and afforestation. The amount of carbon 
stored is dependent on the type of land use (John et al, 2005).  In view of these 
facts, land management can be moderated to enhance carbon-sequestration in 
agricultural land at ecosystem-level by adopting changes in land use.  
There is a need to develop appropriate and feasible land use management to 
enhance the carbon storage capacity of agricultural land. Various conservation 
programmes have been outlined with the aim to enhance or conserve different 
environmental services. These programmes have mostly been developed for 
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reducing soil erosion, improving water quality, enhancing crop productivity, 
conserving biodiversity, forest conservation etc. The programmes include The 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US (introduced in 1985), the Permanent 
Cover Program (PCP) in Canada (in 1989), two policies (in 1992) under the EU 
Common Agricultural Programme (CAP) first involving policies to set aside 
agricultural land and the second involving afforestation to reduce the wood 
shortage problem in the EU (Chen et al., 2009), PSA programme in Costa Rica for 
forest conservation, afforestation and sustainable forest management (Zbinden and 
Lee, 2005). These policies enrolled farmers by providing them with payments for 
converting croplands to grassland, forest or other conservation uses through 
contracts typically lasting 10-20 years. In China the Grain to Green project (1999) 
was developed for conversion of arable land to grasslands and forest. This project 
was started to reduce soil erosion which was affecting the water resource. Similarly, 
Parks and Hardie (1995) provide an account of a payment scheme for afforestation 
of marginal agricultural lands, developed on the pattern of the US CRP using four 
scenarios targeted towards croplands and pastures. Agri-environmental schemes 
have also been introduced in the UK and include the Environmentally Sensitive Area 
(ESA) scheme and Countryside Stewardship (CS). These schemes have been 
designed for farms across the UK, to maintain and protect landscapes and 
biodiversity by adopting environmentally friendly farming practices.  
The literature on payment scheme participation for agricultural land use considers 
the effectiveness of payment schemes. Being voluntary in nature, their 
effectiveness is dependent on the willingness of the farmers to participate. Land 
managers have various motivations for participation (non-participation) in such 
schemes and determining these motivational factors is crucial for effective 
implementation. Farmers’ participation has been identified to be dependent on 
both farm/farmer characteristics and scheme design. It is posited in the literature 
that farmers’ participation decisions are positively affected by their attitude and 
behaviour with a focus on motives and values (Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 
1997), scheme designs being in accordance with the farming type and low 
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associated cost (Wynn et al., 2001), environmental attitudes (Dupraz et al., 2003; 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Wilson and Hart, 2000), and adequate compensation 
considering both the associated costs and loss of income (Defrancesco et al., 2008). 
However, drastic and labour intensive land use changes oblige the farmers towards 
non-participation (Defrancesco et al., 2008). It is also considered important that the 
scheme should fit with the current farming activities (Wilson and Hart, 2000). 
Overall, it can be summarised that in order to attract farmers a scheme should offer 
compensation payments no less than the benefits foregone, at level with efforts 
required; stable long term funding; flexible land use management changes, and 
should account for the best farm management activities for a particular service to 
be improved or conserved. WTA for adopting the changes can provide information 
about the variability in farmer’s requirements. This study utilizes a CE approach, 
which has been the preferred method for various studies (such as Beharry-Borg et 
al., 2012; Broch and Vedel, 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009) looking at scheme effectiveness and farmers participation. Modelling 
farmers’ choices can help to estimate how they trade-off different scheme attribute 
combinations against the compensation payments.  
Most of the past studies for enhancing carbon in arable land have focused on design 
of schemes for a single carbon sequestration activity (such as Henry et al., 2009; 
Morris and Potter, 1995; Parks and Hardie, 1995; Plantinga et al., 1999). However, 
the study presented in this chapter, involves the design of a payment policy 
involving a whole farm plan, incorporating several carbon sequestration measures 
together. This all-inclusive approach better assesses the relative advantage of 
different measures and combination of measures to achieve the required target.   
The overall aim of this chapter is to investigate landowners’ agri-environmental 
scheme preferences for enhancing carbon sequestration and to suggest scheme 
design for developing effective policies for attracting more arable farmers to 
contribute towards the UK’s carbon abatement targets. This will be achieved by 
achieving the following objectives:  
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 Estimating farmers WTA requirements for the adoption of changes 
in land use practices through the uptake of carbon sequestration 
measures. 
 Exploring the extent of heterogeneity in WTA requirements of 
farmers for a potential carbon sequestration policy and 
investigating whether this heterogeneity is associated with 
particular farm or farmer characteristics.  
This chapter first provides a review of the related literature leading to the 
development of the carbon sequestration policy scheme and the framework 
adopted for this study in Section 6.2. This is followed by Section 6.3 describing the 
attributes and the levels defining the sequestration scheme. The descriptive 
statistics and the results of the discrete choice models are presented in Section 6.4. 
This is followed by an analysis of the minimum WTA estimations in Section 6.5 and 
the illustration of the individual-specific WTA values using kernel density graphs. 
Section 6.6 presents a discussion of the estimation results, and finally the chapter 
ends with a discussion of the main conclusions of the study (section 6.7).  
6.2. Theory and Methods 
6.2.1. Carbon sequestration through arable farms 
Increasing soil carbon, not only reduces the carbon levels from the atmosphere, but 
also contributes towards soil fertility, improves moisture content in the soil, and 
improves nitrogen fertiliser use by crops and makes the soil more resilient to 
climatic stress (Dumanski, 2004; Johnson et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2007b). 
According to Smith (2004) recent intensive land use changes have resulted in 
continuous loss of carbon from agricultural lands. To enhance this stock and to 
capture atmospheric carbon farmers must be involved to make appropriate land 
use changes. Using arable land for afforestation, conversion to grassland or other 
non-agricultural uses can help to reduce the GHG emissions and enhance carbon 
sequestration (Rounsevell and Reay, 2009).   
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Agriculture is an important part of UK land use and according to DEFRA (2012); it 
makes up 70% of the total UK land area of which 36% is considered to be crop-able 
land. Increasing soil carbon in arable land can lead to additional benefits like 
increasing soil fertility, improvement in moisture retention capacity, improving the 
absorption of nitrogen, and reducing soil erosion by reducing soil compaction. The 
ability of arable land to enhance carbon sequestration has been identified by 
various studies (for example Follett, 2001; Lal, 2008; Smith et al., 2007b; Smith et 
al., 2008) through cropland management (ploughing methods), grazing 
management, forestation of arable land, and improvement of degraded land. 
Implementing policies incorporating such management changes often requires 
incentives to attract farmers. Therefore, designing payment schemes can prove to 
be useful in this context, as farmers can be compensated for the contribution they 
make to enhance the carbon sequestration service.  
Though various carbon sequestration measures have been recommended in the 
literature, some issues around these have also been presented in Smith et al. 
(2007b). These include, additionality1, permanence, leakage, availability of capital, 
transaction costs, consistency with traditional practices, and the high costs of 
technology, to name a few. Avoiding these issues can enhance the efficiency of 
carbon sequestration; therefore, potential payment schemes were identified for 
arable farmers which also addressed some of these issues. The proposed potential 
sequestration policy required farmers to adopt some land use management 
changes on their farms, which can help to increase the carbon storage potential of 
their farm. They were asked to enrol land for conversion from arable to grassland 
and for afforestation in addition to what they already have on their farms. This 
addressed the issue of additionality as the farmers were required to convert 
additional land to be eligible for compensation payments. Similarly, including 
                                                        
1 To make sure that land use change or the proposed measure achieves additional carbon 
sequestration to the current land use and management activities,  
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attributes like restrictions on grazing time periods and changes in ploughing 
methods, did not require the farmers to adopt new technologies, and hence did not 
lead to any high associated costs. Consistency with traditional practices was 
addressed by including conventional ploughing alongside conservation ploughing.  
The adoption of changes in agricultural land uses by farmers requires various trade-
offs. Generally, farmers consider the economic productivity of their farms, before 
making any conservation-based decisions. However, most of the agricultural 
measures for carbon sequestration also have associated secondary benefits. Carbon 
storage in soil can increase soil fertility (Lal, 2008), reduce erosion by the use of 
conservation tillage methods (Johnson et al., 2005); enhance soil moisture, reduce 
soil compaction by improving the vegetation cover in the form of grassland; 
improve biodiversity; and increase the availability of grassland for feedstock for 
renewable energy production by adopting extensive grazing measures (Smith et al., 
2008).  
Therefore, it can be useful to have information about the attitude of farmers 
towards these trades-offs and co-benefits in order to design better informed 
policies for achieving the climate mitigation target in the agricultural sector.  
6.2.2. Study Framework 
As mentioned in subsection 6.2.1., arable land has the potential to sequester carbon 
both in soil and vegetation. This service can be enhanced by adopting appropriate 
land use activities. This chapter, as highlighted previously, reports a CE study to 
assess how payment scheme design can influence arable farmers’ willingness to 
participate in schemes to enhance carbon sequestration on their lands. This study 
was carried out in conjunction with the CE study presented in Chapter 5. 
The first step was to define appropriate attributes and levels. These were selected 
according to their significance towards enhancing carbon storage after a 
comprehensive review of measures recommended in literature. A detailed account 
of these attributes and levels is presented in section 6.3. After selection of the 
attributes and the levels an appropriate CE design was generated and included in 
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the survey questionnaire. A total of 115 face to face questionnaires were conducted 
(for details please refer to appendix A of the thesis) for this payment scheme 
scenario.  
The data collected included both choice data and socioeconomic data of the 
respondents. This data was used to investigate the behaviour of the farmers 
towards a potential scheme design and to analyse the impact of different attributes 
and attribute levels. In order to understand the preferences better, three Logit 
models; CLM, RPL, and LCM were used to carry out the estimations. The CLM 
provides basic estimations, while RPL was used to identify the preference 
heterogeneity and the LCM to identify the sources of heterogeneity by providing a 
segmentation of the sample population. The minimum willingness to accept 
requirements were calculated and further analysis of individual specific WTA 
estimations were carried out to explain the reason behind the farmers’ decisions 
about WTA compensations and illustrated with kernel density graphs.  
6.3. Attributes for sequestration policy scheme 
Significant attributes with realistic levels were selected after an intensive literature 
review and information from the pre-test of the study. The range of the levels was 
selected to represent each attribute according to the size and scale of improvement 
that farmers are willing to adopt.  
The sequestration policy scheme, as described in section 5.2.2, was developed pre-
dominantly for arable farms and required the farmers to adopt changes in their 
farm management activities in order to enhance the storage of carbon both in the 
soil and vegetation on the farm. This scheme required the farmers to assess 
schemes including enrolment of land for grassland conversion, afforestation, to 
restrict grazing, and to adopt conservation tillage. The potential payment scheme 
was described in terms of 6 attributes, four of which were described in quantitative 
terms while the other two were qualitative. The payment attribute was included to 
determine the WTA of the farmers to participate in potential schemes. This 
-119- 
 
provides an insight into how farmers trade-off the changes in land management 
activities required by the schemes for the carbon sequestration service. 
The assumption was that the selection of the alternatives and attributes would help 
to provide an understanding of the preferences of the farmers towards agri-
environment schemes for enhancing carbon storage in UK arable farms. 
A detailed description of the attributes and levels is presented as follows: 
a. Land enrolment for conversion to permanent grasslands 
This attribute required farmers to enrol a certain percentage of their arable land for 
conversion to permanent grassland. Permanent grassland can help to reduce the 
loss of carbon from arable soil due to lower soil disturbance and reduction in 
harvested products also enhance the carbon storage potential both in the soil and 
vegetation (Smith et al., 2008). Carbon storage through grasslands proves very 
favourable as more carbon is stored in the roots, which keeps it restrained within 
the soil rather than released to the atmosphere (Wreford et al., 2010).  
The attribute was presented in terms of percentages of the total arable land the 
farmer managed and four levels were defined, to provide an opportunity for most 
of the farmers to enrol some of their land, even if they have other constrains in 
their farm management.  
b. Land enrolment for afforestation 
Afforestation on farms and agricultural landscapes has been considered an 
important mechanism when it comes to GHG mitigation in the agricultural sector. It 
has been recognised as a carbon sequestration activity approved under the Kyoto 
Protocol and  comes under the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) 
activities of the IPCC report in 2001 (Ramachandran Nair et al., 2009). This attribute 
required farmers to enrol a certain ‘percentage’ of arable land for afforestation. The 
attribute was represented by four levels, providing an opportunity for both small 
and large scale farmers to be able to participate in the scheme by choosing lower or 
higher levels of the attribute. 
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c. Changes in grazing time 
This attribute was defined for changes in livestock grazing. Intensity and timing of 
grazing influences the growth, carbon storage and productivity of grasslands 
(Freibauer, 2003; Smith et al., 2007c). Under normal conditions the farmers would 
prefer to let their livestock graze as much as possible to increase their livestock 
productivity. However, lower levels of grazing are more favourable for enhancing 
carbon storage in grazing lands (Smith et al., 2007b). Taking these facts into 
consideration it is important to control grazing time periods on grasslands, as long 
term intensive grazing can lead to both over-grazing and eventually can affect the 
carbon storage negatively.   
Hence, this attribute was described with two levels, giving the choice between 
continuing intensive grazing or making a shift to extensive grazing time periods. 
Though extensive grazing is beneficial both for the farmer, in terms of improvement 
in grassland productivity, and for climate change policy makers, still it is observed 
that most of the farmers, prefer intensive grazing for their livestock.  
d. Changes in ploughing methods  
Shifting from a conventional to conservation till system can help to reduce soil 
erosion by reducing the disturbance in the top layers of the soil and also helps to 
capture carbon in the soil, by keeping the top soil covered by organic matter 
(Alvarez, 2005). This helps to reduce erosion and increase the carbon content of the 
soil (Pretty et al., 2002). It was observed that farmers prefer conventional tillage as 
they perceive it to be a hassle free mode of ploughing.  
The respondents were presented with two levels for this attribute, which required 
them to choose between carrying on with conventional ploughing or shifting to 
conservation ploughing methods. This attribute was included into the design with 
the assumption that the estimates for this attribute would help to provide a real 
insight into the preferences of farmers and what would be required at the policy 
design level to encourage them to adopt conservation ploughing methods. 
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e. Length of Agreement 
Changes in soil carbon require longer time periods in order to be measureable. 
Hence, it seems most appropriate to have long term policies for the provision of 
carbon sequestration services. However, it is usually difficult to engage farmers in 
long term commitments. Although it has been identified in previous studies that 
farmers prefer short term contracts, it can also be associated with the type, size, 
and attitude of the farmer himself. In order to investigate this, this attribute was 
represented by four levels, from shorter 2 years contracts to longer contracts up to 
20 years. The long term contracts can help to address the ‘permanence’ issue 
mentioned in section 6.2.1.  
f. Compensation payments 
Compensation amounts are an important part of any scheme design and can 
strongly influence the choice and participation of farmers. In order to estimate the 
WTA payments for adopting the scheme, a monetary attribute was included in the 
scheme design. The selection of the levels of the compensation attribute provides 
an insight into the compensation amounts that farmers would require for the 
overall contribution of their farm towards the provision of a service. Usually farmers 
are considered to be profit maximisers and in order to ensure their participation in 
schemes requiring changes in land use activities it is important that appropriate 
compensation should be allocated for the scheme.   
The compensations was offered as ‘per hectare’ payments for the whole farm. 
Although the levels of payments cannot be assigned according to the actual amount 
of carbon sequestered, it is still important to reward the farmers according to the 
measures implemented and the associated productivity loss. Therefore, a wide 
range of levels were presented and it was also assumed that the compensation 
amounts selected can help to provide a better understanding of farmers’ attitudes 
towards conservation.  
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Table ‎6.1: Description of attributes and levels for the mitigation payment scheme 
Attributes Description  Variable Levels Coding 
Enrolment for 
permanent 
grassland 
Area of land to 
enrol for 
conversion to 
grassland (%) 
PGRASS  10 15 30 50 Linear 
specification 
Enrolment for 
afforestation 
Area of land to 
enrol for 
afforestation (%) 
REF 2 5 10 15 Linear 
specification 
Grazing time 
periods 
Preferable grazing 
time period 
GRAZ Intensive 
grazing 
Extensive 
grazing 
Dummy coded, 
Intensive=0, 
Extensive= 1 
Ploughing 
methods 
Preferable 
ploughing method 
PLOUGH Convention
al till 
 Conservation 
till 
  
Dummy coded, 
Conventional= 0, 
Conservational= 
1 
Length of 
agreement 
The minimum 
contract length 
they prefer (Years) 
LOA 2  5 10 20 Linear 
specification 
Compensation 
(£/ha) 
Compensation 
payments for the 
total farm size 
(£/ha) 
COMP 10 25 50 75 Linear 
specification 
 
6.4.  Experimental Design 
The experimental design was constructed using Ngene 1.0.2., in order to produce 
different combinations of choice attributes and levels to be presented in each 
choice card.  
As presented in Chapter 5, section 5.4., the full factorial design was too large to be 
used; therefore, an orthogonal fractional factorial design was generated. This 
resulted in 36 choice combinations, which were further blocked into 6 blocks of 6 
choice sets, for the convenience of each respondent to be able to understand the 
information provided. Therefore, each respondent was presented with 6 choice 
cards each and a total of 6 respondents were required to complete the whole 
choice design.     
Each respondent was presented with two policy alternatives offering different 
combinations of the levels along with ‘I do not want to participate’ (that is business 
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as usual). During the survey the respondents were first familiarised with the 
attributes and the effect of adopting the changes, on their farm and carbon storage. 
Detailed description of the CE design and the survey is presented in the Appendix A 
and the choice cards are presented in Appendix C at the end of this thesis.  
6.5. Results 
Sequestration payment scheme estimations involved 690 choices elicited from 115 
respondents and the choice model estimations were carried out using Nlogit 4.0. 
6.5.1. Data organisation 
The data was organised according to the levels of the attributes used in the choice 
experiment. The two attributes with two levels were ‘dummy’ coded. Therefore, 
changes in grazing time were coded as 0 for intensive grazing and 1 for restrictive 
grazing. Similarly, changes in ploughing methods were coded as 0 for conventional 
tillage and 1 for conservation tillage. The other four quantitative attributes were 
specified linearly using the same values as presented in the CE attribute design (see 
Table 6.1).  
6.5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides a summary of the socioeconomic characteristics and land use 
management activities carried out at the farms. The descriptive results of 115 
respondents who completed the questionnaires are presented and discussed here. 
a.  Distribution of respondents: 
The CE survey for the study was conducted with an intention to include most of the 
major farming landscape types in the UK. The locations for the data collection were 
strategically selected across different regions, which helped to collect a 
representative sample across the UK. Although this scheme was targeted towards 
pre-dominantly arable farms, farmers with mixed farming types also chose to 
participate in the survey for this scheme. About 50% of the sample belonged to the 
southern parts of the UK (Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, surrey), which are pre-
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dominantly arable crop areas. Figure 6.1 shows the regional distribution of 
participating farmers across the UK.  
 
 
Figure ‎6.1 Regional distribution of the sample population 
 
b. Age, gender, and household size: 
The descriptive results (Table 6.2) revealed that 81% of the sample population were 
males. The majority of respondents were middle aged, with most of them (64%) 
being between the ages of 31-50 years, followed by 28% of respondents being in 
the older age range of 51-80 years.  
About 41% of respondents had a household size of two, while 30% had three and 
18% had a household size of 4. Only 8% of the respondents had more than four 
people living at home.  
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Table ‎6.2: Age, gender, and household size of the respondents 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Age (years)    
17-30 8 9 
31-40 27 31 
41-50 37 42 
51-60 19 22 
61-70 8 10 
71-80 1 1 
Total 100 115 
Gender   
Male 81 93 
Female 19 22 
Total 100 115 
House hold size   
1 3 4 
2 41 47 
3 30 34 
4 18 21 
5 3 3 
6 3 4 
>6 2 2 
Total 100 115 
 
c. Level of Education: 
The results (Table 6.3) show that 35% respondents went to college while 30% had 
been to secondary school. 20% had been to university for undergraduate and 
postgraduate degrees; however, 13% of the sample did not respond to this 
question. 
Table ‎6.3: Education level of the respondents 
Level of Education 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency 
Missing 13 15 
Primary school 2 3 
Secondary school 30 34 
College 35 40 
Undergraduate 17 19 
Postgraduate 3 4 
Total 100 115 
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Table ‎6.4: Farm ownership, farm size, and income from the farm 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Farm ownership   
 Tenant 17 20 
Own 83 95 
Total 100 115 
Farm size (ha)   
10-100 28 32 
101-200 33 38 
201-300 34 39 
>301 5 6 
Total 100 115 
farm income (£/annum)   
£6,000-£30,000 10 12 
£31,000-£60,000 28 32 
£61,000-£90,000 30 35 
>£91000 32 36 
 Total 100 115 
 
d. Ownership of land, farm size, and farm income:  
Table 6.4 displays that 83% of the farmers owned the farms they managed while the 
remaining 17% were either employed to manage the land or renting the land. The 
farm sizes varied considerably with most (67%) of the farmers being in the range of 
100-300 ha. The farm income range was mostly at the higher end, and the dominant 
farm income (30%) range was £61,000-£90,000.  
e. Land use and livestock types: 
The pre-dominant land use was arable farming however; about 77% of the 
respondents also had certain percentage of grassland and livestock on their farms 
(Table 6.5). The arable crops varied into root crops, cereals, oilseed rape and farm 
vegetables. 50% of the sample operated pre-dominantly cereals farms. The 
statistics on livestock shows that about 55% of the farms had sheep along with dairy 
cows and cattle, while 45% had only cattle and dairy cows.  
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Table ‎6.5: Land use and livestock types of the farms 
Livestock types and land use 
  Percentage (%) Frequency 
Sheep with dairy 
and cattle 
55 63 
Dairy and Cattle 
only 
45 52 
Total 100 115 
Land use type    
Only Arable 33 38 
Arable + Grassland 67 77 
Total 100 115 
 
6.5.3. Parameter Estimates of choice models 
a. Estimates of CLM 
The basic conditional logit (CL) model was specified so that the probability of 
selecting a particular alternative was a function of attributes and the alternative 
specific constant (ASC), which had a value of 1 if the ‘do not want to participate’ 
option was chosen and 0 if either of the other alternatives was chosen. This CL 
model provides a modest fit to the data (pseudo-R2 of 0.20) and suggests that 
farmers overall show a reluctance towards participation in payment schemes which 
involve drastic changes in their current land use practices. The results (Table 6.6) 
show that most of the attributes have t-statistics significant at the 0.01% level. All 
the attributes except compensation (COMP) have negative coefficient values 
showing the farmers’ reluctance to adopt the proposed changes, and preference to 
move away from the status quo. However, the positive and significant 
compensation attribute shows that farmers are more likely to participate when a 
scheme offers higher compensations other things being equal.  The basic CL model 
did not identify significant preference towards any specific attributes and the IIA 
test also indicated that the basic CL model’s assumptions of identical and 
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independently distributed errors are not supported by the data; therefore, a more 
flexible model for preference heterogeneity was required. Socioeconomic 
interactions were added to the model, however, none of the characteristics 
revealed any significant coefficients.  
b. Estimates of RPL 
To account for this heterogeneity, Random Parameter logit (RPL) model was used. 
The sensitivity of RPL estimations to the number of draws used for simulations was 
tested and it revealed that the model based on 1000 draws provided sufficiently 
good approximations for estimations. Starting the RPL estimations, first, the utility 
parameters for all the attributes were specified as random choosing a normal 
distribution except for compensation which was specified with log normal 
distribution, in order to ensure non-negative parameters for this attribute. The 
results from this estimation revealed three attributes; permanent grassland 
(PGRASS), grazing time period (GRAZ) and ploughing method (PLOUGH), with 
significant standard deviations. Therefore, these were then specified as random 
parameters with normal distribution for the final estimations. The results (Table 6.6) 
show that the basic RPL model was statistically significant and R2 value of 0.24. The 
log-likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the CLM provides an equally 
good fit to the data at 5% significance level. The RPL results reveal that the standard 
deviation of the three random attributes, enrolling land for permanent grassland, 
grazing time period, and conservation ploughing are statistically significant showing 
these coefficients are heterogeneous over population. The results indicate that 
farmers are averse to most of the attributes and only show a positive preference 
towards conservation ploughing.  
The results suggest that the data supports choice-specific unconditional unobserved 
heterogeneity. In order to further account for this heterogeneity in preferences and 
to explore the segmentation of respondents according to these preferences, the 
Latent Class model was estimated. 
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c. Estimates of LCM 
The model was estimated over 2, 3, and 4 classes; however, the 4-class model did 
not converge. Both the 2 and 3 class model are statistically significant with 2-class 
model with a χ2 statistic of 381.2. The log likelihood and R2 values increased while 
the AIC and BIC values decrease from the 2-class to the 3-class model revealing that 
the 3-class model provided a better fit over the 2-class model. The results of the 3-
class model are presented in Table 6.6 and they show that for segment-1 utility 
coefficients for PGRASS, REF and COMP are significant at 1% and 5% significance 
level, while for segment-2 all attributes except REF and LOA are significant. The 
segment-3 is the largest group with respondents having a 47% probability of 
belonging to this group. This segment shows significant preferences for most of the 
attributes at 0.01% level except the GRAZ. The farmers in segment-2 show higher 
resistance to participation as compared to the other two segments.  
The results of the model estimations suggested considerable heterogeneity in 
preferences between the farmers. The LCM significantly divided the sample into 
three classes. Log-likelihood values indicate that the LCM provided an improvement 
in the overall fit as compared to the CL and RPL models. 47% of the population 
belong to the segment 3 of the LCM while the other two segments had almost equal 
populations each.  
The results of individual characteristic class probability estimations did not show 
much significant distinction among the classes, the only variable that proved 
significant was farm size and revealed that farmers with larger farm sizes have a 
higher probability of belonging to segment-2 and show aversion to restrictions in 
land use activities, requiring higher compensation levels for uptake of the policy.  
d.  ASC (status quo) consideration 
The model estimations for this policy scheme also revealed the same issue of ASC 
aversion as explained in the results section of Chapter 5. Therefore, a similar model 
without a constant was estimated for this scheme. The results (see appendix B) 
supported the issue found for mitigation policy in Chapter 5. Therefore, the ASC 
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constant was ignored for welfare estimations for policy scheme alternatives carried 
out in Chapter 7. 
Table ‎6.6: Parameter estimates from CL, RPL, and LCM models 
Model CLM RPL (3 attributes 
random) 
LCM 
Loglikelihood -594.74 -617.95 -567.43 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.2 0.18 0.25 
AIC 1.744 1.82 1.68 
BIC 1.794 1.904 1.78 
Chi squared  279.66 381.2 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 9 15 
   Segment  1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
Attributes Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
St. dev(SE) Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
PGARSS -0.0657*** -0.0534*** 0.032*** -0.2718** -0.0746*** -0.054*** 
(0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0068) (0.0877) (0.0119) (0.0047) 
REF -0.0356** 0.1685  -0.1156* -0.0034 -0.0423** 
(0.0120) (0.1587) (0.0494) (0.0262) (0.0136) 
GRAZ -0.3268* -0.6832 0.7475** 0.01263 -0.5174* -0.2016 
(0.1323) (0.2145) (0.2775) (0.6192) (0.252) (0.1342) 
PLOUGH  -1.1348*** 0.0021** 1.6316*** -0.2007 -4.5855*** -0.4517*** 
(0.1409) (0.012) (0.2416) (0.484) (0.4383) (0.1363) 
LOA -0.0201* 0.0247*  -0.0446 -0.0146 -0.0313** 
(0.0096) (0.0106) (0.0365) (0.022) (0.0109) 
COMP 0.0162*** 0.3481***  0.0247* 0.0366*** 0.014*** 
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0107) (0.0063) (0.0028) 
ASC -2.5623***   -4.9144*** -3.0081*** -3.1045*** 
(0.2570) (1.4600) (0.5671) (0.2821) 
Percentage    26% 27% 47% 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively 
6.6. Minimum WTA estimates for policy scheme 
The overall marginal WTA estimates reveal that highest estimates are for segment-2 
of the LCM at a value of £125.29 per ha for adopting conservation ploughing on 
their farms. Adopting conservation ploughing method has high values for most of 
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the model estimations. This can be because this ploughing method can potentially 
be more labour intensive, as it also involves retaining an organic cover over the soil. 
The second highest values are for aversion to restrictions on grazing time periods.  
Since, LCM proved to be the better fitting model; , utility estimates from the LCM 
were used to calculate individual-specific estimates and to calculate the individual-
specific WTA values.  
Higher ASC values, however, reveal that farmers prefer to move away from the 
status quo and are willing to participate in the proposed schemes. These results are 
contrasting to the observation that UK farmers are not presently converting to 
extensive practises, which suggests the presence of status quo bias in the data.    
Table ‎6.7: WTA (in GBP/ha) estimations from the choice models for the sequestration 
payment scheme 
Attributes CL RPL 
LCM 3 segment 
 
      Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
PGRASS 4.06 0.15 11.00* 2.04 3.86*** 
REF 2.20 -0.48 4.68 0.09 3.02** 
GRAZ 20.17 1.96 -0.51 14.14** 14.40 
PLOUGH 70.05 -0.01 8.13 125.29*** 32.26* 
LOA 1.24 -0.07 1.81 0.40 2.24** 
*, **, *** indicate statistic significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.01% respectively 
Negative (-) minimum WTA values mean that the respondents do not require any compensation for adopting 
the suggested changes. 
 
Kernel density plots were drawn help to represent the distribution of the 
population and their preferences according to their WTA requirements for each 
segment of the sample population. A description of the distribution for each 
attribute is presented below: 
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Enrolment for conversion to permanent grassland: 
Figure 6.2 shows that all three segments have positive WTA requirements for this 
attribute. The first peak represents the respondents belonging to segment 2 and 3 
showing the highest density point. The WTA values show that this attribute has 
been important across the population especially for the segment 2 and segment 3 
respondents. The lowest peak in the density graph represents segment 1 
respondents, revealing the least density in this compensation range while the 
highest population density belongs to the segment 3 of the LCM.  
Enrolment for afforestation: 
The respondents have lower WTA values for this attribute and farmers belonging to 
segment 1 and 3 have shown importance towards this attribute for their decisions. 
The density curves (Figure 6.3) are higher for segment 1 and segment 3. Though the 
sample does not require very high compensation amounts for enrolling certain 
percentage of their farmland for afforestation, farmers prefer to take up this 
conversion for lower arable land percentages. 
 
Figure ‎6.2 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for enrolment of land for conversion to 
permanent grassland 
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Figure ‎6.3 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for enrolment of land for afforestation 
Livestock grazing time: 
This is the only attribute for which one class (segment 1) of the population does not 
require any compensation. The farmers in this segment include farmers with lower 
levels of livestock. The Figure 6.4 reveals that the highest population density lies 
within the compensation ranges of segment 2 and segment 3.  
Ploughing methods: 
The WTA values for this attribute though being in the positive range have been 
quite varied. The minimum being just £8.00 to the maximum value of £125 per ha 
required by the segment 2 respondents. This segment has shown a significant 
attitude towards this attribute. The model estimations revealed that farmers show 
preference for conventional methods of ploughing. This also explains the higher 
amounts of compensation required by most of the population.  
Length of agreement: 
The compensation estimations show that compensation values though being in the 
positive range were not very high. The minimum compensations are required by the 
segment 2 population and most of the population density lies within the segment 1 
compensation range (Figure 6.6). This shows that though farmers prefer short term 
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contracts, convincing them to participate in longer term contracts can be easily be 
achieved without offering high values of compensation. 
 
Figure ‎6.4 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for changes in livestock grazing time 
 
Figure ‎6.5 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for changes in ploughing methods
 
Figure ‎6.6 Distribution of individual-specific minimum WTA for length of agreement 
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6.7. Discussion 
It is known from the literature that farmers prefer to enrol marginal land for 
conservation purposes and would prefer not to take land out of production. 
However, it is the land being managed intensively that is affecting climate 
regulation. Hence, it is important that conservation policies should be targeted 
towards arable land. The policy scheme was designed to address this by identifying 
target groups in arable areas in the UK. 
A CLM, RPL, and LCM were used to analyse the data. It was revealed from the 
estimations that farmers show heterogeneous preferences for different land use 
management activities. The results suggested that farmers show aversion to drastic 
changes in their land use management activities but they can be encouraged to 
adopt some activities by providing the appropriate level of changes and 
compensation incentives and generally most farmers would prefer to participate in 
schemes with flexible and less restrictive measures.  
The basic CL model estimations show that farmers’ decisions are significantly 
influenced by all the scheme attributes and most of the farmers preferred no 
changes in the grazing time period and ploughing methods. The RPL model 
supported the assumption that the sample data shows unconditional unobserved 
heterogeneity, which was in accordance with most of studies looking into farmers’ 
behaviour (Beharry-Borg et al., 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009). Three of the six attributes were estimated with a random term following a 
normal distribution with significant standard deviation. Though interacting socio-
demographic data in the RPL can reveal this heterogeneity over the whole 
population (Hensher et al., 2005), LCM was estimated to reveal the segmentation of 
the population, to identify the sources of preferences. This model revealed that the 
data could be categorised into three segments, however, segment-3 consisted of 
almost half the population (47%). 
The results revealed a preference towards short term contracts for this scheme as 
well but the models failed to provide clear source of heterogeneity in terms of 
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socio-economic characteristics. Hence, unlike the mitigation scheme (presented in 
chapter 5), no specific target groups could be identified. However, achieving carbon 
sequestration targets require longer time period, hence, there is a need to design 
schemes which provide farmers with low cost measures which can be sustained 
over a longer time period even in the absence of the scheme.  
The sample profile discussed in subsection 6.5.2 shows that most of the sample 
consists mostly of mixed farms with only 5% sample managing arable land only. The 
sample consisted of mature farmers with an average age of 45 years, most of the 
sample (83%) managing own farms. The average farm size of the sample (166ha) 
was much higher than the UK average of 77ha (DEFRA, 2012). The CE results for this 
sample group did not provide clear information on the influence of the farm/farmer 
characteristics on the decisions made by the respondents. This could potentially be 
due to the mixed nature of the farms and unrepresentative distribution of the 
socio-demographics across the sample. This reveals a need to stratify the sample 
population into clear profiles to further investigate the implications of the nature of 
the farms and farmer characteristics on the uptake of sequestration schemes in 
arable land.  
The WTA estimates show a strong aversion to extensive grazing and adopting 
conservation ploughing. The results revealed that the farmers require significantly 
higher compensation values for these two attributes. The individual specific 
estimations showed that segment 2 proved to be the most averse segment of the 
sample, as they require highest amount of compensation for most of the changes 
required by the scheme, except enrolment of land for conversion to permanent 
grassland. In accordance with the literature, a considerable number of farmers were 
willing to adopt the proposed changes if sufficient payments were offered (Beharry-
Borg et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2011; Ruto and Garrod, 2009).  
Methodologically the study shows that CL and RPL models can provide useful 
information on the main drivers of heterogeneity, however, CL-int was not able to 
specify any significant results. LCM is usually required to show a more distinct 
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distribution of that heterogeneity, however, the models were not able to clearly 
identify preference drivers for this scenario. This is in accordance with Beharry-Borg 
et al. (2012) and is potentially attributed to the mixed nature of the supposedly 
predominantly arable farms and a relatively small sample size.  
These findings can be relevant and important for informing any PES scheme design. 
The estimations suggest that the possibility of attracting farmers to enhancing 
carbon sequestration exists but higher compensation payments are required. By 
considering the heterogeneity of farmers, it has been shown that there is a 
potential for attracting farmers at the lower WTA spectrum by keeping some 
flexibility in the level of action required for the measures included in the scheme 
designs.  
6.8. Conclusions 
This chapter focused on a CE study to explore farmers’ behaviour towards changes 
in land management practices required for enhancing carbon storage in arable 
farms. A policy scheme was designed to identify the target groups in  arable 
farmlands of the UK.  
The CE estimates show that farmers can be grouped according to the utility and 
disutility they get from the same attributes. The results revealed that this difference 
of behaviour can be attributed to the scheme design (attributes), however, it was 
unable to illustrate the influence of farm/farmers’ characteristics on the 
preferences. From the attributes presented in this study, it was revealed that a 
significant proportion of respondents do not require high compensation for 
enrolling a lower percentage of arable land for conversion to permanent grassland 
and afforestation. However, making them adopt conservation ploughing or 
extensive grazing can prove very costly in terms of compensation.  This shows that 
the respondents revealed disutility towards restrictions in grazing and conservation 
ploughing methods. The survey also revealed that most of the farmers were under 
the impression that these measures can be more troublesome and would cause a 
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reduction in overall productivity of their farm. Policy makers should be able to 
address this disutility in such scheme designs. This can be achieved by providing 
help or assistance in adopting such restrictive farming activities and by enhancing 
awareness of the benefits of these measures.  
This study also contributes to the literature on the estimation of the economic cost 
of provision of carbon sequestration service from UK farmlands. Since it is a non- 
marketable service, the farmers have no means of revenue generation from it. 
Therefore, payment schemes can be helpful to provide compensation for 
undertaking the required changes. Based on these results from the choice 
experiment it can be concluded that farmers show aversion to changing land 
management, and prefer to participate in schemes requiring lower levels of action. 
This leads to the conclusion that implementation of such schemes will require 
proper planning, design, and appropriate compensation amounts to ensure uptake 
by UK farming community. 
The insights gained through this study can be used to address the climate regulation 
services provided by UK farmlands. It also provides a basis for a further plausible 
cost-effectiveness study to address the potential costs of achieving carbon 
sequestration through land use management activities. 
In summary, this chapter provides an insight into farmers’ behavioural preferences 
towards land use management options that can help to enhance carbon 
sequestration in UK arable farms. This study contributes to the PES literature for 
carbon sequestration by using a holistic approach rather than focusing on a single 
measure i.e. it contains measures which involve the whole farm as a unit, such as, 
arable land conversion to grassland and afforestation, and suggesting changes in 
livestock grazing and ploughing methods. The study was able to associate farmers’ 
preferences to the scheme design however, the impact of socio-economic 
characteristics is still vague and the study failed to provide a very clear 
interpretation of the segmentation of farmer groups. This can be attributed to the 
mixed nature of farms and smaller sample size (as compared to the sample size for 
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the mitigation policy scheme presented in Chapter 5). The issue related to the 
nature of farms can be potentially addressed by linking the land uses with landscape 
and farm characteristics, which can lead to a more pronounced identification of the 
target farms and can help to design schemes accordingly. Nevertheless, the key 
findings provide a base for incorporating this kind of analysis for designing potential 
schemes. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness analysis of such schemes can help to 
address the specific costs of carbon sequestration in terms of carbon cost of each 
farm. This can help to implement the schemes in a cost effective way to encourage 
farmers to adopt changes to achieve the required climate change mitigation targets. 
This cost-effectiveness analysis will be presented in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Spatial pattern of Carbon Valuations  
Abstract 
Voluntary Environmental policies can be used to provide incentives e.g. ES 
conservation and protection. Effective design of these policies can benefit from 
information on the heterogeneity of preferences of farmers towards scheme 
attributes. In agroecosystem context the variability in environmental and farm 
characteristics, which often vary over space, can also, play an important role for 
how costly it would be to use different types of policies to achieve reductions in net 
carbon emissions.  This chapter estimates carbon abatement costs from the CE 
studies. These are combined with GIS based techniques to allow for an assessment 
of cost-effectiveness of two policy schemes and an investigation into the spatial 
distribution of these costs. The WTA estimates from the CE studies reported in 
Chapters 5 and 6 were used for the carbon abatement cost calculations while the 
land use model outputs for the baseline scenario presented in Chapter 4 were used 
for the spatial analysis. The results show that a scheme using agro-ecosystem to 
sequester carbon is more efficient than the scheme designed to a technology based 
scheme to reduce emissions. The carbon valuation also revealed that almost half of 
the sample was within the DECC price range revealing that appropriate policy 
implementation can be achieved at reasonable cost. The spatial mapping revealed 
target locations where implementing such policies can be more cost-effective. 
These results have implications for policy design and appraisal for achieving 
emissions reduction targets in the UK farmlands.  
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7.1. Introduction 
Ecosystem services (ES) from agroecosystems which strongly contribute to human 
wellbeing, are being affected negatively by the increased population, agricultural 
intensification, and climate change. Hence, conservation of the ES from this sector 
needs to be included in the social, economic, and institutional systems (Broch et al., 
2013). Although understanding the drivers contributing towards enhancing the 
conservation of ES can be useful to guide effective policy support, an evaluation of 
the costs associated with these policies is also important.  This puts emphasis on the 
need to implement PES schemes to achieve desired benefits at least cost (Chen et 
al., 2010). This way the programmes can be made cost-effective by enrolling lands 
which provide maximum benefit within an affordable budget. 
There is a need for a robust approach to develop such cost budgets to ensure the 
effectiveness of policies. In the literature two major approaches have been used for 
carbon pricing, the social cost of carbon (SCC) and marginal abatement costs of 
carbon (MACC). The SCC is the marginal damage cost of emissions and is estimated 
for every additional tonne of carbon emitted to the atmosphere (Watkiss and 
Downing, 2008) while the MACC is the cost of mitigation of one tonne of carbon 
based on a mitigation measure or technology (Moran et al., 2008).   
Spatial mapping of ES and their monetary values have been quite popular and is 
gaining much attention e.g. UKNEA, 2011; Natural Capital Project (Termansen et al., 
2013). Mapping of ES values is defined as valuation of ES across a relatively large 
geographical area that includes exploring variation of these values across space  
(Schägner et al., 2013). Mapping welfare estimates can help to provide additional 
information for designing efficient policies as it provides information regarding the 
differences in values across space and their spatial determinants. There is a need to 
develop spatially explicit models combined with value functions based on real world 
observations. This leads to an investigation of the variations in the welfare 
estimates and spatial heterogeneity for carbon valuation studies to achieve climate 
regulation conservation in the agricultural sector. This can help to generate spatial 
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patterns of economic values highlighting cost effective locations for the 
implementation of individual policies. Chapters 5 and 6 provided an account of 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences and the farm/farmer characteristics that 
affect their preferences. However, agricultural land is privately owned and is quite 
heterogeneous according to spatial location and landscape characteristics, 
therefore, understanding the linkage between farmers’ preferences, spatial 
characteristics and distribution of ES can help identify areas which can be targeted 
effectively with policies.  
This chapter examines these two aspects of effective policy design. First, it 
estimates the costs that each respondent associates per tonne of carbon emissions 
avoided from the enrolled land. Although MACC have been calculated by various 
studies for individual measures (see Moran et al., 2008), research for carbon costs 
for complete policy programme has been limited mostly to programmes for carbon 
sequestration by forestry and afforestation (see Richards and Stokes, 2004). This 
study attempts a more holistic approach to provide carbon abatement costs for 
whole policy alternatives for both carbon sequestration and GHG mitigation by 
changes in agricultural land use activities and management. The CE study in the 
preceding chapters provided the WTA estimates for farmers to contribute towards 
enhancing climate regulation. These monetary estimates can be used to calculate 
the carbon abatement cost per tonne of CO2 equivalents for each individual farm. 
Furthermore, it investigates interdependence between carbon costs and the farm 
and landscape characteristics. Since it was revealed from the CE study that, farmers’ 
preferences are heterogeneous and are dependent on various factors such as 
scheme design, farm, and farmer characteristics;  
 The effect of the spatial distribution of these characteristics and preferences are 
investigated. This will be done by linking the carbon values with the spatial patterns 
of the individual farm.  
The chapter begins with a review of background literature in Section 7.2 which 
leads to the specific objectives for this study, followed by a description of the data 
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and framework of the study (section 7.3). The estimations along with a discussion of 
the results are presented in section 7.4. The chapter ends by wrapping up the 
conclusions of the analyses carried out (section 7.4). 
7.2. Conceptual approaches in spatially-explicit carbon valuation 
7.2.1. Carbon valuation 
Carbon valuation is important for effective policy design and implementation for 
dealing with the issue of climate change. Estimations of carbon values have 
included integrated assessments combining physical climate models with an 
economic growth model to determine the benefits of climate policy and comparing 
marginal benefits with marginal costs. Three approaches have been employed to 
estimate the value of carbon; market price – reflects the values of traded carbon 
emission rights to those in the market through policies (e.g. EU ETS), Social cost of 
carbon (SCC) – based on the current global cost of an incremental unit of carbon 
emitted, Marginal abatement cost of carbon (MACC) – based on the cost of 
reducing emissions (Price et al., 2007).  
The market price takes into account the existing price of a tonne of carbon traded in 
accordance with a certain policy. This price is used by the business community and 
it relates to a pre-set target. The SCC is based on the lifetime damage costs 
associated with GHG emissions (DECC, 2009). The SCC estimates the full effect on 
social welfare of reducing the emission of carbon by an additional unit over the 
lifetime of that unit of carbon in the atmosphere. It provides a theoretical optimal 
solution in terms of the price that society should be willing to pay now to avoid the 
future costs resulting from increasing carbon emissions. However, this optimisation 
approach has been criticised due to the contested basis for monetary valuation of 
the uncertain climate impacts including the choice of discount rates for future 
climate change impacts (Downing et al., 2005; Ekins, 2007). 
On the other hand, DECC (2009) suggested that carbon valuation should be based 
on estimates of abatement costs of specific emissions. MACC is one such approach 
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as it is based on the marginal cost of reducing carbon emissions by one tonne (for 
details refer to Moran et al., 2008). MACC represents the UK government’s 
preferred approach to carbon pricing and is the source of official non-market 
carbon price (DECC, 2009). It has been suggested that MACC has an advantage over 
the SCC approach as the costs are based on existing activities and technologies, and 
can therefore be relatively easily estimated empirically (Dietz, 2007). The carbon 
valuation estimates are helpful in guiding decisions on the targets for emission 
reductions and setting up carbon taxes and charges for the damage caused by the 
emissions.  
For evaluation of hypothetical policies or programmes for provision of ES (for this 
study climate regulation service), a target-consistent approach, by estimating the 
expected carbon captured or abated and the cost of abatement or storage can be 
more useful (DECC, 2009). This helps to take into account all relevant costs and 
benefits to assess if a particular policy can improve or reduce the provision of the 
service.  
Hence, for this study MACC was considered to be the preferred approach. MACC is 
a bottom-up analysis representing the costs and abatement potentials for 
mitigation measures, and it is also useful in providing illustrative comparison of 
various measures according to their cost-effectiveness. The current study calculates 
the carbon abatement costs using the compensation the farming community is 
willing to accept for the provision of regulatory services by agroecosystems.  
7.2.2. Spatial distribution 
Spatial analyses can help to evaluate land use policies by displaying trade-offs in 
values of multiple services resulting from land use change. It can also help to design 
effective payment scheme policies by providing spatial variation of values and 
identifying the areas of maximum conservation potential. This provides an 
understanding of the spatial determinants of the ES delivery and the associated 
value to society (van Berkel and Verburg). 
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While investigating heterogeneity in participation behaviour is useful for effective 
policy design, spatial distribution and its effect on the willingness to participate also 
needs to be taken into consideration. Preferences for various ecosystems and ES 
such as water quality improvement, agricultural land use management, recreation 
etc. can be linked to spatial distribution and characteristics. Studies have employed 
spatial analyses to improve accuracy in travel cost studies (Bateman et al., 1996), 
explore distance-decay relationships in environmental values (Bateman et al., 
2006), explore spatial patterns in willingness to pay for rural landscapes for 
estimates from CE (Campbell et al., 2009), estimate spatial patterns of willingness to 
supply ES in agricultural landscapes (Broch et al., 2013), assessed the preference 
heterogeneity related to spatial distribution of water improvements throughout a 
river basin (Brouwer et al., 2010), investigate spatial heterogeneity in forest 
recreation (Termansen et al., 2013), and explore potential impacts of carbon pricing 
on possible land use changes (Abson et al., 2013).  
For policies focusing on climate abatement in agricultural sector there is a need to 
identify cost-effective measures. Hence, the carbon valuation presented in this 
chapter focuses not only on the costs farmers associate with the increase in the 
provision of climate regulation service provided by UK agroecosystems in order to 
identify potential drivers for demand of carbon abatement and participation in 
voluntary schemes but also explores the spatial variation of the carbon values. The 
specific objectives of this study are; 
1) To estimate the carbon abatement costs for potential policy schemes and 
compare the cost-effectiveness of the schemes. 
2) To provide an analysis of the spatial pattern of the carbon costs through PES 
schemes across the UK to identify the areas of highest potential for effective 
implementation of these policies.  
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7.3. Methods and data 
7.3.1. Study framework 
The analysis involves estimation of carbon abatement costs for the two levels of 
action (low and high level) for the mitigation and sequestration policy scheme, 
comparison of the effectiveness the carbon costs for individual farms with the DECC 
(2009) carbon prices, and exploration of the spatial distribution of these values.  
As mentioned earlier, a MACC approach was adopted for the carbon abatement 
cost estimations. The first step was to calculate carbon emissions according to 
emissions abated in line with the adoption of policy scenarios. Second, was to 
estimate the carbon costs for these emissions for individual farms using the 
farmers’ willingness to accept compensation for signing up to the scheme.  
Statistical analysis was conducted to further explore the heterogeneity in the 
distribution of these values according to land use characteristics and carbon 
emissions from the baseline year and individual farmers’ characteristics. The 
individual farm analysis was complemented with a landscape scale analysis. This 
was done by combining the abatement potentials and costs with the land use model 
output from the business-as-usual (BAU) year (2004) presented in Chapter 4 to 
explore the trend in carbon abatement costs across the grids. 
7.3.2. Data 
Multiple data sources were used for this analysis.  The data and outputs from the 
first two stages of the research was combined to conduct a carbon valuation study 
for the policy schemes evaluated in the previous chapters, and is presented in detail 
in the following subsections.  
7.3.2.1. Carbon Valuation 
The carbon costs were calculated as carbon abatement costs from the WTA 
estimates for incentivising farmers to participate in carbon management schemes 
(Chapter 5 and 6). These were estimated by calculating annual changes in potential 
equilibrium carbon stocks and the changes in annual emission (flows) of GHGs 
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resulting from participation in two potential schemes i.e. mitigation and 
sequestration policy schemes. This analysis was based on the framework developed 
in Chapter 4. These annual GHG changes were then combined with estimations of 
costs of participation from the CE study. The GHGs included in the analysis are 
carbon dioxide (CO2 - from land use change) and methane (CH4 - from livestock 
manure) which were converted to CO2 equivalents (CO2e). The steps involved in 
carbon abatement calculations are presented below: 
a. Defining the schemes 
First the two schemes were defined in terms of the measures and levels of intensity 
of measures or changes. The mitigation policy scheme was designed to mitigate 
GHG emissions from livestock manure by setting up anaerobic digestion (AD) plants 
while the sequestration policy was designed for changes in land use management 
activities. These land use change measures included conversion from arable to 
grassland, arable for afforestation, restrictive grazing, and conservation ploughing. 
The two alternative categories for each scheme are presented below: 
- MIT-1 (OFAD): On-farm digestion plant with technical assistance retaining 
ownership of the plant for a 5 years contract. 
- MIT-2 (CAD): Centralised digestion plant to be shared with neighbouring farms 
without technical assistance, maintained by a power supply company for a 
10 years contract. 
- SEQ-1 (Low action): Enrolling 10% of arable land for conversion to grassland, 
2% for afforestation, with intensive grazing and conventional tillage on the 
remaining arable land for a 5 years contract.  
- SEQ-2 (High action): Enrolling 30% of arable land for conversion to grassland, 
10% for afforestation, with extensive grazing and conservation tillage on the 
remaining arable land for a 10 years contract.  
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b. Data for emissions abated 
The potential carbon emissions for the mitigation scheme were calculated by 
combining the number of livestock with emissions factors for each animal (Table 
7.1). The data for per head estimates of GHG from livestock manure were based on 
UK species specific emission factors from Jackson et al. (2009) also used for the 
estimations in Chapter 4. This provided the potential emissions that can abated for 
that particular farm. 
The data (Table 7.2) for carbon sequestration due to the changes in land uses was 
taken from Warner et al. (2008). The soil carbon (SOC) and above ground carbon 
(AGC) calculations were done for every additional measure required by the policy 
scheme. Therefore, the carbon sequestered for restrictive grazing was calculated by 
calculating the difference of carbon stored while moving from intensive to 
restrictive grazing and were then combined with the restrictive grazing estimates 
for the additional area of land converted to grassland. Similarly, for potential carbon 
storage for conservation tillage was calculated for only the land left after enrolment 
for the required changes. 
The GHG emissions and carbon sequestration estimates were combined with 
individual compensation estimated to calculate the cost of abating a tonne of 
carbon (1tCO2e) for each farm for the two policy alternatives.  
Table ‎7.1 Data for calculation of emissions per head of livestock 
Livestock Excretion per animal 
(KgN/animal/yr) 
Emissions 
(tCO2e/ha/yr) 
 
Dairy 111 0.41 
Cattle 48 0.17 
Pigs 11 0.04 
(Source: Jackson et al., 2009) 
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Table ‎7.2 Data for calculation of emissions from land use change and farm activities 
Land use 
activity 
Land use conversion Land use activities 
Arable  to 
grassland 
Arable for 
afforestation 
AGCa 
storage for 
Intensive 
grazing 
AGC for 
Extensive 
grazing 
SOCb for 
Conservation 
till 
SOC AGC SOC AGC 
Emissions 
(tCO2e/ha/yr) 
3.32 0.73 3 2.2 5.9 8.8 0.7 
AGC is above ground carbon (carbon stored in vegetative parts), SOC is soil organic carbon 
(Source: Warner et al., 2008) 
 
The potential GHG abatement was calculated for emissions from livestock and 
carbon sequestered for each land use change and activity for individual farms. 
These calculations were then combined with the welfare estimations to explicitly 
provide costs of carbon abatement for each participating farm. The costs were 
based on the welfare estimations from the CE study presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
These estimates were considered as the costs of taking up the policy schemes. 
c.  Welfare estimates from CE study 
Welfare estimations provide information regarding the monetary impact of the 
change. As discussed in Chapter 3 welfare estimations are calculated for the 
situations before and after the change, hence, subtracting the marginal utility of 
status quo from the marginal utility of all programme attributes. However, as seen 
from the CE results including the status quo constant revealed that although it 
improved the model fit, it still revealed some bias in the estimations and failed to 
explain the choice in terms of observable attributes. Other studies in the literature 
have also argued for not including the ASC in welfare estimations (see Adamowicz 
et al., 1998; Boxall et al., 1996; Hess and Beharry-Borg, 2012). Therefore, it was 
decided to exclude the ASC from the estimations of farmer payment requirement to 
sign up for the two policy scheme scenarios presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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From the model statistics (presented in Chapters 5 and 6) it was revealed that LCM 
provides an improvement to both CLM and RPL, hence, LCM was preferred for the 
calculations of the individual welfare estimates and the carbon costs analysis for the 
schemes. 
d. Carbon costs calculations 
The individual hectare payments multiplied by the total farm size13 is the marginal 
cost of enrolling an additional farm into the scheme. Using the marginal abatement 
cost approach the carbon costs for each participating farm were calculated as:  
      
     
      
 
Where, CCost is the annual cost of carbon (pounds per tonne of carbon 
equivalents), MCost is the marginal cost of measure (WTA estimates for individual 
farm) and CAbate is the potential carbon abated (tonnes) if the policy scenario is 
applied to that farm.  
The marginal abatement cost curve was generated by arranging the marginal cost 
estimates according to increasing carbon costs. The marginal cost curves were 
derived by plotting these cost estimates against the cumulative carbon abatement 
quantities for the policy scenarios and levels across the sample farms (Figure 7.1). 
Thus, the marginal costs expressed the cost of abatement of additional ‘n’ tonnes of 
carbon equivalents.  
7.3.2.2. Regression analysis 
Only illustrating the spatial distribution of carbon valuation would not provide 
enough information about the sources and causes of differences in trends. 
Therefore, regression analysis of carbon abatement costs against landscape and 
farm/farmer characteristics was conducted. The data for the landscape 
characteristics was taken from the BAU year used for the estimation of changes in 
                                                        
13 The compensation payments offered to the respondents were as per hectare payments for the 
total farm size.  
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regulatory services (Chapter 4) and included agricultural land use, livestock units 
and carbon emissions.  This analysis was carried out to further explore and 
understand the variations in carbon costs.  
7.3.2.3. Spatial heterogeneity 
To explore the spatial heterogeneity in the carbon abatement costs calculated for 
the designed policy scenarios, it was necessary to link the valuation data with the 
spatial data. This was done by translating the preferences for policy adoption into 
maps allocating each individual respondent the specific location of the farm using 
ArcGIS (ESRI® ArcMap™ 10.0). Only the respondents with valid and identifiable 
postcodes could be included in the spatial analysis. Therefore, 355 respondents out 
of the total 380 sample collected through the CE survey were mapped across the 
UK.  
The calculated carbon values for each individual were also added to each point 
(respondent) on the map. This layer was then combined with the BAU (2004) data 
layer from the estimations in chapter 4. This layer contained land use and emissions 
data for the UK; hence, overlaying and cross tabulating the two layers provided a 
layer with complete data for the CE survey respondents.  
Each respondent was assigned a complete grid according to its location. It was 
assumed that each respondent’s preferences could be applied to represent the 
whole grid. Potential carbon emissions were calculated for each grid in accordance 
with the requirements of the preferred policy scheme. This provided an estimate of 
emissions that can be abated across each grid by implementing a particular scheme 
at a certain cost.  The detailed spatial analysis was undertaken at landscape level to 
include each land use and livestock type. This helped to examine possible trends in 
the differences and variation in carbon valuation according to the location, land use 
and livestock type.  
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7.4. Results and discussion 
This section provides an account of the results and discussion of the estimations 
done for the carbon valuation and spatial distribution. 
7.4.1. Data representation 
To illustrate the representativeness of the sample across the UK, the area of the 
sample was calculated by combining the sample size (that could be plotted for the 
spatial mapping) with the area of each grid. The total sample area was calculated to 
be 142,000ha of the total UK area. The distribution of respondents according to 
their preferences towards the alternative policy schemes is presented in Figure 7.1.  
 
Figure ‎7.1 Map showing the preference of respondents towards policy schemes 
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7.4.2. Carbon Valuation 
The estimations revealed that sequestration policy has a lower cost of carbon and it 
has a potential to mitigate higher amount of carbon as compared to the mitigation 
policy. Figure 7.2 shows a very steep ascending curve for the adoption of AD plants 
though the emissions abated across farms remains relatively constant.  
 
 
Figure ‎7.2 Comparison of cost effectiveness of mitigation and sequestration policy 
scenarios 
 
Further investigations of the farmers’ decisions within each policy scheme were 
conducted by considering two alternatives based on the level of action for each 
scheme (Figure 7.3 a & b) and revealed large variations in per hectare 
compensation required for the two policy schemes. These results further supported 
the findings discussed above as the cost curves for the mitigation policy revealed 
that MIT-1 (OFAD) is a cheaper option to attract farmers for mitigating manure 
emissions from livestock as compared to centralised AD plants.  
A similar pattern was reported for the estimations for sequestration policy, 
revealing that low action alternative (SEQ-1) will prove cheaper to implement.  
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Figure ‎7.3a & b Carbon abatement costs of mitigation and sequestration policy 
alternatives 
Considering the annual costs estimations of both policy schemes the mean yearly 
costs of 1 tonne of carbon were £130 and £40 for mitigation and sequestration 
schemes respectively. Comparing the abatement curves with the DECC and Stern 
carbon pricing (Table 7.3) show that the costs for the sequestration policy are more 
consistent with these costs as compared to the very high values for the mitigation 
policy scenario. Further comparison of the carbon costs with the DECC (2009) 
pricing also revealed that approximately half of the sample was within the DECC 
price range for overall cost of 1tCO2e/year. 
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Table ‎7.3 Carbon pricing (2010 prices) 
Year Stern 550ppm 
emissions 
trajectory 
(£/tCO2e) 
Stern BAU 
emissions 
trajectory 
(£/tCO2e) 
DECC 2009 
(£/tCO2e) 
2004 £25.47 £88.38 £44.69 
2020 £34.96 £121.32 £58.29 
2040 £51.95 £180.28 £131.15 
2060 £77.20 £267.89 £258.41 
 
7.4.3. Regression analysis 
The regressions analysis was conducted for various farm, farmer and for the BAU 
scenario characteristics by assuming that the preference of each respondent 
represents the BAU grid as a whole (only significant variables are shown in Table 
7.4). The regression estimates are highly significant and R2 is 0.24. The analysis 
revealed that farms with higher livestock units and larger arable land have lower 
carbon costs, suggesting that larger farms have a more positive preference towards 
participation in the schemes. This relationship is also shown at the landscape level 
as landscapes with a high share of arable land in the BAU scenario also tend to have 
lower costs of scheme participation.  
Table ‎7.4 Regression analysis of carbon costs against land use variables  
Variables Coefficients Standards errors 
Farm/farmer characteristics 
Constant 121.83 21.2509*** 
Farm size 1.1149 0.1307*** 
Arable land -1.05622 0.1659*** 
Livestock units -0.60181 0.0767*** 
BAU Landscape characteristics 
Constant 171.865 32.8415*** 
BAU year arable land -0.4488 0.1618** 
*, *** indicates statistical significance at 5%, 0.01% respectively 
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7.4.4. Spatial distribution of carbon values 
The carbon costs for the two policy schemes were estimated according to the 
agricultural land and livestock numbers of each grid. The emissions for each grid 
were estimated for the number of livestock and the agricultural land. The welfare 
estimates of each respondent were combined with these emissions to calculate cost 
of each tonne of carbon abated annually (tCO2e/yr). Figure 7.5 illustrates the spatial 
distribution of carbon costs across grids.  
 
 
Figure ‎7.4  Distribution of carbon values across grids 
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The regional variation in the costs of carbon reveals that Scotland, North of England, 
and Midlands have higher rates as compared to the southern parts of the UK. This 
can potentially be because these farming landscapes include hill farms with cattle 
and sheep and dairy farms while the southern parts include more arable 
landscapes.  
 
Figure ‎7.5.  Regional variations in carbon values 
The spatial mapping of the carbon values was employed to illustrate the spatial 
distribution of these valuations. This helped to identify the areas which offered 
highest mitigation potential where it would be cheaper to implement the policy in 
terms of carbon costs. This was done by calculating the change in emissions across 
grids of the BAU (2004) year. These emissions were calculated according to the land 
use and management changes proposed by each policy scheme. The costs were 
plotted against the accumulated emissions savings across the grids to illustrate the 
comparison of the cost curves for the two policy scenarios (Figure 7.6). The graph 
shows a low steady curve for the sequestration policy scenario, showing a potential 
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for higher carbon abatement at low costs for additional tonne of carbon abated 
across the grids. However, the mitigation policy reveals a high and steep cost curve.  
 
Figure ‎7.6 Comparison of carbon costs of the two potential schemes according to the 
accumulated annual emissions abated across grids for BAU (2004) year (tCO2e/yr) 
 
To further investigate the interdependence of carbon values and landscape 
features, carbon costs were plotted against livestock units and agricultural area 
from the BAU scenario. A DECC (2004) carbon price segment was added to the plots 
as a reference to investigate the distribution of carbon values within the DECC price 
range. To show the distribution clearly the carbon values were log transformed. The 
graphs illustrate that carbon costs within the DECC price range could lead to 
abatement of emissions from 120,000 livestock units (Figure 7.7a) and 45,000 ha of 
agricultural land (Figure 7.7b).   
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Figure ‎7.7 a & b Variation of carbon costs according to land use share and livestock units 
across UKNEA BAU (2004) grids 
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7.5. Discussion 
Carbon abatement costs can be considered as an important aspect for designing 
climate change mitigation schemes, because a cost analysis can help to determine 
the effectiveness of a scheme and identify the abatement targets and associated 
compensations to make the scheme more favourable for participation. To achieve 
this aim, this chapter applies a marginal abatement carbon cost (MACC) approach 
along with spatial analysis.   
The carbon valuation results for the mitigation scheme revealed a high variance in 
the carbon costs farmers associate with emissions mitigation through this scheme. 
The farmers show a resistant behaviour by requiring very high WTA although not 
much emission abatement is achieved. However, for the sequestration scheme the 
carbon valuation revealed that higher abatement can be achieved at fairly 
homogeneous compensations across the sample.  
Carbon valuation for two alternatives for each scheme was also carried out to 
investigate preferences of farmers for different policy characteristics. The analysis 
revealed that on-farm AD (OFAD) plants are a cheaper option to attract farmers for 
mitigating manure emissions from livestock as compared to centralised AD (CAD) 
plants. This interest of farmers can be due to the potential benefits associated with 
the OFAD (such as revenue generation and reduction in utility bills for farm and 
house) and to avoid additional costs of transportation and arranging additional 
feed-stocks for larger CAD plants. Similarly for sequestration policy farmers show a 
preference for scheme alternative which requires lower and flexible land 
management activities. The comparison of the two alternatives revealed that if both 
schemes are introduced the farmers show a preference for the lower intensity 
scheme; however, it remains cost-effective only to a certain level after which the 
higher intensity scheme becomes more cost-effective. This shows that in order to 
implement such schemes effectively, it is important to have clear and pre-defined 
abatement targets. 
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Overall the cost analysis revealed that scheme using agroecosystem to sequester 
carbon can prove to be a more efficient approach for attracting farmers, to achieve 
the climate change mitigation targets through agricultural systems. This can 
potentially be due to no or lower costs for adopting changes in land use and 
management activities compared to the higher costs, skills, and effort associated 
with technologically advanced measures.  
A comparison of the carbon costs with the DECC (2009) price revealed that the 
carbon costs associated with the sequestration policy are more in line with the 
DECC price than the mitigation policy and almost half of the sample was willing to 
sign up  for a scheme at a price below or equal to the DECC (£44.6/tCO2e) price.  
Regression analysis was also conducted which helped to identify the target groups 
of farmers to whom it will be cheaper to implement abatement schemes. The 
analysis showed that farmers with higher number of livestock units and large farm 
size in terms of arable land associate lower carbon values and show a positive 
preference towards participation in carbon abatement schemes. This is in 
agreement with existing literature (Ayuk, 1997; Caveness and Kurtz, 1993; Thacher 
et al., 1997) that farm size is positively related to the willingness to participate in 
payment schemes and is suggested that larger land holdings lead to greater 
flexibility towards the land manger’s decision to participate (Nowak, 1987).  
Furthermore, a spatial analysis was conducted using GIS to reveal the areas of 
higher mitigation potential at a lower carbon cost. It was displayed that carbon 
abatement schemes would be cheaper if implemented in the Southern parts of the 
UK as compared to the North of England and Scotland. This is comparable to the 
UKNEA (Abson et al., 2013) carbon estimations and predictions for enclosed 
farmlands. The UKNEA calculations predicted that carbon costs in England would 
increase from £100 per hectare from BAU year (2004) to around £480 per hectare in 
2060 and around £800 a hectare in Scotland and Wales. If the estimations of this 
study are simulated over time, the costs for the current research would show a 
similar pattern of increase across the regions.   
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7.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter carbon valuation was conducted for the policy schemes designed for 
the CE study presented in the preceding chapters (5 & 6). A marginal abatement 
carbon cost (MACC) approach was employed for estimating the carbon values. The 
two schemes were compared according to their cost-effectiveness. The study also 
explored the spatial pattern of the carbon estimations linking them to farm and 
landscape characteristics.  
The carbon costs evaluations revealed that a scheme involving carbon sequestration 
through changes in agroecosystems is cheaper to implement than a scheme based 
on AD technology and farmers prefer policy schemes which are less intensive in 
terms of costs and effort. This was evident from the preference of farmers towards 
OFADs rather than CADs.  
Overall the costs of the carbon abatement are relatively high compared to the DECC 
price (£44.6/tCO2e) but the analysis also suggested that half of the sample was 
willing to sign up to a scheme at a price below or equal the DECC price. Carbon 
values for sequestration policy were more in line with the DECC price than the 
mitigation policy. Therefore, the results suggest that sequestration policy will be a 
more attractive option to be taken up by the UK farming community, and be more 
cost-effective.  
GIS have been widely used for environmental planning research and environmental 
valuation studies. Analysing spatial heterogeneity and distribution of economic 
values allows policy makers to extract values for any specific ES and area, easily to 
evaluate potential policy measures. The spatial analysis of the carbon values also 
revealed the regional distribution of the carbon costs and suggested that the North 
of England and Scotland prove to be more expensive than the rest of the regions 
included in the sample survey.  
Furthermore, regression analysis was conducted to explore and predict changes in 
carbon values in accordance with different landscape attributes. It was revealed 
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that farmers with higher livestock units and larger arable land can be a potential 
target group which could be effectively attracted towards policies as they have 
lower costs of provision of carbon abatement.  
The study presented in this chapter contributes to the carbon valuation literature 
by providing carbon abatement costs based on real data from a CE study. The work 
reported is the first to use stated preference welfare estimations for carbon 
valuation of potential policy schemes for enhancing climate regulation service in UK 
agricultural sector.  It also adds to the literature by providing a comparison of a 
technologically advanced scheme to a scheme with natural course of action in terms 
of their cost-effectiveness. 
In summary, this chapter provides carbon costs for implementing potential payment 
policies both for emissions mitigation and carbon sequestration. The study provides 
a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of the two schemes.  It provides an overview 
of the preferences of farmers in terms of the carbon values they associate with their 
preferred choice of land use change measures and farm management options. 
Finally spatially mapping the individual carbon values associated with each farm of 
the sample enabled the identification the target groups and locations for effective 
implementation of such policies. This chapter therefore explored the carbon costs 
UK farming community associates with additional tonne of carbon which can be 
potential abated from their farms.  
The following chapter will conclude the thesis by highlighting the synthesis of the 
empirical work conducted to build this thesis. It will also provide the scientific 
contributions and policy relevance of the works along with limitations and future 
research work.  
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Chapter 8 Synthesis and Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
Research addressing incentive policies for the protection and conservation of ES 
from agroecosystems have been exploring the design of schemes (payment 
schemes) (Birol and Cox, 2007; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009), investigating the preferences of farmers (Beharry-Borg et al., 2012; Garrod et 
al., 2012; Kosoy et al., 2008; Wilson, 1997), and exploring the spatial variation of the 
preferences in terms of the associated values (Balderas Torres et al., 2013; Broch et 
al., 2013; Brouwer et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2009). Nonetheless, in many cases 
such efforts have been limited in their focus towards a single aspect (either on the 
design or the preferences). This thesis assesses the scope of UK agroecosystems’ 
contribution towards the UK’s climate change mitigation targets. It provides a 
detailed assessment of the climate regulation service provided by the 
agroecosystems and the scope for designing payment policies for farmers by taking 
all the aspects mentioned above into account. It consists of four main analytical 
components reported in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
This Chapter starts with an overview of the key analytical approaches for executing 
each of the components and the major findings generated from each (Section 8.2). 
Section 8.3 highlights the key contributions of the overall research, followed by a 
discussion of the limitations of the research (Section 8.4). Future research arising 
from this study is outlined in Section 8.5 and the chapter ends with some 
overarching conclusions from the research.  
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8.1. Summary of key analyses 
This section provides an overview of the research approaches employed for 
achieving the key objectives of the thesis along with the key findings of each 
analytical component. 
8.1.1. Objective 1 - Estimating changes in climate regulatory service 
To explicitly model land use related agricultural GHG emissions under high and low 
UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) emissions scenarios for the period 2004-
2060. 
This objective was addressed in chapter 4 of the thesis and contributed to the 
UKNEA project to evaluate the changes in regulatory services due to land use 
changes. The analysis includes estimations of both changes in potential carbon 
stocks and annual flux of GHGs. The changes in land uses were derived from a 
spatially explicit land use model developed by Fezzi and Bateman (2011) and were 
based on UKCIP low and high GHG emissions scenarios for years 2004 (BAU year), 
2020, 2040, and 2060. The analysis included the three main GHGs; CO2, N2O, and 
CH4. The calculations of the stocks and flows of the GHGs were based on data 
collected from a review of existing literature.  
The soil organic carbon (SOC) stocks were estimated for various soil types and land 
uses while the biomass organic carbon (BIOC) stocks were estimated based only on 
land use. The land use types included in the analysis were cereals, oil seed rape, 
root crops, temporary grassland, permanent grassland, rough grazing and farm 
woodland and the livestock types included were dairy cows, beef cattle, and sheep.  
The GHG flux was estimated for various land use and management activities. CO2 
emissions were estimated for both direct sources (changes in soils and vegetation 
carbon) and indirect sources (agricultural activities such as tillage, sowing, fertilizer 
and pesticide application, harvesting, and bailing). N2O emissions were calculated 
for fertilizer use, manure of livestock; both as slurry and direct input from grazing 
livestock and for the emissions from the land use types according to the nitrogen 
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requirements from inorganic fertilizers. CH4 emissions were estimated for enteric 
fermentation from livestock. GHG fluxes from land use change were calculated both 
for annual SOC fluxes and biomass, due to land use changes.  
The total UK vegetative carbon stocks for the baseline year (2004) were estimated 
to be 134MtC, which are in agreement with Milne and Brown’s (1997) estimate of 
113.8±25MtC. The GHG fluxes for the baseline year were estimated to be 35MtCO2e 
which are comparable with official estimates of GHG emissions for 2004 which 
range from 44.53MtCO2e (Thomson et al., 2007) to 51.7MtCO2e (Yearley, 2009).  
The estimations under the two UKCIP emissions scenarios revealed large regional 
variations in annual emissions within enclosed farmlands habitat across UK. It 
indicated that northern parts of the UK are expected to see a decrease in potential 
carbon stocks and rising GHG emissions due to increased livestock numbers and 
increase in arable and horticultural production as the climate warms. Conversion of 
agricultural land on organic soils from rough grazing to improved, temporary, and 
permanent grassland would also contribute to increased GHG emissions. The 
southern parts are predicted to see small increases in carbon stocks and associated 
falls in annual agricultural emissions because of a shift from cereal cropping 
towards grasslands. 
Overall the analysis revealed that aggregate changes in all the analysed years were 
relatively small with the exception of 2060 under the UKCIP high emission scenario 
where predicted conversion from arable to grassland on organic soils resulted in 
considerable net accumulation of SOC.  
The analysis also illustrated that adjustments in land use and management can help 
to mitigate GHG emissions from agriculture. The study suggested that 
agroecosystems have the potential to contribute towards climate change 
mitigation. The evaluation served as a concrete starting point for thinking about the 
potential of agroecosystems for achieving emissions reduction targets and 
concluded that climate change directly or indirectly is likely to cause changes in the 
carbon stocks through land use change. The analysis suggested that climate change 
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will reduce the capacity of agroecosystems to regulate carbon emissions; however 
some adjustments in land use will  help to reduce emissions. The heterogeneity in 
land use and land use change, and associated changes in emissions leads to a need 
to explore the scope of designing policies for land managers to adopt changes in 
land use management. In order to explore this scope, it is imperative to investigate 
farmers’ land use decisions and how these would affect their participation in 
potential policy schemes. This constituted the second objective of the thesis.  
8.1.2. Objective 2 – Heterogeneity in farmers preferences 
To investigate land owners’ attitudes and preferences towards payment schemes for 
enhancing climate regulation (through emissions mitigation and carbon 
sequestration) and suggest scheme design for developing effective policies for 
attracting farmers to contribute towards the UK’s carbon abatement targets.  
This component of the research, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, aimed to evaluate 
potential PES scheme design for enhancing climate regulation service provided by 
farmlands. This research stage explored the potential of payment schemes to 
contribute towards reductions (increases) in emissions (carbon sequestration) and 
investigated their uptake by UK’s farming community. A stated preference 
approach, Choice Experiment (CE) was employed to elicit farmers’ choices for two 
potential payment policies, respectively designed for arable and livestock farming 
landscapes. One scheme was targeted towards reduction of GHG emissions from 
livestock manure (Chapter 5) with the other for enhancing carbon storage in 
agricultural land (Chapter 6).  
The analysis involved ex-ante evaluation of farmer uptake based on attributes of 
the two schemes by analysing the impact of different attributes and attribute levels 
on their participation behaviour. Hence, the first step was to define the policy 
schemes in terms of suitable attributes and levels. The data was collected using 
structured questionnaires containing the choice experiments to reveal farmer 
preferences. CLM, RPL, and LCM were employed to investigate the preference 
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heterogeneity and willingness of farmers to accept compensation for adopting 
changes in land use and management activities.  
  The analysis revealed that farmers show an overall aversion to drastic changes in 
their land use management activities however, they can be encouraged to 
participate in payment schemes by providing appropriate compensation incentives 
and adjusting required levels of change. The results suggested that farmers would 
prefer to participate in schemes with flexible and less restrictive measures. The CLM 
and RPL estimations for both the schemes suggested preference heterogeneity 
which was further explored by using LCM.  
For the mitigation payment policy the results revealed that larger farms and farms 
with higher livestock units prefer OFADs. The results indicated that age, farm size, 
livestock units, and farm income influenced farmers’ participation preferences, and 
indicated that younger farmers and farms with larger farm size would require lower 
compensation payments. Farms with larger number of livestock units were found to 
be less averse to longer contracts, while low income farms revealed a stronger 
preference for on-farm AD plants. The WTA was the highest for ownership of the 
plant, revealing that farmers want to retain management control.  
The sequestration payment policy results revealed that farmers were very averse to 
restrictions on grazing time period and conservation ploughing which was also 
affirmed by the WTA estimates. The socio-economic interactions with the attribute 
coefficients were unable to provide any significant information about the 
determinants of farmers’ preferences for this policy.    
The analysis presented in these two chapters was intended to identify the 
preference heterogeneity of farmers; however, most of the heterogeneity was not 
explained by the farm or farmer characteristics. Nonetheless, it is still important to 
know the range of behaviours among farmers when assessing likely uptake of policy 
schemes for enhancing the provision of climate regulation service.  
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8.1.3. Objective 3 – Spatial patterns of carbon values 
To calculate carbon abatement costs for potential payment schemes and provide an 
analysis of the spatial pattern of the carbon abatement costs through PES schemes 
across the UK. 
This comprised the final stage of the PhD thesis which combined economic 
valuation and spatial mapping to illustrate the cost-effectiveness of potential 
payment schemes and spatial distribution patterns of the estimated costs. A 
marginal abatement cost method was employed to calculate the costs of carbon in 
terms of the costs of reducing carbon emissions by adopting alternative policy 
scenarios. The carbon abatement estimations were combined with WTA estimates 
from the CE study conducted for objective 2. The cost analysis was followed by 
statistical analysis to explore the linkage to farm/farmer characteristics. This 
analysis revealed that farmers with more arable land and higher number of 
livestock units have lower costs for the provision of carbon emission mitigations. 
This was followed by a spatial analysis to further explore the spatial distribution of 
the carbon costs. Land use maps generated for objective 1 were employed for the 
spatial analysis and linked to the data for the regional grids to associating carbon 
costs with landscape attributes. The results of the carbon valuation revealed that 
sequestration policy scenario proved cheaper to implement compared to the 
mitigation policy scenario and farmers associate lower costs for policies with lower 
intensity of the required measures. Spatial mapping of the carbon costs at regional 
level illustrated that achieving carbon reductions in northern parts of England and 
Scotland proved costly as compared to the southern parts. This is potentially 
because the cost of achieving carbon abatement through carbon sequestration 
policy was found to be cheaper than mitigation policy, and the Southern regions of 
the UK contain substantial areas of farmlands.  
Since the DECC price is the UK’s official non-market carbon price, the carbon costs 
estimated were compared with the DECC (2004) price. The comparison revealed 
that half of the sample respondents were below £44.6/tCO2e (DECC 2004 price), 
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suggesting that carbon abatement initiatives in agriculture could be good 
candidates for the UK to meet their emission reduction targets. Regression analysis 
for the determinants of the carbon costs revealed that farms with larger arable land 
and livestock numbers have lower carbon costs. These farms are therefore 
particularly relevant to consider when designing policy schemes.  
8.2. Key contributions 
This PhD thesis employed a novel approach of assessing the scope of payment 
scheme policies for enhancing climate regulation services provided by the UK 
agroecosystems. It evaluates the contribution of agroecosystems towards climate 
change (both in terms of services and disservices) and assesses the scope of 
enhancing the ability of agroecosystems within a single comprehensive study. The 
three analytical stages of this research study generate empirical evidence and 
advancement in understanding the overall role of agroecosystems towards climate 
change. The overall framework can be applied to other countries and other ES. 
Climate change research has identified the potential of agroecosystems to 
contribute towards emission reduction targets (Paustian et al., 1997; Smith et al., 
2007b; Smith et al., 2007c; Smith et al., 2000) and the need for designing and 
implementing effective policies for attracting the farming community (Balderas 
Torres et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2007b). However, at present there is a gap in 
appropriate estimations and valuation of the climate regulation service from 
agroecosystems, effective design of incentives, and improvement of policies in 
terms of their cost-effectiveness. One of the contributions of this thesis (Chapter 4) 
is therefore in its provision of an updated account of the changes in regulatory 
service in terms of carbon stocks and GHG fluxes. Although it builds on the 
emerging literature of estimations of carbon stocks and GHG emissions, unlike most 
of the previous studies, the current study presented the estimations for three major 
GHGs such as CO2, CH4, and N2O in a single study. The changes were estimated 
directly from land use changes and livestock (including manure) and indirectly from 
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farm management activities. The results were comparable to most of the 
estimations in the existing literature (such as Bradley et al., 2005). Another 
important contribution is the prediction of the impacts of land use changes on GHG 
emissions. Land use changes and their impact on agriculture have been addressed 
in the literature (Hediger, 2006; Moran et al., 2010; West and Marland, 2003); 
however, not many spatially explicit analyses can be found for the evolution of GHG 
emissions associated with land use changes and which impact the GHG emissions 
across space even at relatively fine spatial scales. The current study (Chapter 4) 
accounted for this issue by using outputs from a structural econometric land use 
model at a fine resolution of 2km x 2km to explicitly model land use related GHG 
emissions under UKCIP high and low emissions scenario. 
The second contribution of the thesis comes from the investigation of the 
heterogeneity in the preferences of farmers towards participation in potential 
payment policies (Chapters 5 and 6). This thesis contributes to the limited literature 
on estimation of costs of provision of climate regulation from UK farmlands by 
utilising a novel approach, combing two potential payment schemes for two distinct 
(arable and livestock) farm types. It is the first attempt to conduct such a study for 
two schemes (mitigation and sequestration) simultaneously.  
Uptake of anaerobic digestion (AD) plants has not been very popular in the UK; 
therefore, this study contributes to the AD plant literature by assessing the 
preferences of farmers towards a mitigation policy scheme (Chapter 5). This 
provided an insight into the preferences of farmers towards various scales and 
types of anaerobic digestion plants. The study concluded that farmers show 
preference for small scale on-farm AD plants and prefer higher compensations 
(Chapter 5). Centralised AD plants could be an option for small farm holdings 
however, the cost-effectiveness study (Chapter 7) revealed that farmers associate 
higher carbon costs with CAD plants, which makes them a costly option. 
 The third important contribution of the thesis comes from the last stage (Chapter 
7) of the PhD research which included the valuation of carbon abatement 
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potentially achieved through the implementation of the two schemes designed in 
the second stage of the research. Unlike studies which estimate marginal 
abatement costs for individual measures (Moran et al., 2008) this study provides a 
holistic approach by calculating carbon abatement costs for complete policies 
rather than measures. To the author’s knowledge, it is the first attempt to compare 
the cost-effectiveness of a technologically advanced scheme with a scheme based 
on increasing the provision of an ecosystem service. 
8.3. Policy implications 
This research thesis, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, aimed to assess the scope 
of ES payment policies for agroecosystems’ contribution towards climate change 
mitigation. The thesis was framed to provide information for policy makers 
regarding the economic magnitude and spatial distribution of carbon costs at micro 
(farm) level to derive better informed policies for ES conservation. Combining 
preference heterogeneity and spatial variability can prove effective in capturing 
individual preferences and can be helpful in this context.  
It is clear from the research that agroecosystems are expected to undergo 
significant land use changes induced by climate change but also contribute towards 
climate change by releasing carbon and other GHGs into the atmosphere. The 
analysis shows that climate change may lead to significant changes in UK 
agricultural land use and these changes will lead to regional disparity in GHG 
emissions. This information is important to predict the changes in regulatory service 
provided by these agroecosystems and associated costs over time. These 
predictions can help to inform efficient policy design as it provides information 
towards the potential level of action required and suggests information regarding 
the associated compensation amounts that might be required to implement policies 
in the UK farming sector.  
Climate change mitigation is considered to be difficult to achieve in the agriculture 
sector. It faces the challenges of permanence, leakage, and additionality (FAO, 
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2008). Permanence requires the emission mitigation to be sustained, additionality 
requires the mitigation to be additional to the current situation, and leakage, a 
more global issue, includes the increase of emissions elsewhere in the world 
through increased import of food. These challenges require policy makers to design 
policies appropriately. The two policy schemes proposed in this study address the 
permanence and additionality issues by offering land use management activities 
which can be sustained over a longer time period and by asking land use managers 
to adopt these activities in addition to their current management practices. 
Furthermore, leakage can be avoided by proposing policies which do not affect the 
food production of farms locally and hence reduce the need to import food. The 
proposed mitigation policy does not have any effect on the food production 
however, the sequestration policy, proposes conversion of land to permanent 
grasslands and for afforestation, which will eventually reduce the productivity of 
farms. Hence, this research highlights the need to design policies for climate change 
mitigation in a more global context.  
The study also suggests the need for framing regional policy according to the level 
of action required. The study predicted a significant agricultural intensification in 
the northern parts of the country which will eventually lead to an increase in GHG 
emissions and loss in carbon stocks. On the other hand, the results of the 
estimations and predictions in changes in regulatory service also suggested that in 
some regions climate induced land use changes, for example, conversion from 
arable to grasslands in the southern parts of the country, can also have positive 
impact on GHG mitigation. The estimations from the CE study revealed that farmers 
prefer to enrol smaller percentages of land for conversion to grassland and 
afforestation, and the carbon valuation study also revealed that farmers do not 
require high costs for the provision of carbons sequestration in their arable land.  
 The investigation of the potential scheme design and the preferences of farmers 
towards these schemes presented empirical evidence that farmers are 
heterogeneous in their behaviour. The socio-demographic factors that have a 
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significant effect on the participation behaviour of the farmers included age, farm 
income, farm size, and livestock units. Investigating the effect of the attributes of 
the policy revealed that farmers are averse to drastic changes and would prefer 
policies which require lower levels of action and allow certain flexibility over 
measures.  
For the mitigation policy scheme, the study suggested that targeting on-farm AD 
plants towards larger farms with higher numbers of livestock along with appropriate 
compensation has the potential to attract farmers towards the uptake of such 
plants. Lack of technical assistance or training was identified to be one of the 
reasons for the closure of AD plants in the UK (Bywater, 2011). This study also 
revealed the importance farmers associate with this attribute and suggested that 
policies ensuring the provision of technical assistance (training) will have a better 
chance of attracting more farmers. An additional policy relevant conclusion 
obtained from the estimations of the mitigation policy is that even though 
‘generator capacity’ was not significantly considered by the respondents, it is still 
important to factor it in when designing policies related to AD.  
It is known that carbon sequestration requires longer time scales; however, the 
investigation into the carbon sequestration scheme revealed that farmers prefer 
short term contracts over long term policies. Hence, there is a need to design 
policies with measures which are easily sustainable over a longer time period and 
farmers can continue with them even after their contracts. Investigation into the 
preferences of farmers towards the sequestration scheme attributes suggested that 
schemes requiring the farmers to adopt extensive grazing and conservation 
ploughing did not prove popular among the farmers.  
The study of farmers’ attitudes suggests that schemes designed for enhancing 
climate regulation service provision need to factor in the characteristics of the 
farmers and their farms as these partially determine participation. Although most of 
the preference heterogeneity from farmer characteristics was not observable i.e. 
only farmers’ age was significant; farm characteristics such as farm income, farm 
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size, and number of livestock units were revealed to influence their preferences 
significantly. The study also highlighted that accounting for preference 
heterogeneity captures additional diversity in carbon costs, which has a significant 
influence over the predicted impact of scheme policy initiatives.  
The last analytical stage of the thesis explores the cost-effectiveness of the two 
potential schemes. This helped to provided predicted costs of implementing the 
payment programmes for farmers to change their land management practices, to 
achieve the required climate change abatement. The analysis revealed that 
sequestration policy scheme, which does not have any costs of uptake is cheaper to 
implement. This suggests that policy makers can focus more on schemes for carbon 
sequestration by land use change rather than schemes which involve adoption of 
technology.  
Regional analysis illustrated that it will be much cheaper to implement 
sequestration policies in the southern regions of the UK. A comparison with the 
DECC price helped to identify a reasonable price range to attract farmers towards 
emission reduction policies. The spatial analysis explored the spatial patterns of the 
carbon costs and its linkage to farm and landscape characteristics. This analysis 
revealed the locations of the target groups i.e. least resistant farmers in terms of 
carbon costs. This finding is helpful for the policy makers to target policies schemes 
effectively.  
Overall this research suggests that future policies should be based on assessments 
of the attitudes and behaviour of the farmers, which influence their decisions of 
taking up polices schemes. It provides some guidance by quantifying farmer 
heterogeneity and potentially identifying certain farm and farmer characteristics as 
determinants of farmers’ participation behaviour. Using valuation techniques and 
GIS together the thesis allowed to model the spatial variation in the carbon costs 
which is particularly relevant for appropriate targeting of policy schemes.  
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8.4. Limitations and future directions for research 
This section discusses the limitations and challenges faced by this research study. 
Some of the issues encountered were realised in the later stages of the research 
and therefore, can only be addressed in future studies. The following list provides 
the limitation of this research and some future ideas that can be followed up in 
future studies to address the identified issues: 
1. Getting and establishing contacts with farmers was extremely difficult. 
Various farmers’ associations were contacted to establish some connections 
to farmers but they were reluctant to share any information on the basis of 
confidentiality. Consequently as attempt was made to conduct the survey at 
farmers markets in order to conduct face-to-face survey cost-effectively and 
to have a representation of various farming landscapes in the UK. However, 
this was not very fruitful, since not many farmers participated in such 
markets. Alternatively, the survey was conducted at livestock auction 
markets and dairy and livestock expos. Although, this helped to conduct the 
required number of questionnaires as per the CE design; however, it failed 
to obtain a representative sample. 
2. One of the policy scenarios explored the uptake of AD plants for mitigation 
of GHG emissions from livestock manure. ‘Generator capacity’ is an 
important attribute which determines the size and eventually the 
investment costs and revenue generated from these plants. However, as 
evident from the model estimations (Chapter 5) this attribute was not 
significantly considered by the respondents. This could be because of not 
enough information regarding the capital investment options provided to 
the respondents. Therefore, future research needs to better explain this 
kind of policies so that the respondents can better understand the 
importance of each attribute.  
3. The model estimations also revealed a status quo bias (as discussed in the 
respective chapters). Although there are various reasons for this bias, for 
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this research the plausible explanation for this bias could be yea-saying to 
please the interviewer. However, this issue was realised in the much later 
stages of the PhD and could not be addressed at the time. Future research 
studies can take this into consideration at the survey design stage of by 
adding follow up questions to verify the consistency in the choice decisions 
of the respondent.   
4. The GHG abatement calculation for AD plants (Chapter 7) only included the 
emissions from livestock manure and not additional feedstock which might 
be required depending on the size of the plant. Including the information 
about the size of the plants and the required additional feedstock can help 
to increase the accuracy of these estimates.  
5. An up-scaling study across the UK for the spatial analysis could not be 
carried out as the sample was not representative enough at regional levels. 
This was due to limited time scale and budget for the fieldwork carried out 
for this study and also due to lack of contacts with farmers. A much 
improved representation of farmers could provide enough potential for a 
national scale study.  
8.5. Concluding remarks 
The climate regulation service provided by agroecosystems has the ability to help 
towards achieving climate mitigation targets. Incentive policies such as PES have the 
potential to provide a strategy of linking ES to land managers. This research thesis 
assessed the scope of PES policies to enhance the regulatory service provided by UK 
farmlands. The research focused on enhancing services (carbon sequestration) and 
mitigating disservices (GHG emissions) from farmlands. The research adopts two 
approaches to explore land managers preferences for policy alternatives. The first 
approach is an investigation into the heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences for land-
use changes by determining the influence of socio-economic factors and policy 
attributes. The second approach provides a cost-effectiveness analysis of 
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hypothetical policy alternatives and the spatial distribution of the values obtained. 
These two approaches helped to provide an understanding of climate regulation 
service provision and land managers’ decisions required for better informed policy 
formulation. Overall, the outcomes of this PhD research lead to the recognition of 
the potential contribution of agroecosystems towards climate mitigation targets, 
and the increase in the challenges faced due to climate change. It also identified the 
importance of correct policy formulation and appraisal for ES conservation. At the 
same time it highlights the need for using economic valuation and spatial mapping 
for efficient implementation of policies, since agroecosystems are spatial diverse in 
nature. Finally, it is hoped that this thesis would contribute to strengthen and 
advance the literature regarding PES policy schemes, ES valuation in general and 
provide a direction for policy decisions in particular for achieving some of the UK’s 
emissions targets from agricultural land. 
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Appendix A:  Experimental design and description of the 
questionnaire survey 
The administration of the choice experiment surveys for both payment scheme 
scenarios along with the survey design is described in this appendix. The main 
objective of the survey was to investigate farmers’ preferences and their attitudes 
towards different design options in two specific payment schemes respectively 
aimed at enhancing the mitigation of GHG emissions and carbon sequestration in 
the agricultural sector. The experimental design consisted of four main stages: (1) 
developing two hypothetical scheme scenarios for both arable and livestock farms 
across the UK farmlands  (2) selecting the attributes and levels for the choice sets 
for both the policy scheme scenarios (3) choosing the experimental design and 
constructing the choice sets and (4) developing the questionnaire for the field 
survey. The design of the survey was carried out in such a way as to minimize any 
biases that may prevail. The two payment scheme policies were developed after a 
detailed study estimating the changes in regulatory service provided by UK 
farmlands due to land use changes conducted as the first stage of this PhD research 
(chapter 4). This appendix presents the statistical design adopted to generate the 
choice cards and combinations for the CE survey. It also provides a detail of the 
sections of the questionnaire, and followed by a complete version of the survey 
questionnaire.    
Introduction 
The first step for CE design is to identify the attributes and their levels for the ES 
under scrutiny, which in this case is enhancing the climate regulation service 
provided by the UK farmlands. Significant attributes were identified and their levels 
were chosen to be realistic and represent possible future values if policy measures 
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were to be implemented (Bennett and Blamey, 200114). The range of levels was 
selected so as to represent each attribute according to the size and scale of the 
improvement that farmers are willing to carry out. 
The choice and selection of the attributes and levels was based on a combination of 
evidence from the findings in the existing literature on agri-environment schemes 
across Europe and information from the pilot study of this research. Both potential 
payment scheme scenarios designed for this study were described in terms of 6 
attributes each, with two common attributes including length of contract and 
payment per hectare. The payment attribute was included to determine the 
Willingness to Accept (WTA) of the farmers to participate in potential schemes. This 
provides an insight into how farmers trade-off the changes in land management 
activities required by the schemes for the provision of climate regulation services. 
Each choice card presented to the farmers had two policy alternatives offering 
different combinations of the levels along with ‘I do not want to participate’ (that is 
the status quo). The underlying assumption was that the selection of the 
alternatives and attributes would help to provide an understanding of the 
preferences of the farmers towards agri-environment schemes for enhancing the 
climate regulation service of UK farmlands. 
Pilot study: 
CE pilot studies are conducted at a small scale before the main survey in order to 
test the questionnaire and choice experiment design. This also helps to determine if 
the survey is easily understandable and interpretable by the respondents and if any 
changes need to be made in any part of the survey. The pilot for this study was 
conducted by visiting farmers’ markets. Thirty pilot questionnaires were conducted 
by visiting farmers’ markets in Northallerton, Otley, and Doncaster. During this pilot 
the participants were asked whether they considered all the attributes presented to 
them and to provide feedback about the questionnaire. This revealed that all the 
                                                        
14 Bennett, J. W. & R. K. Blamey, eds. 2001. 'The choice modelling approach to environmental 
valuation'. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
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participants were aware of the attributes and levels provided to them and they had 
considered most of the attributes while selecting the scheme alternatives. The 
attribute that received the most attention in both the scenarios was the 
‘compensation’ being offered to them to adopt the changes in their land use 
management activities. Other attributes mostly considered for the mitigation 
scenario were; ‘technical assistance’, and ‘distance’ while for the sequestration 
scenario the attributes considered were; ‘percentage of land allotted for conversion 
to grassland’, ‘percentage of land allotted for afforestation’, and the ‘grazing time 
period’. The choice responses from the pilot study were then analysed using simple 
conditional logit model to determine if the results made logical sense. As already 
stated the main objective of the pilot study was to tailor the questionnaire and 
choice cards in a very effective way before conducting the actual survey of the 
study.  
 A description of the attributes for each of the scheme scenarios is presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  
Experimental Design 
After identifying the attributes and levels of each policy scheme, an experimental 
design was constructed in order to generate the choice cards with different 
combinations of choice attributes and levels. This helps to maximize the amount of 
information that can be obtained from the respondents (Lusk and Norwood, 
200515). Experimental designs are the foundation of stated preference methods 
(Hensher et al., 200516) and the research phase for researchers to manage and 
manipulate attributes and levels. CE assumes that goods/services to be valued can 
be described by their attributes and the levels of these attributes (Lancaster, 
                                                        
15 Lusk, J. & F. Norwood. 2005. Effect of experimental design on choice-based conjoint valuation 
estimates. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87, pp.771-785. 
16 Hensher, D. A., J. M. Rose & W. Greene. 2005. 'Applied Choice Analysis: A Primer.'. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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196617). Respondents are presented with several choice sets, each composed of 
several competing options, and the respondents are asked to choose the one option 
they prefer the most. Experimental design techniques were first introduced in 
multi-attribute stated preference methods by Louviere and Woodworth and 
Louviere and Hensher, in agricultural and biological experiments to derive and 
predict choices (Ferrini and Scarpa, 200718). Through this they identified a set of 
choices which are described on the basis of selected attributes and levels, which are 
arranged in an orthogonal fashion. If the choice sets are too numerous for 
evaluation in a single choice context they are divided into manageable series of 
choice sets using blocking techniques (Ferrini and Scarpa, 2007). This process 
ensures that attributes are statistically independent.  
An important consideration when choosing an experimental design for a CE is to 
maximise orthogonality and balance (Lusk and Norwood, 2005). Orthogonality 
requires that the attributes are uncorrelated with one another across the design. 
Balance means that each level has the same statistical power and occurs with equal 
frequency. To achieve this, a full factorial design can be used which consists of all 
possible combinations of attributes and levels and allows for estimation of main 
effects19 and interaction effects20 independently of one another. However, using a 
full factorial design sometimes is not practical and cost-effective as it produces large 
number of surveys (Louviere et al., 200021). Given that, fractional factorial designs 
are usually implemented. The fractional factorial design is in reality a sample of the 
                                                        
17 Lancaster, K. J. 1966. New approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political Economy, 74, pp.132-
157. 
18 Ferrini, S. & R. Scarpa. 2007. Designs with a priori information for nonmarket valuation with 
choice experiments: A Monte Carlo study. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 53 (3), pp.342-363. 
19 Refers to the direct effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable.  
20 Effect of the interaction between two or more independent variables on the dependent variable. 
21 Louviere, J. J., D. A. Hensher; & J. D. Swait, eds. 2000. 'Stated Choice Methods-Analysis and 
Application'. Cambridge University Press. 
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full design which allows estimation of all the relevant effects. Full and fractional 
factorial designs can also be blocked into different versions. For blocking a design a 
new orthogonal column is added to the design, which divides the whole design into 
different blocks (depending on the levels of that added column). Each block is then 
randomly assigned to the respondents. Researchers have also developed 
statistically efficient designs called as ‘optimal designs’. The main objective of an 
optimal design is to create a design which optimises the amount of information 
obtained from the choice sets, i.e. they are statistically efficient. However, it has the 
problem of correlation between the attributes.  
For this study, in order to generate the choice cards with different combinations of 
choice attributes and levels, a full factorial design was first generated. The total 
number of choice sets resulting from this was 44 + 22 = 260. This large number of 
combinations, was considered not feasible to be used, therefore, an orthogonal 
fractional factorial design was generated using Ngene 1.0.2., which resulted in 36 
choice sets. Since this is quite a large number of information to be presented to one 
respondent, a blocking strategy was employed to reduce the number of choice sets 
given to each respondent. Blocking basically involves introducing an orthogonal 
column to the design, whose attribute levels are then used to segment the design 
(Hensher et al., 2005). For each of the payment scheme scenarios 36 choice sets 
were then blocked into 6 blocks of 6 choice-sets each. Using this, each respondent 
was presented with 12 choice cards for both the scenarios (6 for each scenario). 
Therefore, 6 farmers were required to complete one entire run through the full CE 
design.  
Sample size 
Appropriate sample size can be determined in various ways. Studies like Bennett 
and Blamey (2001) and Louviere et al. (2000) have suggested the minimum 
guideline of 50 respondents. However, for this study the sample size was 
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determined by using the guideline provided by Johnson et al. (2006)22, which 
includes the number of levels of attributes (NLEV), the number of alternatives per 
choice (NALT) and the number of choice questions per individual (NREP). 
      
    
         
 
Based on this guideline the minimum sample size calculated for this study was 334.  
Field surveys 
The survey was designed to cover the main farming landscapes in the UK which 
include uphill farms, dairy farms, mixed farms and arable farms and was conducted 
From July to November 2011. The survey locations were strategically selected at 
various locations spread across Yorkshire, Midlands, Norwich and Scotland. The 
underlying idea for the survey was to have a sample representative of the major UK 
farm types at the national extent. To achieve this within a limited time scale and 
budget, the researcher chose to visit farmers’ markets. However, not many farmers 
participated in  those markets; therefore, various other places like livestock auction 
markets, an annual farming expo and an annual international dairy and livestock 
event were selected to carry out the survey. This helped to conduct 380 face-to-
face questionnaires in a cost-effective way. A research assistant was also hired who 
helped not only in conducting the surveys but also in transportation to different 
towns and cities. Some parts were also accessed by using the train service. 
Sections of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained three sections which helped to gather choice 
experiment responses along with socioeconomic information (including age, 
gender, education, household size, income sources and farm-specific information 
                                                        
22 Johnson, F. R., B. Kanninen, M. bingham & S. Ozdemir. 2006. 'Experimental design for stated 
choice studies in Valuing environmental amenities using stated choice studies, chapter 7'. 
pp.159-202. 
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such as farm location, farm size, tenure management, type of farming, livestock and 
land management activities) of the respondents and attitudinal data regarding 
agricultural management activities and climate change.  
For the CE survey, all respondents were first presented with an information sheet 
introducing the researcher and describing the context of the survey. Then they were 
given the chance of asking any questions they had, before they participated in the 
survey. 
This section includes a full description of the questionnaire followed by a complete 
version of the questionnaire presented to the respondents.  
Introduction  
The enumerator approached the respondents by first introducing herself and 
informing them that she was a student from University of Leeds, carrying out 
research by surveying farmers in different parts of England. The respondents were 
presented with an information sheet, containing information about the researcher 
and the research project and the requirements and nature of participation. Then 
the respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in the survey. If 
they agreed, a consent form was presented to them to be filled and signed by both 
the enumerator and the respondent.  
Section A - Land use management activities 
The first section of the questionnaire consisted of questions regarding the land use 
management activities being carried out by the respondent at his/her farm. First, 
they were asked if they were landowners or tenants and how much total land area 
they managed. Then they were asked about the land use types (root crops, cereals, 
oil seed rape, grasslands, etc), the number and type of livestock, tillage practices, 
application of fertilizer (farmyard or inorganic), and participation in any PES 
schemes.  
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Section B - Ranking statements 
In this section the respondents were presented with statements regarding 
agricultural activities and their effect on reducing GHG emissions and were asked to 
rank them according to their preference. This helped to explore the respondent’s 
attitude towards GHG emissions and impacts of agricultural activities on it. The 
respondents were also asked questions to determine their attitude towards GHG 
emissions in the UK and how agriculture can play a role in reducing these emissions. 
They were also asked about their contribution (if any) in this aspect.  
Section C - Choice Cards 
In this section the respondents were presented with an explanation of the policy 
scenarios along with a description of the attributes and the levels. Once the 
respondents understood both the scenarios well, they were asked to proceed to the 
choice cards. The respondents were presented with 12 choice cards in total, 6 
choice cards each for each scenario. They were asked to consider all the attributes 
and then select one of the three alternatives provided to them in each of the choice 
cards, which best suited their farm situation.  
Figure: A sample choice card for the mitigation scenario 
Attribute Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator Capacity 50kW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5 km 15 km 
Length of Agreement 2 years 20 years 
Technical 
assistance/Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership 
Own the plant Handover to electric 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £25 
I would choose to 
participate in 
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Figure: A sample choice card for sequestration scenario 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land 
converted to 
permanent 
grassland 
15% 50%  
 
 
 
I do not want to 
participate 
Area of land for 
afforestation 
5% 15% 
Grazing time periods 
Only spring 
grazing 
Intensive grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation till Conventional till 
Length of agreement 2 years 20 years 
Compensation 
(£/ha) 
£50 £25 
I would choose to 
participate in 
   
 
A full version of the choice cards for both the scenarios is attached as Appendix c. 
Section D - Follow up 
After the completing the choice cards the respondents were presented with a set of 
follow up questions. The basic motive behind these questions was to determine the 
main rationale behind their behaviour when making their choices. They were asked 
questions to determine the main reason behind their participation or non-
participation in the payment schemes presented to them.    
Section E - Socioeconomic characteristics 
This section contained questions which helped to identify the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the individuals. All respondents were asked questions about their 
education, age, number of people in their household, sources of income, income, 
and their farm addresses. The respondents were assured that all their information 
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would be kept private and anonymous. At the end all the respondents were also 
asked to provide their opinion about the survey, whether positive or negative.  
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Questionnaire for farmers and sample choice sets administered 
per respondent 
SECTION A: LAND MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
1. Which of these describe you the best? [CHOOSE ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
I am the land owner of all the land I manage 1 
I am employed to manage the land 2 
Other (Please specify) 
............................................................... 
3 
 
2. What is the total area of farm land that you manage? ............................ha 
 
3. What is the total area of land that you own? ......................ha 
 
4. How long have you been managing this land? ..................... 
 
5. What percentage of the land that you manage is: 
 
Land use Percentage/ha 
Root crops  
Cereals   
Oilseed rape  
Temporary grassland  
Permanent grassland  
Forest  
Set-aside  
Other (Please specify) 
........................................................... 
 
 
6. What cultivation techniques (e.g. Conventional till, conservation till or zero-
till) do you use? 
...........................................................................................................................
.................................................................................... 
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7. Do you apply farmyard manure to any of your land?  YES/NO 
 
 
8. If yes then please specify the amount of farmyard manure you 
apply..................kg/ha 
 
 
9. Do you use inorganic fertilizers on your farm? YES/No 
 
10. If yes then please specify the amount of inorganic fertilizer you apply  
.................................kg/ha 
 
11. If you manage livestock, can you please specify the number of each: 
 
Type of livestock Numbers 
Total sheep  
Cattle 6-12 months  
Cattle 12 months-2 years  
Cattle over 2 years  
Dairy cows  
Fattening pigs  
Normal pigs  
Others (Please specify)  
  
 
12. Have you signed up to any payment scheme or agreement? YES/NO 
 
 
13. If answer is YES, then please specify  
............................................................................................................................. ....
........................................................................................................... 
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SECTION B: Ranking Statements 
Before carrying on with the choice cards, please provide answers to the following 
questions: 
 
14. Do you think agriculture can have a role to play in reduction of the UK 
emissions? 
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...... 
 
 
15. Have you made any changes in your farm management activities to help 
reduce emissions??  YES/NO 
 
 
16. If YES, what changes have you made?( Please specify) 
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
....... 
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17. How important do you think the following land management activities are 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing carbon storage? 
(Please encircle one number for each option) 
 
Using appropriate amounts and timings of fertilizers 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using reduced or conservation tillage 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Covering manure storage tanks (slurry tanks) 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Regulating the grazing period of livestock 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Improving the feed rates according to the animal needs 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Planting more trees on the farm 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Converting arable land to grassland 
Unimportant Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
important 
Important Extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION C – Choice cards 
Please read the explanation of the scenarios on the next page, only then move on 
to the choice cards presented and choose ONE policy alternative (out of the three 
presented per choice card) best suited to you. 
EXPLANATION OF MITIGATION SCENARIO:  
The mitigation scenario includes the development of anaerobic digestion plant, 
which can be both on-farm and a centralized (being shared with other local farms).  
The basic purpose of developing anaerobic plants is not only to generate renewable 
energy which can be used for the farm or exported to the national grid for revenue 
generation (depending on the generating capacity) but it is beneficial for mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural sector as each 1kW of electricity helps 
to reduce emissions from 2.5 cows or 3 cars. 
The requirement of this scenario is to provide all the manure (assuming the 
livestock is housed throughout the year) produced from the livestock to the 
digestion plant for energy generation depending on the generator capacity of the 
digestion plant. In return you will be paid some compensation for participating in 
the scheme. The compensation will be provided to you in terms of £/ha for the 
complete farm size. You also have two options for the operation and management 
of the plant either to retain ownership and in this case you will enjoy the benefits 
yourself or to hand it over to a power-supply company and in that case you will 
have to share certain percentage of benefits with it.  
Description of the attributes and their levels for this scheme is presented below: 
Attributes Description Levels 
Generator capacity The capacity of the plant to 
generate electricity kW/MW 
20kW 50kW 1MW 2MW 
Distance The distance of the plant 
from the farm 
<1km ~5km 10km 15km 
Technical 
Assistance/training 
whether they would like 
technical assistance/training 
provided with the program 
Yes No - - 
Length of agreement The minimum contract length 
they prefer 
2 years 5 years 10 years 20 years 
Plant ownership Suitable option of receiving 
the benefits and ownership of 
the plant 
Own the plant Hand over to 
power-supply 
company 
- - 
Compensation (£/ha) Compensation payments £10 £25 £50 £75 
-216- 
 
EXPLANATION OF SEQUESTRATION SCENARIO: 
The sequestration scenario requires the changes in land use management activities 
to enhance carbon sequestration. This requires you to allocate a certain percentage 
of arable land to permanent grassland and for afforestation, changes in grazing time 
period, and changes in ploughing methods. In return you will be paid 
compensations in terms of per hectares payments according to your farm size.  
The proposed changes can help to enhance the carbon storage (carbon 
sequestration) both in soil and vegetation. It has been calculated that conversion of 
1 ha of land (from arable land to permanent grassland/forest) can save 4.45 tCO2/yr 
which means that it saves emissions from approximately 2.2 cars. 
Description of the attributes and their levels for this scheme is as follows: 
Attributes Description Levels 
Enrolment for 
permanent grassland 
Area of land to enrol 
for conversion to 
grassland 
10% 15% 30% 50% 
Enrolment for 
afforestation 
Area of land to enrol 
for afforestation 
2% 5% 10% 15% 
Grazing time periods Preferable grazing time 
period 
Only spring 
time grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
- - 
Ploughing methods Preferable ploughing 
method 
Conservation till Conventional till   
length of agreement The minimum contract 
length they prefer 
2 years 5 years 10 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) compensation 
payments 
£10 £25 £50 £75 
 
 
Present the choice cards to the respondent here. 
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SECTION C: FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS 
 
18. Which of these statements best describes the main reason for not choosing 
to participate in any of the programs that were offered to you in the choice 
cards? [CHOOSE ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
The policy options presented were not important to me 1 
The payments were not attractive enough 2 
I do not have enough livestock at my farm 3 
I do not want to sign up to an agreement 4 
I already manage my farm in an environmentally responsible way 5 
Some other reason (please specify) 
......................................................................................................................
. 
......................................................................................................................
. 
6 
 
 
 
19. Which of these statements best describe the main reason why you chose 
one of the two policy scenarios? [CHOOSE ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
I would like to help to improve the climate regulation for my generation 1 
I would like to improve the climate regulation service for our future 
generations 
2 
I would like to contribute towards nature conservation to the extend that 
I can afford  
3 
The program was a good business proposal 4 
Some other reason (please specify) 
......................................................................................................................
... 
......................................................................................................................
.. 
5 
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SECTION D: SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
Before finishing the survey please provide some answers about yourself to the 
following questions. 
 
20. Can you please provide the address of your farm? (postcode at least)  
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................... 
1. Gender (Male/Female)  
22. Age (years)  
3. What is the highest degree of education you have 
received? 
a) Primary school 
b) Secondary school 
c) College certificate  
d) Undergraduate degree 
e) Postgraduate degree 
 
4. How many people are there in your household?  
5. Is the income from the farm the main household 
income? 
 
6. Can you please specify how much income is generated 
from the farm 
 
7. Is there any other source of income?  
8. If YES can you please specify the source and the amount?  
 
21. What do you think of this survey? [Please tick all that apply] 
The questionnaire was interesting  
Difficult to understand  
Took a long time to think about the answers  
Informative  
Unrealistic   
Other (Please specify)  
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME 
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APPENDIX B – Estimation of CE models without status quo model 
(No ASC) 
This appendix provides the results of the CE models for which status quo was 
excluded. 
Estimations for mitigation policy scheme 
Model CLM RPL LCM (3 class) 
Loglikelihood -1654.1 -1601.98   -1568  
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.26   0.27  
AIC 1.68 1.63   1.60  
BIC 1.69 1.64   1.66  
Chi squared  1133.3   1201.17  
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 11   20  
Attributes Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Standard 
deviation 
(SE) 
Segment 1 Segment 
2 
Segment 
3 
Generator 
capacity 
0.00006 
(0.00004) 
-0.000002 
(0.00006) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Distance -0.0411*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0408*** 
(0.0108) 
0.1242*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0135 
(0.0094) 
-0.0378** 
(0.0136) 
-0.6688*** 
(0.0848) 
Technical 
assistance 
0.3304*** 
(0.0713) 
0.3599*** 
(0.0909) 
0.5967** 
(0.1964) 
0.3476*** 
(0.0967) 
0.1193 
(0.1521) 
2.1596*** 
(0.3450) 
Plant 
ownership  
-0.6960*** 
(0.0781) 
-0.8030*** 
(0.0989) 
0.5659** 
(0.2039) 
-0.5825*** 
(0.1094) 
-0.8456*** 
(0.1521) 
-2.4759*** 
(0.3705) 
Length of 
agreement 
-0.0119* 
(0.0050) 
-0.0185* 
(0.0071) 
0.0637*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0047 
(0.0073) 
-0.1247*** 
(0.0130) 
0.1223*** 
(0.0268) 
Compensatio
n 
0.0358*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0477*** 
(0.0024) 
 0.0392*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0569*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0076) 
Percentage    65% 25% 10% 
- 220 - 
 
 
Estimations for sequestration policy scheme 
 
Model CLM RPL  LCM (2 
class) 
 
Loglikelihood -649.59 -618.21  -625.88  
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.18  0.17  
AIC 1.90 1.81  1.85  
BIC 1.93 1.87  1.93  
Chi squared  279.66  264.32  
Degrees of Freedom  9  13  
Attributes Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Standard 
deviation 
(SE) 
Segment 1 Segment 2 
Conversion to 
permanent grassland 
-0.4284*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0534*** 
(0.0065) 
0.03207*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.2054*** 
(0.0494) 
-0.0302*** 
(0.0033) 
Conversion for 
afforestation 
0.0053 
(0.0086) 
0.0021 
(0.0102) 
0.7475** 
(0.2775) 
-0.0177 
(0.0398) 
0.0058 
(0.0082) 
Grazing time period 0.1761 
(0.1187) 
0.1685 
(0.1587) 
1.6316*** 
(0.2416) 
1.4717* 
(0.6269) 
0.0675 
(0.0923) 
Ploughing methods  -0.5209*** 
(0.1216) 
-0.6832** 
(0.2145) 
 1.8265* 
(0.0325) 
-1.0310*** 
(0.09239) 
Length of agreement 0.0164* 
(0.0086) 
0.0247* 
(0.0106) 
 0.0322 
(0.0325) 
0.0156* 
(0.0075) 
Compensation 0.0269*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0348*** 
(0.0032) 
 0.0478*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0294*** 
(0.0022) 
Percentage    25% 75% 
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APPENDIX C- Consistency of responses for both scenarios 
For mitigation policy scheme: 
A dummy ‘PS’ was introduced into the model which is 1 if the respondent 
‘participated in both mitigation and sequestration schemes’ and 0 if the respondent 
‘participated in mitigation scheme only’.  Only three of the attributes were 
significant revealing that the respondents who participated in both schemes show a 
different behaviour towards these attributes only; showing a significant preference 
towards low generator capacities which means that they prefer smaller AD plants, a 
preference towards longer length of agreements, and are willing to participate in 
schemes for low compensation payments.  
 
Model CLM 
Loglikelihood -1605.89 
Pseudo-R2 0.18 
AIC 1.63 
BIC 1.64 
Attributes Coefficient Standard error 
GCAP 0.00007 -0.00004 
DIST -0.0700 0.0075*** 
TECH 0.1230 0.0755 
OWN -0.9055 0.0819*** 
LOA -0.0388 0.0062*** 
COMP 0.0310 0.0017*** 
ASC -1.1952 0.1368*** 
PS*GCAP -0.0003 0.0001** 
PS*LOA 0.0289 0.0118* 
PS*COMP -0.0053 0.0029* 
For sequestration policy scheme: 
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A dummy ‘PM’ was included in the model to analyse the change in the behaviour of 
the respondents who participated in both sequestration and mitigation scheme. PM 
had a value of 1 for the respondents who participated in both the schemes while 0 
for the respondents who participated in sequestration scheme only. The results 
reveal that respondents who participate in both schemes show a significant 
aversion towards longer contracts. Hence, revealing that respondents who 
participate only in sequestration scheme show a positive preference towards longer 
contract lengths. This result helped to identify farms which can easily be attracted 
towards longer contracts making sequestration policies more effective, since carbon 
sequestration both in soil and vegetation requires longer time period. 
 
Model CLM 
Loglikelihood -601.92 
Pseudo-R2 0.19 
AIC 1.76 
BIC 1.82 
Attributes Coefficient Standard error 
PGRASS -0.0659 0.0050*** 
AFFOR -0.0270 0.0132* 
GRAZ -0.3145 0.1324* 
PLOUGH -0.9867 0.1399*** 
LOA 0.00514 0.0133 
COMP 0.0150 0.0027*** 
ASC -2.4973 2.6619*** 
PM*LOA -0.0447 0.0148** 
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APPENDIX D – Choice cards 
CHOICE CARDS FOR MITIGATION SCENARIO 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1MW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km ~5km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km <1km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1MW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km 15km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Ownership of  
plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km 15km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Ownership of  
plant 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 50kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km 15km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km <1km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1MW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km <1km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km 10km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km ~5km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 50kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km 10km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1MW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km <1km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km 15km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes 
Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 10km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 10km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km ~5km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km 10km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 50kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km <1km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km ~5km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km <1km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 50kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 10km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 15km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km ~5km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50kW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km 15km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 50kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km 10km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 5 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 2MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km <1km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1MW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 10km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 20kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km 15km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 2MW 1MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km 10km 
Length of agreement 20 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50 kW 2 MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km <1 km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 50 kW 20 kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km ~5 km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1 MW 20 kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 10km 15 km 
Length of agreement 10 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20 kW 50 kW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km ~5 km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 1 MW 2 MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance <1km 10 km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 20 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Own the plant Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity 20kW 1 MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance ~5km <1 km 
Length of agreement 2 yrs 10 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
No Yes 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity  1 MW 2 MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km 15 km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Generator capacity  1 MW 2 MW  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Distance 15km 15 km 
Length of agreement 5 yrs 2 yrs 
Technical assistance/ 
Training 
Yes No 
Plant ownership Handover to 
power-supply 
company 
Own the plant 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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CHOICE CARD FOR SEQUESTRATION SCENARIO 
 
 
 
 
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 10% 10%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 2% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 30% 50%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 5% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 30% 50%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 15% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 50% 50%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 15% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 15% 15%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 15% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 50% 15%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 2% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 30% 10%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 2% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 10% 50%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 10% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 10% 30%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 5% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 10% 15%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 10% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 30% 30%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 2% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 10% 10%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 15% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 15% 15%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 10% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 50% 10%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 10% 
Grazing time periods Intensive  
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 15% 30%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 5% 
Grazing time periods Intensive  
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted to permanent 
grassland 
 15% 30%  
 
 
I do not 
want 
to 
participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 10% 
Grazing time periods Only spring  
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 15%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 5% 
Grazing time periods Only spring  
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 5% 
Grazing time periods Intensive  
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 30%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 2% 
Grazing time periods Only spring   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 15% 15%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 2% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 15% 30%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 15% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 10%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 5% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 15% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 15% 
Grazing time periods Only spring   
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 15%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 10% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 10% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 2% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 30% 10%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 10% 
Grazing time periods Only spring   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 10% 10%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 15% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 50% 30%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 10% 
Grazing time periods Intensive   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 20 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 15% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 2% 
Grazing time periods Only spring   
grazing 
Only spring 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £75 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 15% 10%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 5% 
Grazing time periods Only spring   
grazing 
Intensive 
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 30% 10%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 10% 15% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Only spring    
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 5 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 10% 15%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 5% 
Grazing time periods Intensive 
grazing 
Intensive     
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £50 £50 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 30% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 2% 10% 
Grazing time periods Only spring 
grazing 
Intensive     
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conventional 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 20 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £10 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 10% 30%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 5% 2% 
Grazing time periods Intensive  
grazing 
Only spring     
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 2 years 10 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £10 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
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Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 30% 50%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 15% 15% 
Grazing time periods Only spring  
grazing 
Intensive     
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conventional 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 5 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £75 
I would choose to participate in    
Attributes Alt_1 Alt_2 Alt_3 
Area of land converted  
to permanent grassland 
 30% 15%  
 
 
I do not want 
to participate 
Area of land for reforestation 50% 5% 
Grazing time periods Only spring  
grazing 
Only spring     
grazing 
Ploughing methods Conservation 
till 
Conservation 
till 
Length of agreement 10 years 2 years 
Compensation (£/ha) £25 £25 
I would choose to participate in    
